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Details from the “Black Ship scrolls,” 
created in Japan soon after the visits 
of Commodore Matthew Calbraith 
Perry’s squadron in 1853 and 1854. 
Digitized copies of the original scrolls, 
on long-term loan from the Preserva-
tion Society of Newport County, Rhode 
Island, are on display at the Naval War 
College Museum. They appear in an 
attractive new exhibit space on the fi rst 
fl oor produced by moving the Naval War 
College Foundation’s Museum Store to an 
expanded site in the Museum’s fi rst-fl oor 
west wing. Shown are USS Saratoga (up-
per left), USS Powhatan (upper right), 
USS Susquehanna (lower left), and USS 
Lexington (lower right). See our “From 
the Editors” department in this issue for 
related, exciting developments at Found-
ers Hall. Courtesy Naval War College 
Museum.
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FROM THE EDITORS
It is becoming increasingly clear that the prolonged financial crisis in which the
United States currently finds itself will not be without significant consequences
for the size and shape of American military forces in the coming decades. While
the present administration has so far been careful to avoid linkage of the defense
budget with the domestic economic situation, it is difficult to believe that this
state of affairs is politically sustainable for the indefinite future. In recent
months, the secretary of defense himself has signaled unmistakably that the
Pentagon needs to rethink in fundamental ways how it spends public funds and
to identify areas of significant savings. Very recently, Secretary Gates for the first
time turned his gaze specifically on the U.S. Navy. In a speech in May to the Navy
League Sea-Air-Space Expo, reprinted in its entirety at the beginning of this is-
sue, the secretary called attention to the erosion of the U.S. monopoly of precision-
strike long-range missiles and the consequent developing threat to our major
naval combatants; also, he specifically questioned whether the current carrier
force and large-deck amphibious ships will retain their utility for the Navy in re-
lation to their escalating costs. The secretary’s words should be carefully pon-
dered by anyone concerned about the future direction of the sea services. In this
connection, we also offer our readers a current snapshot of the Navy’s
long-range budget situation and its implications for Navy shipbuilding by ana-
lyst Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional Budget Office. O’Rourke’s paper,
“Programs vs. Resources: Some Options for the Navy,” was originally presented
at a workshop sponsored by the Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at
the Naval War College and held in Newport in May of this year.
Any effort to rethink the force structure of the Navy over the coming decades
needs to revisit the issue of sea control, especially, though not only, in the con-
text of China’s growing antiaccess challenge to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In “Talking
about Sea Control,” Robert C. Rubel provides a historically grounded overview
of the sea-control mission of naval forces, which he argues has been substan-
tially forgotten by the U.S. Navy since that service’s achievement of undisputed
maritime dominance following the end of the Cold War. Rubel suggests that the
loss of such dominance in the western Pacific today requires a fundamental re-
thinking of the operational roles of aircraft carriers and other large “high-value
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units” and a rededication to the sea-control mission of submarines and smaller
surface combatants. Robert Rubel is dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Stud-
ies at the Naval War College.
In this issue we continue our focus on allied navies. In “The Canadian Navy
and Canada’s Interests in This Maritime Century,” Vice Admiral Dean
McFadden, Chief of the Maritime Staff and Commander of the Canadian Navy,
sets out a broad vision of the importance of the maritime domain for Canada,
arguing that Canada has a continuing and growing interest in the application of
naval power in cooperation with the United States and other powers in defense
of the global maritime system. A complementary perspective on Canada’s recent
contributions to maritime security in the policing of Somali piracy in the Indian
Ocean is provided by Christopher Spearin in “A Private Security Solution to So-
mali Piracy? The U.S. Call for Private Security Engagement and the Implications
for Canada.” Spearin, a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada in To-
ronto, focuses on the controversial issue of the use of private security companies
in countering piracy and suggests that Canada may want to consider taking a
leading role in resolving the various international legal and regulatory chal-
lenges involved in such a move.
The seemingly intractable problem of dealing with the piracy threat off the
Horn of Africa is the theme of “Taming the Outlaw Sea,” by Admiral James G.
Stavridis and Lieutenant Commander Richard E. LeBron, USN. The authors ad-
vocate a comprehensive approach to countering piracy, one that focuses on a
broad range of issues including deterring and disrupting piratical activity at sea,
capturing pirates and bringing them to justice, developing regional and interna-
tional agreements to prosecute suspected pirates effectively and punish them
humanely and legally when found guilty, enabling Somalia’s Transitional Fed-
eral Government to extend and enforce the rule of law, and encouraging the eco-
nomic development of Somalia over the long term. Countering piracy off the
Horn of Africa is an effort that must reflect international will, must focus on
building the capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and that of
neighboring countries, and must be centrally and skillfully led to achieve a ho-
listic effect. Admiral Stavridis is Commander, U.S. European Command, and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
The Navy continues to digest the implications of the advent of large numbers
of Chinese precision-strike conventional ballistic missiles for the American mil-
itary posture in the western Pacific. Marshall Hoyler, in “Chinese ‘Antiaccess’
Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active Defense,” builds on recent work by Naval War
College analysts and other observers to present a detailed picture—to the extent
this can be done from open sources—of the dimensions of the current Chinese
conventional missile threat to U.S. land- and sea-based assets in the western
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Pacific and to the ability of American active defenses (principally, the Aegis Bal-
listic Missile Defense System) to counter them. He concludes that active de-
fenses by themselves will not be sufficient to cope with the likely threat and
recommends serious exploration of alternative defensive approaches. Hoyler
was until recently a professor in the War Gaming Department of the Naval War
College.
Finally, two articles explore the naval past for lessons for today. In “The Most
Daring Act of the Age: Principles of Naval Irregular Warfare,” Lieutenant Com-
mander Benjamin Armstrong, USN, discusses the successful American raid
leading to the destruction of the captured frigate Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor
in 1804 as an exemplary illustration of principles of irregular naval warfare that
remain valid today. In “Four Lessons That the U.S. Navy Must Learn from the
Dreadnought Revolution,” Angus K. Ross offers a novel interpretation of the
complicated and obscure history of the evolution of British naval strategic
thinking in the critical decade leading up to the First World War. Among his les-
sons learned is the importance of professional military education as a counter-
weight to the imperatives of bureaucracy and technology. Formerly an officer in
the Royal Navy, Angus Ross is a professor in the Joint Military Operations De-
partment of the Naval War College.
NEWPORT PAPER DISTRIBUTION
The budgetary pressures that will begin to affect the Naval War College in the
coming fiscal year will make it impossible hereafter to mail free copies of New-
port Papers to individual subscribers. Beginning with the next title in the series
(number 36, Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, by Jan S.
Breemer, to appear this fall), print copies will be mailed or available free only to a
limited number of naval staffs selected by the editor, a small list of historical as-
sociations selected by the College’s Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History, and
the College’s leadership. For all other readers, print copies of Newport Paper
36—and future titles, on a case basis—will be available by purchase from the
Government Printing Office’s online bookstore, linked from our website. Elec-
tronic copies (pdf) of all titles in the series will continue to be posted online on
our site. Print copies of earlier titles (Newport Papers 1–35) remain available on
request while stocks last.
NEW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
The eighteenth in our Historical Monograph series—To Train the Fleet for War:
The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940, by Albert A. Nofi—will soon be deliv-
ered by the printer and available for sale by the Government Printing Office’s
online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/. In this book, which is based especially
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 7
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on the Naval War College archives, Dr. Nofi, an American military historian, ex-
amines in detail each of the U.S. Navy’s twenty-one “fleet problems” conducted
between World Wars I and II, elucidating the patterns that emerged, finding a
range of enduring lessons, and suggesting their applicability for future naval
warfare.
THE PRESS MOVES, AND THE MUSEUM RENOVATES
This issue marks our farewell earlier this summer to Founders Hall and the Na-
val War College Museum, after having occupied since 2003 what had been exhi-
bition space for temporary shows on the second floor. The Museum restored the
former West Gallery to its original use just in time for the Wilma Parker Naval
Art Show, which opened on 4 August 2010, to run through November. That
marked the culmination of a series of dramatic remodelings and renovations at
the Museum over the past year. The familiar exhibits on the history of the U.S.
Navy in Narragansett Bay and the Torpedo Station remain, in new locations, as
do selections from the Museum’s impressive ship-model collection. They are
joined now by a new “Navy in Art” gallery (on the first floor, next to the relo-
cated Museum Store); by an extensively redecorated second-floor exhibit, lec-
ture, and function space in the Center Gallery; and by new electronic and
Web-based media throughout. In addition, exterior repairs to the porches on the
east and west ends are about to begin as this issue goes to press. Our editorial of-
fices are now in Pringle Hall (rooms 141 and 143). Our Web and e-mail ad-
dresses and telephone and fax numbers remain unchanged.
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REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT M. GATES
Delivered to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo, Gaylord Convention
Center, National Harbor, Maryland, on 3 May 2010
The topic of this year’s exposition is “Responding Globally: Engaged at Seaand Ashore.” Considering our military’s unprecedented level of global en-
gagement—especially the sea services—I cannot think of a better subject.
The pattern of engagement is reflected in a range of activities around the
world that would no doubt leave Alfred Thayer Mahan spinning in his grave:
building partnership capacity through the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf
of Guinea; training with friends and allies to secure vital shipping lanes in
Southeast Asia; digging wells and building schools in Djibouti; leading multina-
tional efforts to counter the scourge of piracy around the Horn of Africa; dis-
patching hospital ships to treat the poor and destitute; helping with crises like
the oil spill along the Gulf Coast; and responding to natural disasters, most re-
cently in Haiti—efforts that demonstrate our service members’ incredible com-
passion and decency.
Then there are the wars. With roughly twenty-five ships—and more than
twenty thousand sailors—in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of
operations, there is no doubt that this is a navy at war. Every time I visit Iraq or
Afghanistan, I am struck by the number of sailors on the ground—one of the
great unappreciated stories of the last few years. Tens of thousands of sailors
have been to theater—including officers commanding provincial reconstruc-
tion teams, finance clerks, riverine crews, engineers, the SEALs and the corps-
men, and our “devil docs.” These men and women are vital to the mission and
helping to ease the strain on our ground forces—and doing so without fail and
without complaint.
And then, of course, there is the role of the Marine Corps, whose impact has
been a game-changer: first in Anbar Province, key to the turnaround in Iraq, and
now in southern Afghanistan, the center of gravity in that war. In March, I had a
chance to meet with Marines at the tip of the spear in a town called Now Zad—a
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place that had been, for nearly four years, a ghost town under the jackboot of the
Taliban. Then came a battalion of Marines, who, after months of hard work and
sacrifice, have slowly brought the town back to life—creating a model for opera-
tions elsewhere.
For years now, the Corps has been acting as essentially a second land army. As
General [James T.] Conway [Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps] has noted, there
are young, battle-hardened Marines with multiple combat tours who have spent
little time inside of a ship, much less practicing hitting a beach. Their critical
work well inland will be necessary for the foreseeable future.
Many of the tasks and roles I’ve just mentioned would have been unthinkable
as recently as a decade ago and are with our sea services to stay. But we must al-
ways be mindful of why America built and maintained a Navy, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard in the first place. Indeed, it was an Army general, Ulysses S.
Grant, who said that “money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our secu-
rity and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our com-
merce with foreign nations in the meantime.” In fact, this country learned early
on, after years of being bullied and blackmailed on the high seas, that it must be
able to protect trade routes, project power, deter potential adversaries, and, if
necessary, strike them on the oceans, in their ports, or on their shores. We cannot
allow these core capabilities and skill sets to atrophy through distraction or
neglect.
This is even more important considering that, with America’s ground forces
dedicated to the campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia, the weight of
America’s deterrent and strategic military strength has shifted to our air and na-
val forces. So in the next few minutes I’d like to offer some perspective on the
challenges facing America’s sea services as they strive to field and fund the capa-
bilities our nation will need for the decades ahead—focusing on three central
questions:
• What kind of qualities should the maritime services encourage in a new
generation of leaders?
• What new capabilities will our Navy–Marine Corps team need, and which
ones will potentially be made obsolete?
• How can we be sure that our procurement plans are cost-effective, efficient,
and realistic?
As a starting point, given the complex security challenges America faces
around the globe, the future of our maritime services will ultimately depend less
on the quality of their hardware than on the quality of their leaders. I addressed
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this question to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy a month ago by citing
some of the towering figures from our sea services. Leaders like:
• Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, the visionary behind the Higgins boat
who later contributed greatly to our understanding of counterinsurgency in
Vietnam;
• Admiral Chester Nimitz, who as a young officer helped develop the circular
formation for carrier escorts, used to great effect in World War II and for
decades afterward;
• Admiral Hyman Rickover, whose genius and persistence overcame the con-
ventional wisdom that nuclear reactors were too bulky and dangerous to
put on submarines; and
• Finally, Roy Boehm, who after World War II designed and led a special new
commando unit that became the Navy SEALs. Boehm’s legacy is at work ev-
ery night, tracking down our country’s most lethal enemies in Afghanistan
and elsewhere around the world.
The reason I wanted to talk to midshipmen about these leaders—and why I
am citing them today—is not that they were always right. Nor that they should
be emulated in every way—to put it mildly. What is compelling about each of
these leaders is that they had the vision and insight to see that the world and
technology were changing, they understood the implications of these shifts, and
then they pressed ahead in the face of often fierce institutional resistance.
The qualities these legends embody have been important and decisive
throughout the history of warfare. But I would contend that they are more nec-
essary than ever in the first decades of this century, given the pace of technologi-
cal changes, and the agile and adaptive nature of our most likely and lethal
adversaries—from modern militaries using asymmetric tactics to terrorist
groups with advanced weapons. Our officers will lead an American military that
must have the maximum flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of
scenarios and adversaries.
Second, in order to be successful, the sea services must have the right makeup
and capabilities. Surveying our current force, it is useful to start with some per-
spective—especially since the Navy, of all the services, has been the most consis-
tently concerned about its size, as measured by the total number of ships in the
fleet.
It is important to remember that, as much as the U.S. battle fleet has shrunk
since the end of the Cold War, the rest of the world’s navies have shrunk even
more. So, in relative terms, the U.S. Navy is as strong as it has ever been.
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In assessing risks and requirements even in light of an expanding array of
global missions and responsibilities—everything from shows of presence to hu-
manitarian relief—some context is useful:
• The U.S. operates eleven large carriers, all nuclear powered. In terms of size
and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship.
• The U.S. Navy has ten large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea
bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets. No other navy has more than
three, and all of those navies belong to allies or friends. Our Navy can carry
twice as many aircraft at sea as the rest of the world combined.
• The U.S. has fifty-seven nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile subma-
rines—again, more than the rest of the world combined.
• Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants carry roughly eight thousand
vertical-launch missile cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the U.S. ar-
guably outmatches the next twenty largest navies.
• All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet—a proxy for overall fleet
capabilities—exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next thirteen na-
vies combined, of which eleven are our allies or partners.
• And, at 202,000 strong, the U.S. Marine Corps is the largest military force
of its kind—exceeding the size of most world armies.
Still, even as the United States stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the
high seas, we have to prepare for the future. As in previous eras, new centers of
power—with new wealth, military strength, and ambitions on the world
stage—are altering the strategic landscape. If history shows anything, it’s that we
cannot predict or guarantee the course of a nation decades from now—the time
it takes to develop and build the next generation of ships, a process that has been
likened to building a medieval cathedral: brick by brick, window by window,
over decades.
Our Navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new
missions—because another one of history’s hard lessons is that, when it comes
to military capabilities, those who fail to adapt often fail to survive. In World
War II, both the American and British navies were surprised by the speed with
which naval airpower made battleships obsolete. Because of two decades of test-
ing and operations, however, both were well prepared to shift to carrier opera-
tions. We have to consider whether a similar revolution at sea is under way today.
Potential adversaries are well aware of our overwhelming conventional ad-
vantage—which is why, despite significant naval modernization programs un-
der way in some countries, no one intends to bankrupt themselves by
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challenging the U.S. to a shipbuilding competition akin to the dreadnought race
prior to World War I.
Instead, potential adversaries are investing in weapons designed to neutralize
U.S. advantages—to deny our military freedom of action while potentially
threatening America’s primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air
assets, and the networks that support them.
We know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach
and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet. At the low end, Hezbollah, a nonstate
actor, used antiship missiles against Israel’s navy in 2006. And Iran is combining
ballistic and cruise missiles, antiship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats
in order to challenge our naval power in that region.
At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the
U.S. has enjoyed with precision-guided weapons is eroding—especially with
long-range, accurate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially
strike from over the horizon. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers
and other large, multibillion-dollar, blue-water surface combatants, where, for
example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would
represent potentially $15 to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk. The U.S. will
also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems—including
numbers of stealthy subs—all of which could end the operational sanctuary our
Navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades.
One part of the way ahead is through more innovative strategies and joint ap-
proaches. The agreement by the Navy and Air Force to work together on an
Air-Sea Battle concept is an encouraging development, which has the potential
to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the twenty-first
century what AirLand Battle did near the end of the twentieth.
But we must also rethink what and how we buy—to shift investments toward
systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of
conflict. This means, among other things:
• Extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike,
with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
• New sea-based missile defenses.
• A submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more
missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. We will also have to in-
crease submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned un-
derwater platforms.
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These changes are occurring even as the Navy is called on to do more missions
that fall on the low end of the conflict spectrum—a requirement that will not go
away, as the new naval operational concept reflects. Whether the mission is
counterinsurgency, piracy, or security assistance, among others, new missions
have required new ways of thinking about the portfolio of weapons we buy. In
particular, the Navy will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shal-
low water, especially as the nature of war in the twenty-first century pushes us
toward smaller, more diffuse weapons and units that increasingly rely on a series
of networks to wage war. As we learned last year, you don’t necessarily need a billion-
dollar guided-missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage
pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades].
The Navy has responded with investments in more special warfare capabili-
ties, small patrol coastal vessels, a riverine squadron, and joint high-speed ves-
sels. Last year’s budget accelerated the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS],
which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced
in quantity and go places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the
Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants. The new approach to LCS procure-
ment and competition should provide an affordable, scalable, and sustainable
path to producing the quantity of ships we need.
There has been some talk that the rebalancing effort of the last couple of
years—where resources and institutional support have shifted toward what is
needed in the current conflicts and other irregular scenarios—has skewed prior-
ities too far away from high-tech conventional capabilities. In reality, in this fis-
cal year the Department requested nearly $190 billion for total procurement,
research, and development—an almost 90 percent increase over the last decade.
At most, 10 percent of that $190 billion is dedicated exclusively to equipment
optimized for counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian operations,
or other so-called low-end capabilities. In these last two budget cycles, I have di-
rected a needed and noticeable shift—but hardly a dramatic one, especially in
light of the significant naval overmatch that I described earlier.
These issues invariably bring up debates over so-called gaps between stated
requirements and current platforms—be they ships, aircraft, or anything else.
More often than not, the solution offered is either more of what we already have
or modernized versions of preexisting capabilities. This approach ignores the
fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force
them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways. The more rele-
vant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and
those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.
Considering that, the Department must continually adjust its future plans as
the strategic environment evolves. Two major examples come to mind.
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First, what kind of new platform is needed to get large numbers of troops
from ship to shore under fire—in other words, the capability provided by the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt, it was a real strategic asset during the
first Gulf War to have a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City—forcing
Saddam’s army to keep one eye on the Saudi border, and one eye on the coast.
But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to
launch another major amphibious landing again—especially as advances in
antiship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore.
On a more basic level, in the twenty-first century, what kind of amphibious ca-
pability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how
much?
Second—aircraft carriers. Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike
groups through 2040. To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans
will never go away. But, consider the massive overmatch the U.S. already enjoys.
Consider, too, the growing antiship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need
eleven carrier strike groups for another thirty years when no other country has
more than one? Any future plans must address these realities.
And that brings me to the third issue: the budget. I have in the past warned
about our nation’s tendency to disarm in the wake of major wars. That remains a
concern. But, as has always been the case, defense budget expectations over time,
not to mention any country’s strategic strength, are intrinsically linked to the
overall financial and fiscal health of the nation.
And in that respect, we have to accept some hard fiscal realities. American
taxpayers and the Congress are rightfully worried about the deficit. At the same
time, the Department of Defense’s track record as a steward of taxpayer dollars
leaves much to be desired.
Now, I know that part of the problem lies outside the Defense Depart-
ment—and it has been this way for a long time. One of my favorite stories is
about Henry Knox, the first secretary of war. He was charged with building the
first American fleet. To get the necessary support from the Congress, Knox even-
tually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six dif-
ferent states.
In this year’s budget submission, the Department has asked to end funding
for an extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter as well as to cease production of
the C-17 cargo aircraft—two decisions supported by the services and reams of
analysis. As we speak, a fight is on to keep the Congress from putting the extra
engine and more C-17s back in the budget—at an unnecessary potential cost to
the taxpayers of billions of dollars over the next few years. The issues surround-
ing political will and the Defense budget are ones I will discuss in more detail at
the Eisenhower Library on Saturday [8 May 2010].
G A T E S 1 5
NWCR_Autumn2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Friday, August 13, 2010 2:49:16 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
21
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2010 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
None of that, however, absolves the Pentagon and the services from
responsibility with regard to procurement. These issues are especially acute when
it comes to big-ticket items whose costs skyrocket far beyond initial estimates.
Current submarines and amphibious ships are three times as expensive as their
equivalents during the 1980s—this in the context of an overall shipbuilding and
conversion budget that is 20 percent less. Just a few years ago, the Congressional
Budget Office projected that meeting the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would cost
more than $20 billion per year—double the shipbuilding budget of recent years,
and a projection that was underfunded by some 30 percent. It is reasonable to
wonder whether the nation is getting a commensurate increase in capability in
exchange for these spiraling costs.
The Navy’s DDG-1000 is a case in point. By the time the Navy leadership cur-
tailed the program, the price of each ship had more than doubled and the pro-
jected fleet had dwindled from thirty-two to seven. The programmed buy is now
three.
Or consider plans for a new ballistic-missile submarine, the SSBN(X). Right
now, the Department proposes spending $6 billion in research and development
over the next few years—for a projected buy of twelve subs at $7 billion apiece.
Current requirements call for a submarine with the size and payload of a boom-
er—and the stealth of an attack sub. In a congressional hearing earlier this year, I
pointed out that in the later part of this decade the new ballistic-missile subma-
rine alone would begin to eat up the lion’s share of the Navy’s shipbuilding
resources.
To be sure, the most recent thirty-year shipbuilding plan is a step in the right
direction. Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus and Admiral [Gary] Roughead
[Chief of Naval Operations] have worked hard to create reasonable budgets and
reset the service “in stride” to reduce operational disruptions. At the same time,
the Navy’s innovative energy security and independence initiative not only helps
the environment, but also will save money in the long term.
Even so, it is important to remember that, as the wars recede, money will be
required to reset the Army and Marine Corps, which have borne the brunt of the
conflicts. And there will continue to be long-term—and inviolable—costs asso-
ciated with taking care of our troops and their families. In other words, I do not
foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond
current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation
can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion sub-
marines, and $11 billion carriers.
Though I have addressed a number of topics today, I should add that I don’t
pretend to have all the answers. But, mark my words, the Navy and Marine Corps
must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of
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evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities. We simply cannot af-
ford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technolo-
gies onto fewer and fewer platforms—thereby risking a situation where some of
our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could poten-
tially become wasting assets.
A concluding thought. The number and kind of ships we have—and how we
use them—will be ever changing, as they have for the last two hundred–plus
years. What must be unchanging, what must be enduring, is the quality of the
sailors and Marines on board these ships and serving ashore. They must have
moral as well as physical courage; they must have integrity; they must think cre-
atively and boldly. They must have the vision and insight to see that the world
and technology are constantly changing and that the Navy and Marine Corps
must therefore change with the times—ever flexible and ever adaptable. They
must be willing to speak hard truths, including to superiors—as did their leg-
endary predecessors.
Over the past three and a half years, in the fury of two wars, I have seen the fu-
ture of the Navy and Marine Corps on board ships, on the ground in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, at Navy bases and Marine camps, and at the [U.S. Naval] Academy.
These young men and women fill me with confidence that the future of our sea
services is incredibly bright and that our nation will be secure in their hands.
Thank you.
DR. ROBERT M. GATES
Dr. Gates was sworn in on 18 December 2006 as the twenty-second Secretary of Defense.
A text of the speech given at the Eisenhower Library on 8 May 2010, mentioned in these
remarks, is available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1467.
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Com-
mander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in interna-
tional relations from the University of Southern Califor-
nia, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Com-
manding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquar-
ters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Direc-
tor, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Gaming in Newport and What Lies Ahead
ONE OF THE THINGS I FIND as I travel around and talk about the Na-
val War College is that many people aren’t aware of the fact that
Newport is the home of war gaming in the United States. In fact, our war-gaming
facility is named after William McCarty Little, who in 1903 as a young naval
officer—a lieutenant—was instrumental in establishing gaming as a funda-
mental part of the curriculum and research. In 1995 McCarty Little Hall was
designed from the ground up to support this. If you’ve never seen it, I highly
recommend, especially to naval professionals, that you visit it at some point.
I had said in a previous edition of the “President’s Forum” that I would talk
some about gaming. Even as a student at the Naval War College in 1998 I had lit-
tle idea of the variety and relevance of some of the gaming going on. Our Dean
of Naval Warfare Studies, Robert Rubel, wrote an article that appeared in these
pages in the spring of 2006 entitled “The Epistemology of War Gaming.” He goes
into some of the history of gaming and also some of the misconceptions sur-
rounding it. Most important, he tells us that gaming is not prescriptive but de-
scriptive.1 What this means is that games will not foretell the future. In fact, no
individual game may produce the “Aha!” moment, but the cumulative effect of
persistent gaming over time if you are looking at the right things can produce in-
sights over time. This also means that as naval leaders we must also be knowl-
edgeable about the nature of gaming, so that we can be “good consumers” of its
results. Sometimes these games can turn out like Rorschach tests, where all draw
their own conclusions, or there may be inconclusive results; sometimes, how-
ever, there are very interesting results—or you might see things you have looked
at for years in a very different way, for the first time. McCarty Little’s most fa-
mous quote resonates with me even today: he said in 1887, “Now the great secret
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of its power lies in the existence of the enemy, a live, vigorous enemy in the next
room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to
puncture any visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.”2
In Newport, our history makes pretty fascinating reading, and it is chronicled
in some interesting and readable books:
• Edward S. Miller’s War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan,
1897–1945 (reissued in 2007)
• John T. Kuehn’s Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of
the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy (2008)
• Michael Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American
Mission, 1919–1941 (1980)
• John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh’s Sailors
and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (1984)
• Hal M. Friedman’s Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Les-
sons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947 (2010)
• Albert A. Nofi’s forthcoming To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet
Problems, 1923–1940.
These works describe in detail how the Navy used the Naval War College and
also its gaming to educate a generation of officers over twenty years about how a
campaign in the Pacific (and elsewhere, for that matter) might be waged. Admi-
ral Chester Nimitz, speaking in the early 1960s about his time at the College (he
was a 1923 graduate) said two things that I find very interesting. First, he said, by
the time the war arrived all the officers who attended the Naval War College had
done the necessary logistical planning during their courses; he didn’t even have
to look at a chart to find some of the islands in the Pacific, as he had learned the
geography during his time in Newport. Second, he talked about new technology,
in this case, aviation: “We all knew that aviation would play a central role in the
next war; we just didn’t know how.”3 The “how” was eventually provided by the
fleet—and people like John Towers, and former Naval War College faculty mem-
ber Joseph Reeves—during the annual fleet problems, over a period of years.
The conclusion I draw from reading these books and talking with our histori-
ans here is this: a persistent effort over a long period of time in gaming and study
imparted to almost the entire flag community a common understanding of the
major issues of campaign plans against potential adversaries. On 7 December
1941 all flag officers in the U.S. Navy but one were Naval War College graduates.
In fact, by the time this issue goes to press we will have dedicated a “wall of
honor” in Spruance Hall that will include many of their names.
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At the same time, there was always a belief even at the highest levels of the
Navy that “failure to attend the Naval War College never hurt anyone’s career.”4
Admiral Rickover famously said that “all the tactics and strategy taught by the
Naval War College were of little use if a ship could not operate properly.”5 It’s not
my intention to debate this issue here—I think the facts speak for themselves.
That said, much has changed here in Newport during my thirty-two years of na-
val service. Most recently, the size of the student body has grown from three
hundred during the 1970s to almost six hundred. International officers now
make up 20 percent of the student body. There are officers from all services and
several government agencies (the State Department, the Intelligence Commu-
nity, and others). There is now a significant research faculty, which includes the
War Gaming Department. For U.S. officers, we issue a master’s degree in na-
tional security and strategic studies accredited by the New England Association
of Schools and Colleges. Over two-thirds of our faculty is civilian.
Throughout, the attention to gaming has remained a constant. The Global
War Game series spanned over two decades of the Cold War, ending in the
run-up to the attacks on 9/11. Its success not only for the Navy but for the nation
is chronicled in two Newport Papers.6 When I arrived as President, now almost
two years ago, I was surprised at the variety of gaming in progress, though also at
how much it had been scaled back in comparison to those halcyon days of
“Global,” when a thousand players participated from high levels and most de-
partments of government. Even so, there is interesting work going on here, and it
is continuous. I tell my parents in Ohio that we are looking at all those things
they would want us looking at, and some that might surprise them—topics such
as maritime domain awareness, cyber warfare, regional issues, piracy, the Arctic,
international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, bi-
lateral games. The list is endless. As this goes to press, we’re conducting a game
looking at irregular challenges and some of the stressors that could lead to po-
tential conflicts. This is consistent with Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce’s charge
over a hundred years ago for the Naval War College to be “a place of original re-
search on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship related to war, or the
prevention of war.”7 It is also a fundamental part of today’s “Cooperative Strat-
egy for 21st Century Seapower,” which raises “prevention of war” to a level equal
to the “conduct of war” and elevates humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
to core elements of maritime power.8
There is a tremendous tradition of gaming here in Newport. At its zenith, the
Naval War College and the lessons from decades of gaming helped the Navy and
the nation figure out a way ahead at critical junctures, and many graduates and
some of its faculty were players on the world stage.9 The gaming tradition is alive
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 2 1
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and well today, but we face an increasingly complex world of wicked problems
coupled with budget squeezes. Our challenge, then, becomes using our best pro-
fessional judgment over the long haul to help the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Navy answer the question, “What will be asked of us in the future?” You can
bet that gaming will play a part in finding the answer.
JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Ronald O’Rourke has been since 1984 a specialist in na-
val affairs at the Congressional Research Service of the
Library of Congress. He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of
the Johns Hopkins University, from which he received
his BA in international studies, and a valedictorian
graduate of that university’s Paul Nitze School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, where he received an MA
in the same field. He has written numerous reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy. He reg-
ularly briefs members of Congress and congressional
staffers and has testified before congressional commit-
tees on several occasions. Mr. O’Rourke, whose work
last appeared in this journal in the Winter 2001 issue, is
the author of several articles on naval issues and is a past
winner of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Arleigh Burke essay
contest.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2010, Vol. 63, No. 4
NWCR_Autumn2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Friday, August 13, 2010 2:49:16 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/1
PROGRAMS VS. RESOURCES
Some Options for the Navy
Ronald O’Rourke
The Navy, like other U.S. military services, faces a challenge in funding vari-ous program goals within a budget that is expected to experience little or no
real growth. This challenge will be compounded if the change in the nation’s
projected budget and debt situation that has developed since the 2008 financial
crisis leads to a real decline in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.
The total number of ships in the Navy is to be bolstered over the next decade
by the entry into service of substantial numbers of relatively inexpensive Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs). In addition, the
unit capability of Navy ships, aircraft, and other systems will increase in coming
years as a result of the introduction of new platforms and technologies. If, how-
ever, the Navy’s budget does not increase in real terms, the Navy faces a longer-
term prospect of a decline in ship and aircraft numbers that would offset at least
some of the gains realized in unit capability. The resulting fleet could have a rich
collection of capabilities for performing various missions but lack the capacity
(i.e., numbers) for performing those missions simultaneously in all desired geo-
graphic areas.
If Navy budget pressures are compounded by a real decline in the DoD bud-
get, policy makers could face difficult choices to fund programs for some kinds
of Navy capabilities but not others. If so, the resulting fleet could have gaps in ca-
pability as well as capacity. These developments could occur at a time when the
United States faces various international security challenges, including a poten-
tially significant challenge from a modernized Chinese military capable of act-
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Although the Navy forms only a part of the U.S. military, which in turn forms
only a part of the nation’s overall tool kit for defending its interests and pursuing
its policy goals, a Navy with insufficient ability to maintain desired levels of
forward-deployed presence and engagement, to respond to contingencies and
contain crises, or to conduct combat operations of certain kinds could contrib-
ute to a situation in which American policy makers might need to prioritize key
U.S. interests and goals and reconsider the national strategy for defending those
interests and pursuing those goals.
THE NAVY’S PROGRAMS-VS.-RESOURCES SITUATION
Shipbuilding accounts for only 35 percent or so of Department of the Navy
(DON) procurement funding and only 10 percent or so of DON’s entire base-
line budget.1 Even so, examining funding pressures in the Navy’s shipbuilding
account can be a useful means of gaining an understanding of the service’s over-
all programs-vs.-resources situation, for two reasons. First, the Navy balances
funding demands for shipbuilding against those for other programs, so funding
pressures in the shipbuilding account are likely to be mirrored by similar pres-
sures in other accounts. Second, ships are central to the Navy: it is difficult to
have a navy without them; many of the Navy’s manned aircraft, unmanned vehi-
cles, and weapons are based on them; and much of the Navy’s other spending
funds their basing, crewing, operation, maintenance, and modernization.
The Navy’s five-year (fiscal year [FY] 2011–FY 2015) shipbuilding plan in-
cludes a total of fifty ships, or an average of ten per year. Such a rate represents an
increase over the single-digit numbers of ships that have been procured for the
last eighteen years (FY 1993–FY 2010) and is a little above the steady-state re-
placement rate for a fleet with 313 ships (the Navy’s force-level goal), which is
about 8.9 ships per year, assuming a weighted average ship life of thirty-five
years.
The Navy’s ability to assemble a five-year plan for fifty ships within available
resources does not, however, necessarily mean that the service has solved its
long-term challenge of shipbuilding affordability. The Navy was able to fund
this fifty-ship plan in part because twenty-five of those ships—half the total
—are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Since LCSs and JHSVs are to ac-
count eventually for about 25 percent of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet,
they are temporarily overrepresented in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.2 Beyond
FY 2015, as the LCS and JHSV programs run their courses and are procured in
smaller annual quantities, and particularly as the Navy enters the period for pro-
curing twelve replacement ballistic-missile submarines, or SSBN(X)s, the
amount of funding needed for an average of ten ships per year will increase
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substantially. The Navy preliminarily estimates the unit procurement cost of the
SSBN(X) at six to seven billion dollars in constant fiscal-year 2011 dollars—a
figure equivalent to roughly half the Navy’s annual budget for new ship con-
struction. The thirty-year shipbuilding plan acknowledges the pressure the
SSBN(X) program will place on the shipbuilding budget and shows reduced
rates of shipbuilding during the fifteen years (FY 2019–FY 2033) when the
twelve boats are to be procured.
The Navy’s thirty-year (FY 2011–FY 2040) shipbuilding plan does not in-
clude enough ships to support fully all elements of the Navy’s planned 313-ship
fleet over the long run. The Navy projects that if all 276 ships in the plan are
bought, the total number of ships in fleet will increase from 284 in FY 2011 to
320 in FY 2024, in part due to the
entry into service of substantial
numbers of LCSs and JHSVs; then
fall below 313 in 2027, reaching a
minimum of 288 in 2032 and
2033; and then increase to 301 by
the end of the thirty-year period.
The Navy projects that the fleet would have significant shortfalls during the
latter years of the plan in two types of combat ships—attack submarines and
cruisers/destroyers:
• The attack submarine shortfall, which in previous thirty-year plans was
“bathtub-shaped” (i.e., the total number of attack submarines was pro-
jected to fall below the force-level goal of forty-eight boats in the 2020s and
then get back up to forty-eight by the early 2030s), is now projected to be
more open-ended. That is, under the new thirty-year plan the attack sub-
marine force is not projected to get back up to forty-eight boats by the end
of the thirty-year period.
• The previous (FY 2009–FY 2038) thirty-year shipbuilding plan did not
show a shortfall in cruisers and destroyers. The new (FY 2011–FY 2040)
plan shows the cruiser-destroyer fleet falling below the eighty-eight-ship
force-level goal for these ships to a low of sixty-seven in 2034 before in-
creasing to the middle seventies by the end of the thirty-year period. The
eighty-eight-ship goal, like other elements of the 313-ship plan, dates to
2006. Some observers believe it should be increased to some higher number
to reflect increased demands for cruisers and destroyers resulting from the
administration’s plan, announced in September 2009, for using ballistic
missile defense (BMD)–capable Aegis cruisers and destroyers for European
BMD.
O ’ R O U R K E 2 7
If limits on resources lead not only to reduced
ship and aircraft numbers but also to smaller
investments in capabilities, the Navy’s margin
of superiority in certain high-end combat sce-
narios could be reduced.
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It is not clear whether the Navy will be able to procure all 276 ships shown in
the thirty-year plan, for three reasons.
• Several Navy shipbuilding programs have experienced significant cost
growth in recent years. If some of the ships in the plan turn out to be more
expensive than estimated, the projected funding profile in the plan will
likely be insufficient to build all the ships intended. Programs that might be
considered risks for cost growth include the Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class
of aircraft carriers (first ship procured in FY 2008); the Flight III Arleigh
Burke (DDG 51)–class Aegis destroyer (first ship to be procured FY 2016);
the LSD(X) amphibious ship (first ship to be procured FY 2017); and the
SSBN(X) (first ship to be procured FY 2019). The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates for all these ships are higher than the Navy estimates.3
• The shipbuilding funding profile shown in the plan presumes the availabil-
ity of an additional two billion dollars or so per year in constant dollars in
the middle years of the plan—when the Navy plans to procure the twelve
SSBN(X)s. There is little in the Navy’s report on the plan, however, to ex-
plain how this “hump” in shipbuilding funding will be realized, particularly
in the context of a budget that experiences little or no real growth. If this
hump in funding were not realized, the Navy might not be able to fund nu-
merous ships now shown in the plan. A draft version of the thirty-year plan
that was reported by the defense trade press in December 2009 showed a
scenario in which the shipbuilding budget was not increased to pay for the
twelve planned SSBN(X)s. In that scenario the total number of ships built
over the thirty-year plan dropped to 222 and the total number of ships in
the Navy to declined to 237 by the end of the thirty-year period.4
• As a result of the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent developments, the
nation is facing significant projected budget deficits and significant pro-
jected growth in the debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio. CBO’s
March 2010 estimate of the administration’s FY 2011 budget submission
shows annual deficits averaging 5.2 percent of GDP from FY 2011 through
2020 and debt as a percentage of GDP increasing from 63.2 percent in FY
2010 to 90 percent in 2020.5 Given that the DoD budget accounts for
roughly half of discretionary federal spending, if policy makers decide to
take steps to reduce substantially projected deficits and growth in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, the DoD budget could be reduced in real terms. This
could cause a reduction in the Navy’s budget, which could lead to ship-
building budgets that are smaller than what would remain in the thirty-
year plan without the above-discussed two-billion-dollar-per-year hump.
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If the Navy is not able to afford all 276 ships in the thirty-year shipbuilding
plan, the total number of ships in the fleet would, other things held equal, be less
than that shown in the thirty-year plan. A fleet below three hundred ships, per-
haps closer to 250 ships, is a possibility. The Navy might also experience short-
falls in some aircraft types, such as strike fighters (where a shortfall is already
projected).
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SMALLER FLEET
Although tomorrow’s ships will in many cases have more individual capability
than today’s, a fleet of fewer than three hundred ships, and perhaps closer to
250, could be hard-pressed to meet regional combatant commander requests
for forward-deployed Navy ships. If limits on resources lead not only to re-
duced ship and aircraft numbers but also to smaller investments in capabili-
ties, the Navy’s margin of superiority in certain high-end combat scenarios
could be reduced, which could increase operational risks in conflict situations.
The implications of a Navy that is substantially below its force-level goals and
perhaps lacking certain desired mission capabilities could be particularly signif-
icant in the Pacific. U.S. Navy capabilities in that region could affect the likeli-
hood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the
Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict
to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic link-
ages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides.
In the absence of such a conflict, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific
could influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including
choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United
States. In this sense, decisions on U.S. Navy programs for countering improved
Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the
Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THIS SITUATION
Options for dealing with the prospect described above include but are not lim-
ited to the following. The options are not mutually exclusive, are in some cases
overlapping, and are presented in no particular order. Each option poses either
feasibility challenges or potential downsides.
• Increase DoD’s budget in real terms.
• Increase the Navy’s share of DoD’s budget.
• Find more Navy cost-saving efficiencies.
O ’ R O U R K E 2 9
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• Exploit joint Navy–Air Force combat effectiveness, particularly in the Pa-
cific, through the Air-Sea Battle concept.
• Reduce the cost of Navy shipbuilding programs.
• Shift to a more highly distributed fleet architecture.
• Extend the service lives of in-service ships and aircraft.
• Increase the use of forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and long-
duration deployments with crew rotation.
• Increase the use of unmanned vehicles to augment or substitute for
manned ships and aircraft.
• Reduce levels of forward deployments in some regions while maintaining
them in others.
• Transfer Navy responsibilities to other U.S. military forces or federal
agencies.
• Transfer “low end” Navy missions to allied and partner navies and coast
guards, concentrating available Navy resources on programs for “high end”
combat capabilities for countering improved Chinese maritime military
forces.
• Encourage allies and partners to do more in terms of fielding naval and
other forces for countering Chinese forces.
Each of these is discussed very briefly below.
Increase DoD’s Budget in Real Terms. The change in projected budget deficits
and the projected debt-to-GDP ratio that has developed since the 2008 financial
crisis make this option difficult to implement. To the contrary, as mentioned
earlier, given DoD’s share of discretionary federal spending, if policy makers
take steps to reduce substantially projected budget deficits and the projected in-
crease in the debt-to-GDP ratio, DoD’s budget might be reduced rather than
increased in real terms.
Increase the Navy’s Share of DoD’s Budget. Supporters of naval forces could
seek to open a debate about the value of sea-based forces relative to land-based
forces in defending the nation’s interests in coming years, with the aim of shift-
ing a greater share of DoD’s budget to the former. Supporters of such a shift
could argue that American access to overseas land bases in coming years could
be limited or uncertain; that those bases are fixed in location and thus highly
vulnerable to attack by theater-range ballistic missiles and other forces; and that
U.S. forces based on foreign soil could face host-nation limits on how they are
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used. Supporters could argue that a large percentage of the world’s population
and economic activity is located in littoral areas; that sea-based forces can pro-
ject power into and otherwise influence events in littoral areas while operating
in international waters without permission from other countries; that sea-based
forces can use the sea as a medium of maneuver to avoid detection, targeting, or
attack; and that sea-based forces can easily move closer to shore or back over the
horizon, as needed, to achieve desired political effects. They could also argue
that China’s military modernization effort will make the Pacific a key U.S. mili-
tary operating area in coming years and that the geography of the Pacific makes
it a primarily maritime and aerospace theater.
As compelling as these argu-
ments might appear to supporters
of naval forces, attempts to shift a
greater share of DoD’s budget to
naval forces could face strong headwinds. Current U.S. military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan tend to focus attention on the value and needs of the
ground forces rather than of the Navy. The Navy’s emphasis in recent years on its
contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan might actually reinforce this dynamic.
While operations in Iraq appear to be winding down, those in Afghanistan may
continue for several more years, extending the focus on ground forces for some
time. Even when operations in Afghanistan wind down, advocates of land-based
forces could argue that weak or instable governments in other countries of inter-
est to the United States make it possible, if not likely, that the United States will
engage in similar operations in the future. Navy leaders in recent years have been
stressing the fleet’s value in engagement, partner capacity building, and human-
itarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) operations. Emphasizing these
operations helps demonstrate the Navy’s day-to-day relevance but does little to
make a case for shifting to it a greater share of DoD’s budget, because such oper-
ations do not appear to require investment in expensive, high-end combat capa-
bilities. A stronger case for such investments might be made by placing more
stress on the need to counter improved Chinese military forces in coming years,
but the executive branch appears averse to putting China nearer the center of the
public discussion of American defense plans and programs.
Last, it can be noted that even gaining a larger share of DoD’s budget might
not result in a substantial increase in funding for Navy programs if the DoD’s
budget is at the same time reduced.
Find More Navy Cost-Saving Efficiencies. The Navy in recent years has imple-
mented a number of cost-saving efficiency measures. Among other things, it has
closed and realigned bases, reformed its approach to maintenance, implemented
O ’ R O U R K E 3 1
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energy-saving initiatives ashore and on ships, and reduced its end strength. The
Navy continues to look for additional cost-saving efficiencies and will likely find
some, but it is not clear that such initiatives by themselves will be sufficient to re-
solve the service’s programs-vs.-resources situation fully. Future reductions in
end strength may be difficult to achieve, given the reductions the Navy has al-
ready made, and savings from past end-strength reductions have been offset by
increases in per capita personnel costs.
Exploit Joint Navy–Air Force Combat Effectiveness through Air-Sea Battle.
DoD’s final report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states, in its section
on deterring and defeating aggression in antiaccess environments, that
the Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for
defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries
equipped with sophisticated antiaccess and area denial capabilities. The concept will
address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational do-
mains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S.
freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of
future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations.6
In theory, joint efficiencies created through closer integration of Navy and Air
Force operations under the Air-Sea Battle concept could reduce requirements
for certain Navy and Air Forces assets. It is not clear, however, how much effect
Air-Sea Battle will have in this regard. It can also be noted that development of
the concept could conceivably increase requirements for certain Navy and Air
Force assets by uncovering gaps in joint capabilities.
Reduce Cost of Navy Shipbuilding Programs. The Navy in recent years has re-
duced the cost of its shipbuilding programs by, among other things, incorporat-
ing significant numbers of LCSs and JHSVs in the 313-ship plan, canceling the
planned CG(X) cruiser in favor of the Flight-III DDG 51 destroyer, and reduc-
ing numbers and capabilities of new maritime-prepositioning ships. The Navy
is also seeking to reduce shipbuilding costs through changes in acquisition strat-
egy and ship design.7 Some observers might advocate further reducing costs by
changing the Navy’s planned shipbuilding mix to include a larger number of less
expensive (but less capable) ships.8
Shift to a More Highly Distributed Fleet Architecture. Some observers in recent
years have advocated shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture fea-
turing a reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reli-
ance on smaller ships, arguing that such an architecture could generate
comparable aggregate fleet capability at lower cost and be more effective at
confounding Chinese maritime antiaccess capabilities.9 Skeptics, including
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supporters of the currently planned fleet architecture, question both of these
arguments.
Extend Service Lives of In-Service Ships and Aircraft. One option for mitigating
the force-structure effects of reduced ship and aircraft procurement rates would
be to extend the lives of in-service ships and aircraft. Potential candidates would
include cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines. The thirty-year plan con-
templates operating the twenty-two Ticonderoga (CG 47)–class Aegis cruisers
and twenty-eight Flight I/II Arleigh Burke–class Aegis destroyers to age
thirty-five and the growing number of Flight-IIA DDG 51s to age forty. A poten-
tial goal for a service-life-extension program for these ships would be to increase
all their operating lives to forty-five years. The thirty-year plan contemplates op-
erating the final twenty-three submarines of the Los Angeles (SSN 688) class (i.e.,
the Improved Los Angeles–class boats) and the three Seawolf (SSN 21)–class
boats to age thirty-three. A potential service-life-extension goal for these ships
would be to increase that figure by ten or more years, which would require nu-
clear refuelings.
The feasibility and costs of such service-life extensions would need to be ex-
amined. Feasibility could be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given
limits on pressure-hull life. The limited growth margins of the existing cruisers
and destroyers could also pose challenges. Ships identified for service-life exten-
sion would likely need enhanced maintenance in coming years to ensure that
they are in good enough condition at the end of their normal service lives to have
them extended, which would increase maintenance costs.
Increase Use of Forward Homeporting, Multiple Crewing, and “Sea Swap.”
Another option for mitigating the effects of reduced ship force structure would
be to make greater use of forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and long-
duration deployments with crew rotation (an initiative known as “Sea Swap”).
More forward homeporting could involve shifting additional attack submarines
to Hawaii and Guam; forward-homeporting BMD-capable Aegis ships in Eu-
rope (to reduce the number of such ships needed for sustaining BMD operations
in that region); moving additional surface ships to such existing homeporting
locations as Hawaii, Guam, Japan, and Bahrain; and perhaps establishing new
forward-homeporting locations in such places as Singapore, Australia, or India.
Surface ships would be candidates for both multiple crewing and Sea Swap, at-
tack submarines for multiple crewing.
Additional forward homeporting, multiple crewing, and Sea Swap could help
a fleet with fewer ships maintain desired levels of day-to-day forward deploy-
ments but might do little to mitigate shortfalls in required numbers of ships for
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wartime operations. Forward homeporting in foreign countries carries a possi-
bility of host-nation limits on how the ships are used and a risk of sudden evic-
tion following shifts in host-nation policy, particularly those that might result
from changes in government. Multiple crewing and Sea Swap would likely in-
crease ship operation and support costs and more quickly consume ship service
lives, which could eventually make it more difficult to maintain force levels.
Increase Use of Unmanned Vehicles. The Navy is currently developing and de-
ploying a variety of air, surface, and underwater unmanned vehicles (UVs). In
theory, UVs might reduce required numbers of ships and manned aircraft by
substituting for those platforms in certain missions or by extending their capa-
bilities. UVs, however, are more suitable for some missions than others; have
their own development, procurement, operation, and support costs (including
for remote human operators); and pose their own development risks, particu-
larly in the case of UVs intended for autonomous operations.
Reduce Levels of Forward Deployments in Some Regions. Another option would
be to reduce levels of naval forward deployments in some regions while main-
taining desired levels in others. One approach would be to maintain naval de-
ployments in the Pacific, so as to counter improved Chinese maritime military
forces, while reducing forward deployments elsewhere. The administration’s
new plan for European BMD operations would make it more difficult at the
margin to implement that particular possibility, since it will require increasing
the number of Aegis ships deployed to European waters. More generally, reduc-
ing naval forward deployments to some regions could reduce the deterrence of
potential aggressors and the reassurance of allies, Navy engagement and partner
capacity–building operations, and ability to respond quickly to contingencies in
those regions. It could also encourage perceptions, both in those regions and
elsewhere, of the United States as a declining power, which could make it more
difficult to achieve U.S. policy goals of various kinds.10
Transfer Navy Responsibilities to Other U.S. Forces and Agencies. In theory,
there are several possibilities for transferring Navy responsibilities to other U.S.
military services or federal agencies.11 Implementing these options might reduce
Navy funding requirements but might not necessarily improve the service’s
programs-vs.-resources challenge if the funding for meeting these responsibili-
ties were shifted out of the Navy’s budget along with the responsibilities them-
selves. Skeptics might argue that these responsibilities currently reside with the
Navy because they are most cost-effectively performed by the Navy and that
transferring them consequently could increase government costs or result in
these tasks being carried out less fully.
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Another option that has been mentioned would be to reduce or eliminate the
amphibious-assault mission, on the grounds that it is unlikely to be needed in
the future. Opponents would argue that it is difficult to predict the kinds of op-
erations the United States might need to conduct in the future, that amphibious
ships are valuable for engagement and partner capacity building, and that these
ships and associated ship-to-shore transfer capabilities are especially useful for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, which are not only of hu-
manitarian value but also generate significant political benefits for the United
States.
Transfer Low-End Navy Missions to Allies and Partners. Another option would
be to transfer such missions as engagement, partner capacity building, and mar-
itime security (including antipiracy operations)—to allies and partners, on the
grounds that allied and partner navies and coast guards are capable of perform-
ing them. Under this option, the Navy would concentrate its resources more
heavily on “high end” combat capabilities, such as those required for countering
improved Chinese maritime forces. Whether allied or partner navies would be
willing to take on new or expanded responsibilities for low-end operations is
uncertain. Also, transferring them to other navies and coast guards might free
up only a relatively modest amount of Navy funding and would reduce the polit-
ical and interoperability benefits the United States currently receives from
performing low-end missions.
Encourage Allies and Partners to Do More to Counter Improved Chinese Forces.
One more option would be to encourage allies and partners to do more in terms
of fielding naval and other forces for countering improved Chinese maritime
military forces. Countries that might be candidates include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and India. Even without American encouragement, Chinese military
modernization might persuade one or more of these countries to modernize or
expand their military forces; Australia and India might be viewed as already tak-
ing steps in this direction. It is not clear whether American encouragement
would result in countries’ taking more steps along these lines than they other-
wise might, particularly since these other countries must contend with their
own constraints on what they can spend on their military forces. This option
could pose risks for the United States, because the interests and policy goals of
allies and partners do not always coincide with U.S. interests and goals, and be-
cause a change in the government of an ally or partner could lead to a change in
its security policy.
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N O T E S
This article (in slightly different form) was
originally prepared for and delivered to a
workshop, “Economics and Security:
Resourcing National Priorities,” sponsored
by the Naval War College’s William B. Ruger
Chair of National Security Economics and
held at the College on 19–21 May 2010. It ap-
pears in essentially the present version, in the
proceedings of that conference available at
www.usnwc.edu/rugerpapers. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Con-
gressional Research Service, the Library of
Congress, or Congress.
1. DON’s FY 2011 baseline budget request of
$160.6 billion includes $46.6 billion for pro-
curement, of which $16.1 billion is for ship-
building. Rear Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Budget, “Department of the Navy FY 2011
President’s Budget,” briefing, 1 February
2010, p. 5.
2. The Navy plans to achieve and maintain a
force level of fifty-five LCSs and about
twenty-three JHSVs.
3. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of
the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan
(Washington, D.C.: May 2010), p. 14, table 3.
4. Inside the Navy, 7 December 2009, tables. See
also Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Confronts
$80 Billion Cost of New Ballistic Missile Sub-
marines (Updated),” Inside the Pentagon, 3
December 2009.
5. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of
the President’s Budgetary Proposal for Fiscal
Year 2011 (Washington, D.C.: April 2010),
table 1-1 (“Comparison of Projected Reve-
nues, Outlays, and Deficits in CBO’s March
2010 Baseline and CBO’s Estimate of the
President’s Budget”), available at www.cbo
.gov.
6. U.S. Defense Dept., Quadrennial Defense Re-
view Report (Washington, D.C.: February
2010), pp. 32–33.
7. These measures include the following, among
other things: exerting more discipline in estab-
lishing performance requirements for new
ships; resisting subsequent growth in those re-
quirements; working toward more stability in
shipbuilding plans; making use of competition
where possible in the awarding of contracts for
building ships; using fixed-price-type ship-
building contracts; making greater use of com-
mon hulls, systems, and components and
seeking greater cross-yard and cross-firm effi-
ciencies in shipbuilding, so as to regain lost
economies of scale in shipbuilding; increasing
the use of modularity in ship design and
construction; increasing the use of open-
architecture combat systems; incorporating
improved design-for-producibility features
and making better use of production engineer-
ing in developing new ship designs; developing
technologies for reducing the size, weight, and
cost of shipboard systems; incorporating tech-
nologies for reducing crew size; and develop-
ing improved construction processes and
methods, such as those developed by the Na-
tional Shipbuilding Research Program
(NSRP). Some observers might advocate addi-
tional measures, such as consolidating Navy
shipbuilding into a smaller number of ship-
yards (which would be strongly resisted by
supporters of the yards that would lose their
Navy shipbuilding business and perhaps face
possible downsizing or even closure) or build-
ing U.S. Navy ships in foreign shipyards or
acquiring foreign-built ships for Navy use
(which would require a change in federal law
and be strongly resisted by supporters of
American shipyards).
8. Possibilities that some observers might advo-
cate could include building conventionally
powered aircraft carriers instead of nuclear-
powered carriers (which would reduce their
mobility and combat sustainability and per-
haps achieve only a small savings in total
life-cycle costs), building smaller aircraft car-
riers (which would embark smaller and less
capable air wings), and supplementing the
Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarines
with conventionally powered boats (whose
mobility limitations might make them un-
suitable for performing typical U.S. Navy
submarine missions).
9. For an example of a study outlining a more
highly distributed naval force architecture,
see Stuart E. Johnson and Arthur K.
Cebrowski, Alternative Fleet Architecture De-
sign, Defense & Technology Paper 19 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Technology and
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National Security, National Defense Univ.,
August 2005). See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.,
The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of
the Connections between Contemporary Policy,
Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the
Composition of the United States Fleet (Monte-
rey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, Aug-
ust 2009).
10. For further discussion of options for reduc-
ing levels of forward deployments in some re-
gions, see Daniel Whiteneck et al., The Navy
at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at
Stake? (Alexandria, Va.: CNA, March 2010).
11. These might include, among other things, the
following: shifting a greater share of the stra-
tegic nuclear deterrence mission to Air Force
intercontinental ballistic missiles and bomb-
ers; transferring Navy tactical aircraft
missions, including strike and airborne elec-
tronic warfare, from carrier-based aircraft to
the Air Force; transferring intelligence and
surveillance responsibilities from attack sub-
marines or other Navy platforms to non-
Navy intelligence and surveillance assets;
transferring special operations forces (SOF)
missions from the Navy SEALs to Army and
Air Force SOF; transferring engagement and
partner capacity–building responsibilities to
the Air Force and Army; transferring Navy
homeland-security responsibilities, and po-
tential Navy responsibilities for Arctic surface
and air operations, to the Coast Guard; and
transferring Navy responsibilities for HADR
operations to the Air Force, Army, Coast
Guard, and civilian U.S. agencies, such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency or
the State Department.
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TALKING ABOUT SEA CONTROL
Robert C. Rubel
The year 1990 was a significant one in naval history. It marked the transitionfrom a world in which the oceans were contested to one in which one navy
had uncontested command of the sea. The evidence for this shift is that during
the run-up to the first Gulf War with Iraq, the U.S. Navy positioned half of its to-
tal aircraft carrier striking power in narrow seas, splitting it between the Red Sea
and the Persian Gulf. If there was any conceivable threat, such a move would
have constituted strategic Russian roulette. The incipient demise of the Soviet
Union and the evaporation of its fleet, along with Iran’s decision to stand aside,
made the only threat to U.S. ships the stub oil platforms in the Persian Gulf and
some mines in the gulf ’s northern reaches.
In the two decades since, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed
total command of the sea, so much so that it has
stopped talking about sea control, even to the extent
of forgetting how to. With the emergence in China of a
robust area-denial force of great range and a navy ca-
pable of reaching beyond home waters, the time has
again come to talk about sea control. This article will
try to support the dialogue by discussing naval opera-
tional concepts that navies have used in the past and
relating them to today’s environment.
NAVAL OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
The first thing to understand about naval warfare is
that it almost never occurs between two evenly
matched navies or fleets. There is always some
Professor Rubel is Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the
Naval War College. Before retiring from the U.S. Navy
in the grade of captain, he was an aviator, participating
in operations connected with the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the TWA Flight
847 crisis, and DESERT SHIELD. He commanded Strike
Fighter Squadron 131 and served as the inspector gen-
eral of U.S. Southern Command. He attended the
Spanish Naval War College and the U.S. Naval War
College, where he served on the faculty and as chairman
of the War Gaming Department, in the Center for Na-
val Warfare Studies, before his present appointment.
He has a BS degree from the University of Illinois, an
MS in management from Salve Regina University in
Newport, Rhode Island, and an MA in national security
and strategic studies from the Naval War College
(1986).
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imbalance, and it is the degree and nature of the imbalance that spawn the naval
operational concepts admirals employ to squeeze the most strategic value out of
their fleets. Thus the following discussion will be organized against a presump-
tion of imbalance, starting with the concepts used by a fleet with great superior-
ity and ending with those used by the weaker side. Also, it should be noted at the
outset that it is hard to separate naval operations from merchant shipping; naval
operational concepts frequently involve acting against another’s sea commerce.
This point will be blended in rather seamlessly in the concepts discussed below.
A third factor underlying this examination is sanctuary. Because naval warfare is
characterized by the dominance of the tactical offense (he who shoots effectively
first generally wins—a principle articulated by Wayne Hughes), sanctuary is
needed to prevent the enemy from getting off a first shot or engaging in the first
place. In an age of aircraft, missiles, and nuclear bombs, sanctuary is harder than
ever to achieve.1
Blockade. A fleet that has great superiority may choose simply to bottle up an
opponent’s fleet and his commerce by stationing forces off his ports. The goal
may be economic strangulation, or it may be simply to keep his fleet from get-
ting to sea. This worked well in ages before aviation, when ships could operate
out of shore artillery range (i.e., the enemy’s sanctuary). Aircraft greatly compli-
cate the problem, missiles and submarines even more. At some point a distant
blockade becomes ineffective in a military sense and turns into commerce raid-
ing, in an economic framework. Moreover, in an age where merchant ships have
flags of convenience, multinational crews, international ownership, and cargoes
that may change hands several times during a voyage, economic blockade be-
comes problematic.
From the Sea. A fleet that enjoys command of the sea (that is, establishes condi-
tions in which the other navy cannot come out and challenge), or at least local
sea control, but does not have the possibility of land-based aviation support can
nonetheless bring with it everything it needs to project power ashore. In current
terms, this is sea basing. The Leyte Gulf operation in World War II is an example.
Given today’s long-range aircraft, it is doubtful that there will be any more pure
“from the sea” operations, although the initial operations in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM approximated such an undertaking, with the important
exceptions that land-based tankers and reconnaissance aircraft were available.
The British operations in the Falklands in 1982 also came close. Smaller-scale
sea-basing operations might be mounted purely from the sea, and the modern
expeditionary strike group is well designed for such a concept.
Air-Sea Battle. The stronger fleet, whether or not it encounters opposition, may
be supported by land-based aircraft to a significant extent. General Douglas
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MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign in World War II constituted a good ex-
ample; his operational jumps reached only as far as the operational radius arcs of
his land-based fighters. Today it is hard to imagine any major naval operation that
would not represent some form of this concept.2 Of course, we can blend space
and cyberspace into this concept too—and surely will. The defensive converse of
this concept would be the operation of an area-denial force, like that which the
Chinese are building, in the littoral. The idea would be, using a combination of
ballistic missiles and shore-based aircraft in conjunction with submarines and
surface ships, to present the U.S. or other navy with a multidimensional threat
that would be too hard to deal with. In both the offensive and defensive versions,
the coordination of land-based and sea-based forces is critical, but that is some-
thing that has not often been satisfactorily achieved.
Decisive Naval Battle. In a contest for control of the oceans between two capable
navies, a decisive battle has been the goal of the stronger. This is what Nelson
sought in 1805 as he chased the combined Franco-Spanish squadron, and it is
what Yamamoto sought in 1942 at Midway. Generally speaking, the weaker force
will attempt to avoid such an engagement, but every once in a while circum-
stances conspire to precipitate one. Trafalgar was produced by Napoleon’s order-
ing Admiral Villeneuve to sortie, and Midway was produced by Chester Nimitz’s
recognition that an ambush was possible. There might have been one off the
Falklands in 1982, had there been sufficient wind for the Argentine carrier to
launch its strike aircraft and had the aircraft then inflicted damage on the British
carriers. In today’s world there is little or no chance of such an engagement, ex-
cept possibly among two smaller navies.
Fleet-in-Being. A navy that is strong but reluctant to roll the dice on a decisive
battle might elect to avoid engagement but still present a threat to the stronger
navy that would keep it from doing what it wanted (like projecting power
ashore). In 1690 Lord Torrington, commanding the Anglo-Dutch fleet, adopted
such a concept by keeping his fleet upwind of the French. Although suffering a
defeat at the battle of Beachy Head, he kept his fleet intact, such that it consti-
tuted a threat to any invasion operation (which would compromise the mobility
of the French force) but could not be brought to battle. Thus it achieved its stra-
tegic goal of preventing an invasion. The key to making a fleet-in-being strategy
work is sanctuary. Today sanctuary is hard to find. However, diesel submarines
might constitute a fleet-in-being if they went to sea and “got lost.” If they could
avoid detection they might constitute a sufficient threat, at least for a while, to
keep the stronger navy (presumably American) from projecting power as it
wished. A lone Argentine Type 209 submarine almost did this in the Falklands;
the British task force used up almost all its antisubmarine weapons on false
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contacts. Other sources of sanctuary might be political alignments or dense um-
brellas of missiles and aircraft.
Commerce Raiding. A navy that is not strong enough even to constitute a fleet-
in-being might try commerce raiding (also known by the French term guerre de
course). The Germans resorted to it in both world wars. This concept requires
sustained and systematic operations and therefore sanctuary for the bases of the
raiders (since the early twentieth century, usually submarines). In an age of jet
bombers and missiles, achieving such sanctuary is hard to imagine today, except
perhaps for the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the same factors that complicate blockade
make commerce raiding almost infeasible in the current environment. In any
case, if the U.S. Navy attempted to interdict Chinese commerce, nuclear escala-
tion could become an issue.
Delay, Disruption, Denial, and Demoralization. If a navy is not strong enough
for anything else, it can attempt “delay, disruption, denial, and demoralization”
(D4) operations. That is, it can send out units to try to do enough damage to the
stronger force (which is presumably attempting to project power or blockade) to
cause that force to abandon the operation or at least delay it, giving the weaker
power some strategic breathing space. The effects of the “hits” may be physical,
such that the operation cannot continue, or they may be demoralizing, either to
the force itself or the attacking nation’s public or leadership. The Argentine
strategy after its fleet retreated to port was of this nature, and it almost worked
when the containership Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by an Exocet. The Japanese
SHO plan in World War II was also a D4 strategy. One of the elements that make a
D4 strategy dangerous and potentially effective is the resolute acceptance by its
implementer of the prospect that what it sends out will not come back. A D4
strategy is normally not sustainable unless—and this is a big unless—the weaker
side has some kind of sanctuary that enables it to hide its forces until they are
used and thereby meter them out over time. Mines and coastal submarines are
potentially effective D4 tools. Such operations that are maintained for a substan-
tial length of time essentially constitute “irregular warfare” at sea.
Maritime Security. Though not universally recognized today as a true area of na-
val warfare, maritime security has nonetheless been raised to a naval strategic
imperative by the possibility that terrorists might sneak nuclear or other weap-
ons into the United States or a friendly nation by sea. Given the economic and
political disruptions caused by the 9/11 attacks, a seaborne insertion of weapons
of mass destruction could be regarded as having the strategic importance of a
conventional invasion. Maritime security thus occupies the same level of impor-
tance for the U.S. Navy as did fleet-based defense of the hemisphere in Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s time. Maritime security in today’s world requires an almost
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seamless blanket of awareness and cooperation over all the world’s oceans. Thus
it is inherently an international naval mission; the U.S. Navy’s job is to help cata-
lyze this cooperation. In fact, as an operational concept, maritime security today
is different from the others in that it is absolutely dependent on the integrated
operations of both strong and weak navies.
Bastions and Maneuver. If the principle of dominance of the offense at the tacti-
cal level holds true, which it has for the majority of naval history, logic says that
trying to establish strongpoints or bastions at sea is a losing proposition. Two ex-
ceptions—where the defensive at sea has worked—have, by their rarity, the ef-
fect of proving the rule. The first is the clash between USS Monitor and CSS
Virginia in March 1862, during the American Civil War. These ships being the
first ironclads, naval guns and shells that could pierce armor did not yet exist,
and thus the cannonballs of each bounced off the other. Less than a century later,
the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 was a triumph of integrated air de-
fense due to the slowness of Japanese bombers and to the American use of radar
to direct fighters, as well as of VT (proximity, or “variable time”) fuses on anti-
aircraft shells. Today, although U.S. cruisers and destroyers carry the incompara-
ble Aegis weapons system, modern antiship missiles have capabilities and
characteristics that make them very hard to detect and shoot down. Submarines
and mines are still very difficult to find. Naval leaders must still consider very
carefully the fact that if “the other guy” knows where to find you, he can likely
find a way either to evade or saturate any defensive scheme. If nothing else, he
may just get lucky. Therefore, when there is a sea-control threat, maneuver is a
requirement until that threat is neutralized.
That point raises the issue of the modern “sea base,” essentially a stationary
strongpoint at sea. In some U.S. Navy publications, the definition of the term is
stretched to include almost any grouping of ships at sea, regardless of how they
are arranged or maneuvered. Such definitions have more relevance to inter-
service budget competition than actual utility in naval operational art. A sea
base is intrinsically a group of ships supporting an operation ashore. Accord-
ingly, its scope of operational maneuver is highly restricted, as is the degree of
tactical maneuver that can be tolerated if support to the shore is to remain effec-
tive. But history has taught navies not to get themselves into situations in which
they must risk a disaster ashore in order to avert one at sea, or vice versa. This was
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s dilemma right after the Guadalcanal landings in
1942: he felt constrained to remove his “sea base” of aircraft carriers before it
could be attacked by the Japanese, since his carriers were the only operational
ones in the Pacific. Thus, in theory, a navy should not attempt to project power
ashore until it has achieved sea control. But the theory almost never holds. A
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smart opponent will wait until the attacker is lodged ashore and cannot maneu-
ver without invoking the dilemma above. This was the Japanese plan at
Guadalcanal (from which resulted the first battle of Savo Island, disastrous for
the Americans), Saipan (and the battle of the Philippine Sea), and Leyte (the
SHO plan). The same dynamic was illustrated with the Argentine D4 operations
during the British landings at the Falklands. Attempting to create and defend
bastions at sea entails risk.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER DOCTRINAL ROLES
If there were no sea-control threat, there would be no need to discuss the doc-
trinal roles of carriers. As a new and uncertain modern world emerges, it is time
to review how aircraft carriers have been used during their history. They are
high-value units, and accordingly their use has always been governed by the de-
gree of risk it is appropriate to incur; the doctrinal roles for carriers are centered
on this aspect of their operations.
Eyes of the Fleet. The original use envisioned (at least by battleship admirals) for
carriers was behind the battle line, out of harm’s way, sending aircraft to scout
and spot for the battle line. Interestingly, this may be a future role for our carri-
ers. They stay far out at sea, beyond the range of missile-based access-denial sys-
tems, and send in ultra-long-range unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication relay in support of a grid of
submarines, destroyers, and other craft “inside the arena.”
Cavalry. In early 1942, aircraft carriers supported the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, as
well as a number of hit-and-run raids meant to disrupt Japanese operations. In
these, the carriers relied on the protective cover of a large ocean. The missions
were such that the carriers, if detected, could immediately run for safety; stand-
ing and fighting would have been suicidal. So long as a carrier can remain
unlocated, it can speed around and deliver quick pulses of aerial bombardment.
Capital Ship. When in World War II a decisive naval battle became possible, as at
Midway, carriers would stand and fight. Nimitz’s definition of calculated risk
nicely captures the logic of committing capital ships to a desperate fight: “You
will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to
mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces
without good prospect of inflicting . . . greater damage on the enemy.” Any capi-
tal ship is a “consumable” in such a fight, but not cannon fodder. Thus, when
there was a prospect of inflicting greater damage to the other fleet, carriers could
be risked, and of course some were lost. By the way, a capital ship is that ship type
that is most capable in a fight for sea control and around which the tactics of the
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fleet are centered. “Capital ship” is thus a doctrinal term related to sea control,
not a general phrase describing any big, expensive naval ship.
Nuclear Strike Platform. After World War II, in the “Revolt of the Admirals” era,
the Navy pressed its carriers into service as nuclear strike platforms. This was
due not only to interservice fights with the Air Force but also to genuine concern
that the slow B-36 bombers might not get through. The carriers had to survive to
get to their launch positions; after that, all bets were off. Carriers retained their
nuclear missions until the 1980s, when the evolving global situation made the
massive Single Integrated Operational Plan obsolete.
Air Base at Sea. When carriers provide continuous support to operations ashore,
they are functioning as air bases at sea—that is, as a kind of sea base. As such,
they are constrained in their maneuvering and thus cannot tolerate any risk
from sea-control threats. This is the mode in which aircraft carriers have been
operating for virtually the whole post–Cold War era. Trying to use them in this
mode in a sea-control situation almost guarantees they will take hits. During the
Falklands War, the British had to use their carriers as sea bases, but because there
was a sea-control threat from the Argentines, the carriers had to be kept out of
harm’s way. This meant that their short-legged Harrier jets could not provide
adequate air defense for the San Carlos beachhead, and a number of destroyers
and frigates were lost as a result. When carriers try to function as air bases inside
the range arcs of sea-control threats, they must try to erect bastions around
themselves. As previously discussed, this is a debatable proposition.
WATER COLORS
Reference is heard in naval circles to three metaphorical “colors” of water: blue,
green, and brown. They denote generally the proximity of land: “blue” water, the
oceanic, reaches farthest from land; “green” water is the oceanic littoral; and
“brown” water comprises rivers, bays, and estuaries. In the Cold War, these col-
ors had more specific meanings. Blue water meant those areas of the ocean in
which only other naval forces could confront one’s own. Green water denoted
those areas of the ocean in which naval forces could be confronted and affected
by land-based aircraft. Brown water was that zone of the ocean that could be
covered by ground-based artillery. This distinction had some vague planning
value, but the advent of long-range jet bombers carrying antiship cruise missiles
made virtually all of the oceans “green.” In the era of total U.S. Navy dominance
after the Cold War, the “colors” of water all but disappeared, other than in char-
acterizations of a navy as “blue water,” which meant oceangoing, capable of
more than purely littoral operations. With the emergence of very capable
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sea-denial forces and oceangoing navies that might turn out to be adversaries,
there is utility to readopting this shorthand, but with new definitions. The new
basis of definitions would be the kind of naval forces that can operate at an ac-
ceptable degree of risk in water of each color.
Blue water would denote those areas of the ocean in which naval forces struc-
tured around high-value units (usually aircraft carriers or large amphibious
ships, but perhaps in the future such things as arsenal ships as well) can operate.
High-value units (HVUs) concentrate a substantial proportion of the force’s of-
fensive combat power in a single ship, the loss of which would likely unhinge a
whole operation or at least significantly reduce the odds of its success. These
ships are normally surrounded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers, as well as
perhaps submarines operating in more distant support; the idea is to create a de-
fensive bastion around the HVU that can fend off attacks by submarines, air-
craft, other surface ships, and missiles. An HVU-centered naval formation relies
on not only defensive firepower and electronic countermeasures but also ma-
neuver to defeat attacks. Such maneuver seeks to deny detection and targeting as
well as to force enemy units, especially submarines, to engage in such disadvan-
tageous actions as speeding up in order to attack. If an HVU and its escort are far
enough out at sea, the odds will be in their favor: they have plenty of room for
maneuver, and an opponent can muster fewer forces against them. Blue water
comprises those areas of the ocean where both of these conditions obtain. The
weaker the opponent, the closer to shore blue water exists.
If an opposing nation possesses powerful antiaccess forces, especially if they
consist of capable submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, and missiles, there comes
a point at which the ability of the screen protecting an HVU risks being satu-
rated. Depending on the sophistication of the antiaccess force—in terms of ad-
vanced missiles that are hard to shoot down, numerous tactical aircraft, robust
sea surveillance and targeting, etc.—the distance at which saturation could oc-
cur varies. A small boat–based force can reach out only a few miles; one possess-
ing antiship ballistic missiles can reach out hundreds. As an HVU-centered force
moves inside the range arcs of various antiaccess systems, the defense problem
becomes more difficult. Instead of just submarines and long-range bombers, the
screen now has to deal with surface vessels (like fast missile boats), land-based
tactical aircraft, and shore-launched missiles. Threats become not only more di-
verse but also more numerous. As the force moves in, the likelihood of “leakers”
(missiles, aircraft, submarines, etc., that survive screen defenses to get a shot at
the high-value unit itself) increases. Depending on the strategic and operational
situation, there is a point at which the risk to the HVU becomes incommensu-
rate with the nature and value of its mission. It is at that point that blue water
would turn green.
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Green water, in the new scheme, would embrace those areas of the ocean into
which it is not rational to send HVUs. In green water, a different approach to na-
val warfare would have to be taken; offensive power must be dispersed into a
number of vessels that have sufficient stealth and other characteristics that make
them capable of operating in these areas, where antiaccess systems are capable of
“ganging up” on high-value units. At first glance, this may seem to mean only
submarines could enter green water, but certain kinds of surface combatants
might be usable as well. What seems clear is that the offensive weapons of neces-
sity in these waters would be missiles, torpedoes, and mines (be they launched
from manned or unmanned vessels). The “names of the game” in green water
would be hiding, deception, countertargeting, and ambush—and also, con-
versely, reconnaissance, targeting, and communicating. Given the lethality of
modern antiship missiles, torpedoes, and mines, naval forces entering green wa-
ters would be at significant risk, whether attacking or defending. As space, mis-
sile, and other technologies improve, the proportion of green water in the world
will expand.
Brown water, in the new order of things, would not simply be “worse green
water” but zones in which oceangoing units could not operate effectively at all.
Generally speaking, this would mean waters that are too shallow, narrow, or in-
fested with mines. In brown water, only smaller craft could operate effectively,
whether or not there was any actual opposition. While brown water clearly de-
notes rivers and some bays, it would not necessarily be limited to them. Depend-
ing on opposition and other conditions, certain seaward littoral areas, as well as
straits and other choke points, might be regarded as brown water.
These new definitions, if they became widely accepted, would represent a use-
ful shorthand for planning and discussing sea control. The very fact of acknowl-
edging that green water, as just defined, even exists would lead necessarily to
force-structure decisions that would in turn produce a naval force that is at least
a bit less centered on high-value units than at present. Moreover, determining
where potential naval missions exist in brown water might yield a force that was
not simply “riverine” in nature. Using these water colors, with the proposed def-
initions, could enhance dialogue on sea control and point to a force more use-
fully adapted to the emerging strategic and operational environment.
THE DISCIPLINE OF SEA CONTROL
When a navy’s sea control is challenged, life is more difficult. That navy cannot
assume free access to the littorals, and it may face the prospect of being attacked
far out at sea, depending on the particulars of a dispute. Since the best protection
for a naval force is to be unlocated in the vast ocean, the force must not only de-
velop measures for achieving this condition in wartime but must set things up
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accordingly in advance, in peacetime. Thus a navy that contemplates opposition
must attain an operational discipline that includes not only tactics and weapons
but also command-and-control doctrine and nodes, as well as integration with
diplomatic circles. The U.S. Navy allowed this discipline to erode in the Vietnam
era, when it focused all its energies on power projection. Consequently, when a
true sea-control challenge arose, in the form of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra during
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the U.S. Navy had neither the weapons nor the tac-
tics to deal with the situation.3 Only after the crisis (mercifully) blew over did the
Navy take up rediscovering sea control. Since 1990, however, the Navy has again
focused on power projection and, again, has lost the discipline of sea control.
Perhaps this article will stimulate a new rebirth of this discipline before the Navy
is confronted with a new challenge for which it is unprepared.
N O T E S
1. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1986), p. 25.
2. For a theoretical, doctrinal, and historical ex-
amination of the nature, planning, and con-
duct of major naval operations generally, see
Milan Vego, Major Naval Operations, New-
port Paper 32 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, September 2008), available at
www.usnwc.edu/press/.
3. For this episode see Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri
M. Zhukov, “A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian
Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the
Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review
57, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 27–63, available
at www.usnwc.edu/press/.
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THE CANADIAN NAVY AND CANADA’S NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN THIS MARITIME CENTURY
Vice Admiral Dean McFadden, Canadian Navy
In my centennial message at the beginning of [the Spring 2010] issue of the Ca-nadian Naval Review, I reflected briefly on our history as a navy. In this article,
I will offer my reflections on the future. While no one can predict exactly what
will happen in the decades ahead, I am confident in stating two things about the
21st century. First, the oceans will be of increasing im-
portance to Canada’s security and prosperity. Second,
virtually every defence and security challenge I can
envisage will require that Canada integrate all of the
elements of the Canadian Forces—in fact, the entire
arsenal of skills and competencies that this county has
at its disposal—if it is to succeed.
The aim of this article is not to focus on how the
Canadian Forces must organize to meet challenges,
but rather what these challenges are likely to be, and
why they should matter to Canadians. I will argue, as
you might expect, that Canada’s maritime air and na-
val forces will make a substantial contribution to ad-
dressing these challenges, as they did in the past 100
years and as they do today, as was so recently evident
in Haiti, Vancouver and off the Horn of Africa. But
first, let me explain why the 21st century will be a mar-
itime century.
Vice Admiral McFadden assumed responsibilities in
June 2009 as Chief of the Maritime Staff and Com-
mander, Maritime Command, having completed se-
quential tours in joint formations, most recently as
Commander Canada Command and, prior to that, as
Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic/Joint Task
Force (Atlantic). Prior to this work his experience was
primarily in the conduct of fleet and task group opera-
tions, at every level of command: in HMCS Montréal;
Sea Training (Atlantic); Fifth Maritime Operations
Group; and finally, as commander of Canadian Fleet
Atlantic and of the high-readiness task group. In this last
assignment he led a joint/interagency task group, com-
posed of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard ele-
ments, in support of the disaster-relief mission to U.S.
Gulf states in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Vice Admiral McFadden is a graduate of Royal Roads
Military College, with a degree in physics and physical
oceanography, and of the Command and Staff Course
and the Advanced Military Studies Programme at the
Canadian Forces College. He is a fellow of the Asia-
Pacific Centre for Security Studies.
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Today’s global maritime order is based on a delicate geopolitical and juridical
balance between two central but essentially competing ideas that have existed in
a state of tension for some 500 years. These ideas are:
• mare liberum, the concept that the seas cannot be made sovereign and
hence are free for all to use; and
• mare clausum, the idea that the seas can be made sovereign to the limits of
effective state control.
The delicate balance was achieved not through bloodshed, but rather through
an unprecedented degree of international consultation in the closing decades of
the 20th century to reconcile the vital interests of the great maritime powers
with the interests of coastal states. That balance was precisely what the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) achieved, making this
landmark international treaty arguably the crowning legal achievement in
history.
Few states have benefitted as much from the Law of the Sea treaty as Canada.
It has endowed us with an immense ocean estate, one that extends beyond our
shores to encompass the riches of more than 3.5% of the planet’s entire surface.
This represents a priceless inheritance for generations to come, with inalienable
sovereign authority over nearly one-half of this massive oceanic reach, but as
well special duties of care and custody for the resources and ecosystems of the re-
mainder. Anything that challenges or threatens to challenge the geopolitical bal-
ance embodied in UNCLOS therefore touches deeply on Canada’s national
interest.
Given the enormous stakes involved, however, it is by no means assured that
the unique and remarkable consensus of maritime interests that occurred in the
latter half of the 20th century will withstand the tremendous changes this cen-
tury is likely to witness. Ocean politics will make for a global maritime com-
mons of great strategic complexity and growing strategic competition.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific, where ocean politics
already occupy centre-stage. China—the region’s most rapidly growing mari-
time power—acknowledged a fundamental strategic reality when it recently
stated that its principal vulnerabilities and threats came from the sea. This is a
remarkable shift for a state which has focused for millennia on protecting its
frontiers from threats originating inland. But it’s a shift that was also inevitable
as China assumed a more prominent place in a global system that depends on
maritime commerce and the fundamental openness of the “great commons,” as
Alfred T. Mahan once described them. It’s the echo of a powerful geopolitical
idea, expressed in the following words written in the early 16th century and now
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pertinent to all states, that “[w]hoever is Lord of Malacca has his hand on the
throat of Venice.”1
What is very clear today is that the world’s oceans no longer serve to shield
Canada from far-distant events. Rather, they connect us through a vast and in-
tricate web of relationships—political, economic, financial and social—that has
made us neighbours with all the world’s peoples. Our prosperity and security are
thoroughly enmeshed in a global system that transcends all boundaries. It is a
system that depends to varying degrees on regulated air, space and cyber com-
mons for its functioning, but it would not function at all without a regulated
ocean commons. Defending that system is not a matter of choice for Canada: it is
essential to our way of life.
In fact, I would maintain that the most essential public good of this global-
ized era is a regulated ocean commons. By this I mean a world in which the seas
are open for all to use freely and lawfully, regulated against the increasingly trou-
bling range of illegal and criminal activities that are occurring on them, and de-
fended against those who would threaten the pillars upon which the current
global system is built.
Thus, the organizing principle for the application of Canadian seapower in
this maritime century is to defend the global system both at sea and from the sea.
The strategic requirement this calls for is a globally deployable sea control navy,
with an operating concept of a maritime force not only held at readiness, but
also forward deployed.
The responsibility to regulate the ocean commons in our own home waters
must be taken by Canada alone, even if we were to develop closer arrangements
with our American neighbours to defend the three ocean approaches to North
America. But this task is not exclusively the preserve of the navy. It requires a
comprehensive, whole of government approach in which Canada is considered a
world leader.
Defending the global system may begin at home but it must also be defended
abroad, and this clearly is the work of navies. Only navies can ensure the safety of
waters that are likely to become increasingly contested by a range of actors.
These actors may be purely criminal and opportunistic, as we’re seeing today off
Somalia or the Gulf of Guinea, or they may be armed maritime groups whose
political purpose and access to increasingly sophisticated weapons can be used
to hold even an advanced navy at risk.
But even the largest of navies can’t be everywhere. This is why the leaders of
many like-minded navies speak of the need for a maritime strategy that seeks to
enlist all coastal states and maritime powers to regulate the ocean commons co-
operatively, to the extent permitted by their capacities. We need to build a
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meaningful capacity within the Canadian Forces, including the navy, to help
build the capacity of others.
Not only must we defend the global system at sea, we must also defend the
conditions that permit the global system to flourish, by being able to operate as
part of a joint force “from the sea.” There’s a reason we’re seeing defence diplo-
macy becoming more focused on populations through the elevation of humani-
tarian assistance and disaster relief to core military missions. It’s not just the
right thing to do, it’s in Canada’s national interest because of the crucial roles
these populations play in our collective future.
This is not to say that traditional maritime diplomacy will no longer be im-
portant. In fact, it is probably more important now in this globalized era than
“gunboat diplomacy” ever was. At the strategic level, forward-deployed mari-
time forces help to prevent and contain conflict, while also creating the condi-
tions that can shape the success of joint forces should they ever be needed. They
provide Canada with insight and influence, promote trust and confidence
among our friends and give pause to our potential adversaries.
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At the operational level, forward-deployed maritime forces provide options
to government. They provide the capacity to respond quickly to unfolding
events and a range of choices that can be carefully calibrated to the situation, in-
cluding creating the time for diplomacy to work, and declaring intent without
irreversible entanglement. Nothing says commitment like “boots on the
ground,” whether sailors, aviators or soldiers. However, when the decision is
taken to act, maritime forces provide governments the priceless advantage of
choosing when and where to commit a force. The use of the sea for operational
manoeuvre, as this advantage is called, can greatly amplify the employment of
even a relatively small ground force, as was the case in East Timor.
Defending the global system “from the sea” doesn’t require the kind of
high-end capabilities that are associated with modern amphibious warfare,
which tend in the public imagination to evoke images of Normandy, Iwo Jima or
Inchon. These kinds of capabilities are beyond Canada’s aspirations. What is
within our national ambitions, as declared by the current government, is the ca-
pacity, in relatively permissive environments, to deliver a force ashore and to
sustain it there indefinitely without reliance on shore-based infrastructure. As
Haiti so recently demonstrated, there is a whole range of operations where such
a capacity would permit Canada to project its power and influence to defend the
global system from the sea.
The world’s littoral regions—that strip of the planet where land meets sea, ex-
tending landward or seaward as far as force and influence can be projected from
either environment—will not always be as permissive as we saw in Haiti. None-
theless, we will be drawn to these regions by our vital national interests. Over
three-quarters of the world’s population lives within 200 nautical miles of a
coast and over half of them within dense urban landscapes. Four out of five of
the world’s capital cities are to be found in the littoral region, and virtually all of
the world’s productive capacity. Moreover, these regions are where the effects of
massive change along every human axis—social, demographic, cultural, techno-
logical and climatological—are increasingly being concentrated. Accordingly,
there is little doubt that this is where Canada’s future joint force will operate, al-
most invariably as part of a large multinational operation led by our closest
allies.
As a battle space, the world’s littoral regions are becoming cluttered and con-
gested, requiring the precise delivery of a whole range of effects, from the need
to win the “battle of competing narratives” at one end of a spectrum to the need
to take and hold ground at the other. As we’re seeing in Afghanistan, we will usu-
ally be more constrained by international law and the values of Canadian society
than the potential adversaries that Canada and its allies are likely to face. These
M C F A D D E N 5 3
NWCR_Autumn2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Friday, August 13, 2010 2:49:18 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
59
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2010 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
are adversaries who have learned to integrate the warfare traditions of
Clausewitz and Mao Zedong and to organize all means of violence—criminal,
irregular and conventional—to achieve their political ends. This will make for
future joint operations of great ambiguity and complexity.
There are important implications in this for Canada’s maritime forces, in-
cluding the fundamental capacity to fight and prevail in combat at sea against a
potentially far broader and more comprehensive range of threats than ever be-
fore. Our maritime forces must continue to be organized, trained and equipped
to control events in contested waters. The price of admission to these high-end
capabilities, including the capacity to lead multinational maritime operations, is
unlikely to go down.
It is far from certain that the West will continue to enjoy its current techno-
logical and materiel advantages, and Canada is unlikely ever to enjoy the advan-
tage of numbers. This means that we must become far more agile and adaptable
as an integrated fighting force. Haiti demonstrated what we could achieve as an
integrated joint team in the face of great tragedy, and this operation achieved
more than a dozen exercises and months of doctrinal discussions could have
achieved. But much more remains to be done.
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The operation in Haiti illustrated one of our clear strengths—our people.
They are the key to our future success, and so they must remain a key area of in-
vestment. This is not merely a matter of bringing the number of sailors up to the
navy’s authorized strength, or of ensuring that the Canadian Forces adopt poli-
cies that make sense for a Canadian population that is evolving dramatically.
This is about making sure that our people have the skills and competencies that
hybrid warfare will demand, and deny to potential adversaries the advantages we
now concede them in terms of their superior knowledge of local terrain—physi-
cal, social and cultural.
The government gives the Canadian Forces responsibility for defending Can-
ada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and se-
curity. The navy has vital roles to play in all of these enduring pillars of defence
policy. Defending the global system is fundamental to all three, as is the capacity
to defend from the sea the conditions that permit the global system to prosper.
This is our unique contribution towards Canada’s prosperity, security and na-
tional interests, and has been since the navy’s creation in 1910. This is what
makes Canada’s globally deployable, sea control navy of enduring relevance in
this maritime century.
N O T E S
This article originally appeared, under the ti-
tle “The Navy and Canada’s National Inter-
ests in this Maritime Century,” in Canadian
Naval Review 6, no. 1 (Spring 2010). It is re-
printed with permission. That article was
based on opening remarks made by Vice Ad-
miral McFadden during a panel discussion to
examine “National Interests and Power
Projection: Required Capabilities,” at the
73rd Annual General Meeting of the Confer-
ence of Defence Associations, held in Ottawa,
3 March 2010.
1. Tomé Pires, Suma Oriental of Tome Pires: An
Account of the East, from the Red Sea to China,
Written in Malacca and India, 1512–1515.
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A PRIVATE SECURITY SOLUTION TO SOMALI PIRACY?
The U.S. Call for Private Security Engagement and the
Implications for Canada
Christopher Spearin
Canada’s naval response to Somali piracy has been a mixed affair. On the pos-itive side, in recent years the Canadian Navy has successfully dedicated a sig-
nificant level of resources to countering Somali piracy: the destroyer HMCS
Iroquois, the frigates HMCS Calgary, Ville de Québec, Winnipeg, and Fredericton,
and the oiler HMCS Protecteur. Collectively, these vessels operated effectively
alongside the ships of several other navies, especially those of the U.S. Navy, that
together form the various international flotillas confronting Somali pirates. The
Canadian Navy’s level of involvement has been no mean task, because of the
great distances involved, its limited number of surface combatants, and its other
responsibilities.
On the negative side, the effective handling of Somali pirates has been an
ephemeral and problematic task. Despite the international naval presence, the
incidence of Somali piracy has increased. In 2008 pirates attacked 122 vessels,
and in 2009 the number rose to 198. In the spring of 2010, just as HMCS Freder-
icton was cruising back to Halifax, Nova Scotia, after completing a 4.5-month
patrol, Somali pirates renewed their attacks following the monsoon season.1
Fredericton’s captain, Commander Steve Waddell, recognized the elusiveness of
overall success: “Pirates continue to attack shipping in the region. . . . [T]hey’ve
been doing it while we are here, and they continue to
do it now even as we get ready to go home.”2
In light of the counterpiracy mission’s prominence
for Canada and the limited effect navies have had so
far, a call by the United States for international
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commercial shippers to rely upon private security companies (PSCs) demands
attention. For instance, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, “double-hatted” as com-
mander of the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command, has advised that
“companies don’t think twice about using security guards to protect their valu-
able facilities ashore. Protecting valuable ships and their crews at sea is no differ-
ent.”3 General David Petraeus, then commander of U.S. Central Command,
similarly espoused the engagement of PSCs by international shippers operating
near Somalia.4 Though Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter
Natynczyk, has not explicitly endorsed the U.S. call, he has argued that pirates
who “see some challenge” will back off: “There’s a responsibility on the shipping
companies in terms of where they are routing ships and the kind of protection
they take, and it’s an issue they have to resolve because what we have found is
that the pirates are not a bunch of courageous people.”5
What, therefore, are the call’s implications in terms of future Canadian activ-
ism and the overall effectiveness of countering Somali piracy? To answer this
question, this article offers four main points. First, through initially examining
the rationales supporting Canada’s counterpiracy activities, it identifies the co-
nundrum that PSC/shipper engagement presents to Canada. The call’s Ameri-
can roots suggest boundaries on what Canada should likely expect in terms of
future U.S. Navy efforts and, correspondingly, the efficacy of a counterpiracy ap-
proach stressing mostly state assets (i.e., naval ships). Second, the article com-
pares the differences between a state naval (i.e., Canadian) counterpiracy
response to that of PSCs. It finds that though PSCs can avoid many of the prob-
lems that state responses currently confront, their engagement presents some
qualitative challenges. Third, the article identifies the Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (to
which we will refer as the Montreux Document) as an appropriate device that
Canada might advance to ameliorate the maritime PSC option. Finally, the arti-
cle argues that while, quantitatively, more interactions between PSCs and ship-
pers might result through the Montreux Document’s promotion, many
commercial shippers do not wish to respond to the American recommendation;
it upsets long-held expectations about who does what at sea. Increasing the PSC
presence to such an extent that a strong public/private partnership at sea exists
will be a longer-term undertaking.
CANADIAN RATIONALES FOR COUNTERING SOMALI PIRACY
Five rationales frame the Canadian Navy’s efforts in countering Somali piracy.
One concerns the negative effects that piracy poses to maritime trade in both
holistic and, in turn, direct ways for Canada. At the holistic level, the Canadian
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Navy’s 2001 guiding document Leadmark and the government’s 2008 Canada
First Defence Strategy set the direction for the nation’s policy. They link Canada’s
economic prosperity as a trading nation with globalization, which in turn de-
pends on advancing stability and limiting lawlessness abroad.6 The Canadian
Navy’s assessment of important future strategic issues similarly stresses main-
taining this prosperity:
The greater interdependence of economies resulting from globalisation means that
great harm can be inflicted upon the economy and people of Canada by even
low-level warfare or asymmetric threats virtually anywhere in the world. . . . It is
therefore in the best interests of Canada to assist in ensuring the free flow of goods
and the creation and maintenance of an environment free of disruptions and threats
not only to us but also to our trading partners.7
Likewise in a direct manner—for instance, Somali pirates seized control of the
MV Yasa Neslihan on 29 October 2008. This Turkish-flagged bulk carrier held
seventy-seven thousand metric tons of Canadian iron ore and was en route to
China. Canadian naval personnel have also acknowledged the importance of the
Gulf of Aden to commercial vessels bound to Canada.8
The second rationale pertains to the physical security of Canadians. The Ca-
nadian government asserts that a variety of security concerns, regardless of geo-
graphical proximity, can pose a threat. To justify the government’s 2009 dispatch
of HMCS Winnipeg to the Gulf of Aden to counter Somali piracy, Defence Min-
ister Peter MacKay contended that “the security challenges facing Canada are
real and globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound im-
pact on the safety and interests of Canadians here.” The minister’s language ech-
oed the government’s stance laid out in the Canada First Defence Strategy.9
Third, in a political sense, Canadian involvement in counterpiracy efforts
demonstrates a commitment to responsible and meaningful participation in in-
ternational security endeavors. Political calculations intrude here, given the cur-
rent government’s desire to portray its Canada First Defence Strategy as reversing
the decline of international activism precipitated by preceding governments.
For Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the strategy “[ensures] that Canada can re-
turn to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do
its part.”10 In this context, Canada demonstrates leadership by “being there,”
which in turn helps to avert strategic marginalization felt by nonparticipants.
Canada also demonstrates leadership through its seeking out and acceptance of
prominent roles within international military activities.11
The fourth rationale is that historically the Canadian Navy has generally par-
ticipated in international naval activities headed by the U.S. Navy (USN). Put
differently, though the Canadian Navy certainly does not disregard independent
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operations or participation in coalitional activities lacking American leadership,
it does link much of its operational fortunes to the U.S. Navy. As Leadmark’s
drafters note, “There will continue to arise any number of situations in which
naval forces of medium powers such as Canada can make a difference by work-
ing in combination with the USN.”12
Therefore, the Canadian Navy’s long-standing interoperability with the U.S.
Navy allows for the contemplation of a range of operations that feature the lat-
ter’s involvement.13 Equally, interoperability is recognition of the Canadian
Navy’s own qualitative and quantitative limitations. Interoperability permits the
Canadian Navy to do more regarding both operations and the potential accrue-
ment of political credit, but it also ties the service closely to what its U.S. coun-
terpart does.14
The final rationale concerns the Canadian Navy’s self-preservation: there is
public appeal in confronting pirates. Though Somali pirates differ substantially
from the buccaneers of old or the swashbuckling figures of popular culture,
counterpiracy activities have an allure that the population easily appreciates.
This is no small issue, because historically the Canadian Navy has had difficul-
ties in promoting its relevance in terms of maintaining the nation’s security and
prosperity.15 If anything, this promotion has become more difficult in recent
years, for four reasons: the end of the Cold War brought a reduction in strategic
clarity; nontraditional threats, such as terrorism, are largely land-based phe-
nomena; considerable media attention has focused on the Canadian Army’s op-
erations in Afghanistan; and it is difficlt to espouse to domestic political
audiences measures of effectiveness that reveal the linkage between forward na-
val presence and globalization’s economic benefits.16 Thus, it is striking that
Commander Craig Baines, commanding officer of HMCS Winnipeg during its
counterpiracy mission, asserted that Canada’s efforts garnered “a level of na-
tional and international media interest ‘that is unprecedented in recent naval
operations.’” Equally surprising is that the media labeled Commander Baines a
“national celeb” as a result of his efforts and those of his crew in the waters off
Somalia.17
IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. CALL
Notwithstanding the importance Canada places on countering Somali piracy,
the American origins of the call for PSC/shipper engagement suggest a vacillat-
ing U.S. Navy approach. On the one hand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
justified an initial naval, rather than land-based, approach toward Somali piracy,
arguing that “[you] have to try to put out the fire before rebuilding the house.”18
More generally, American policies issued in 2005, 2007, and 2008 explicitly con-
nect freedom of the seas with countering piracy.19 In a congruent manner, the
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2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” identifies piracy as an
irregular and transnational threat. A U.S. Navy response to these threats, it de-
clares, “protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom
of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”20 Similarly, the current chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, asserted in the past that piracy
can “no longer be viewed as someone else’s problem. It is a global threat to secu-
rity because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks, smuggling
of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce.”21
Yet on the other hand, the call for PSC/shipper engagement does imply limi-
tations on the degree to which piracy is to be a U.S. Navy problem. Certainly, that
service has not said that it is ending its counterpiracy work, nor has it suggested
that other states stop their own efforts. But one can argue that additional U.S.
Navy vessels, however necessary, will not be immediately forthcoming in coun-
tering Somali piracy.22
In this context, among the various transnational threats the U.S. Navy now
confronts, countering Somali piracy is apparently of a lower order of concern
than, for example, terrorism. As Jonathan Stevenson, of the faculty of the U.S. Na-
val War College, contends, “Most naval commanders do not consider the contain-
ment of the piracy problem a central military task, seeing it as a distraction from
core counterterrorism, counterproliferation, deterrence and war-fighting mis-
sions.”23 Though U.S. Navy officials are consistently wary of possible linkages be-
tween Somali pirates and Islamic extremists, there is no evidence to suggest the
two are connected.24 Until such a connection is clear, antipiracy efforts will seem-
ingly be a lesser priority for the U.S. Navy.
For Canada and its navy, the U.S. call for PSC/shipper engagement leads one
to question the nature of Canadian involvement in countering Somali piracy.
The Canadian Navy can still in the future show Canada’s international creden-
tials by “being there” in the Gulf of Aden, so garnering publicity at home. How-
ever, the ultimate success of a solely state-centric approach is minimized if
additional state naval resources, especially from the U.S. Navy, are not in theater.
Put differently, while the Canadian Navy can still assist the U.S. Navy in con-
fronting contemporary security threats that are of concern to Canada, Somali
piracy specifically is apparently on a lower level of importance for the U.S. Navy.
In the face of these issues, might Canada work to develop a better public/pri-
vate relationship beyond General Natynczyk’s demand that shippers be capable
at deterrence? Generally, such an approach, given Canada’s rationales for engag-
ing in counterpiracy efforts, might help to safeguard its interests at sea and sup-
port its interests by sea.25 Canadian activism would help compensate for the
quantitative limitations of a solely state-centric response at sea. It would also be
in keeping with the U.S. Navy’s desires to develop positive partnerships with sea
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users. These desires are evident in the 2005 “thousand-ship navy”/Global Mari-
time Partnership and the policy directives presented in the 2007 “Cooperative
Strategy,” noted above. Indeed, the language employed in these cooperative
frameworks is not exclusive to states.26
Therefore, to assess in what ways Canada might best advance the private pres-
ence as per the American call, the article now turns to the differences, vis-à-vis
state naval resources, of a PSC response and the possible drawbacks of the PSC
approach that require minimization.
Public/Private Differences
While warships of state navies off the Horn of Africa may convoy specific ships
of interest, they also patrol areas of water and intercept pirates. These are diffi-
cult tasks for state navies, given the Somali coastline’s size—the longest in main-
land Africa—and Somali pirates’ increasing brazenness and prowess. Somali
pirates, using mother ships to support smaller skiffs, have attacked vessels far-
ther than a thousand nautical miles from Somalia’s shores. The mother ships
provide for reach and the dispatched skiffs are stealthy and fast. Indeed, attacks
often end in less than fifteen minutes. Somali pirates have even mounted attacks
within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor—in which shippers
and navies alike are to concentrate their resources—to the degree that the Gulf
of Aden has been nicknamed “pirate alley.”27
In light of these factors, state navies also emphasize reach and speed in coun-
tering Somali pirates. Canadian naval officers, such as Commander Baines, have
underlined the reach and swiftness of air assets: “It cannot be overstated how
critical Winnipeg’s embarked Sea King was to mission success. . . . The helicopter
was integral to every major piracy event that Winnipeg was involved in.”28 Com-
mander Waddell, of Fredericton, similarly stressed how state navies can stretch
their abilities: “It’s really huge geography. You don’t work side by side with other
ships. . . . You spread your resources out as best you can. You extend the range of
what you’re looking for by using radar, helicopters and patrol aircraft.”29
In contrast, PSCs largely avoid the coverage issues and the consequent capital
requirements by concentrating on the close protection of their clients’ vessels.30
As explained by one private security company, Hollowpoint Protective Services,
“vessels travelling in hostile waters require one on one protection. The seas are
much too vast for governments both foreign and domestic to protect every ship
that travels.”31
In exercising this close protection, PSCs are not under international law per-
mitted to “go after” and conduct offensive activities against Somali pirates. Arti-
cle 107 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
highlights state prerogative in this regard: “A seizure on account of piracy may
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be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized
to that effect.” What is more, only defensive measures are allowable, given
UNCLOS article 101’s definition of piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or de-
tention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft.” Indeed, taking action beyond
the mere defense of a client could itself constitute piracy.
In two particular ways, these legal limitations at sea fit well with how the
PSC industry has evolved generally. One pertains to the manpower rather than
capital-centric orientation of PSCs already evident in their operations on
land.32 At sea, whereas some PSCs do send their own vessels to sail alongside
clients’ ships, most instead offer only onboard security personnel, hired on a
contractual basis.33 Through this hiring method and by “equipping the man”
rather than “manning the equipment,” PSCs can avoid much of the adminis-
trative, management, investment, and infrastructure-related costs that state
militaries confront. This approach also, however, removes any opportunity for
a PSC to pursue and intercept pirates; a ship’s master retains control of the ves-
sel even if PSC personnel are on board.
The second way has to do with the carving out of a market niche for defensive
activities. States and PSCs alike are generally keen to conflate the offensive appli-
cation of violence with combat duties—that is, something that only states per-
form.34 In the view of both, private commercial actors who perform offensive
tasks are “mercenaries.” Indeed, American officials draw the distinction between
mercenaries and PSCs:
Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever national-
ity, are mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women who put their
lives on the line to protect people and facilities every day. . . . The security guards
working for U.S. government contractors in Iraq and elsewhere protect clearly de-
fined United States government areas, and their work is defensive in nature.35
In this vein, directives of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the
Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan restrict combat duties and
law enforcement to state forces exclusively.36 One can note comparable offensive/
defensive distinctions made by British and Canadian officials. The “value
added” of PSC engagement comes through allowing militaries to concentrate
on combat-related tasks.37
Similarly, more and more firms utilize the term “private security company”
rather than “private military company,” so as to keep the “military” as the pre-
serve of states. This is also true for industry associations, such as the British As-
sociation of Private Security Companies, whose membership pledges “to avoid
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any armed exchange in their operations, except in self-defence.”38 Individual
companies also routinely espouse their defensive credentials.39
Another major difference between the public and the private is that PSCs
avoid the operational and legal challenges associated with bringing Somali pi-
rates to justice. Canadian Navy crews have let suspected pirates go rather than
face prosecution, a policy derided as “catch-and-release.”40 Several reasons in-
form this approach. Some relate to the navy’s human capital, as suggested by
Commodore Bob Davidson, who led Combined Task Force 150 in 2008: “We are
military people, not law-enforcement people. . . . We are not trained in evidence
gathering and the connection between crime and punishment.”41 Some prob-
lems relate to developing legal proxies in the region. For instance, only in 2010
did Canada initiate funding for special judicial venues in the Seychelles and
Kenya to prosecute captured pirate suspects.42 Other issues concern reluctance
to bring pirates to account in Canada: first, clear evidence of an attack, rather
than simply probable intent to attack, must be obtainable; second, no Canadians
are likely to be directly affected by a particular pirate attack; and third, prosecu-
tions in Canada might be ineffective and even lead to subsequent refugee
claims.43
It is true that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 “calls upon all . . .
States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legisla-
tion, to cooperate . . . in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible
for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.” The Security
Council has emphasized the resolution’s importance by renewing it twice
through UNSCR 1846 of 2 December 2008 and UNSCR 1897 of 30 November
2009. Nevertheless, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade argues that Canada is not obliged to respond: “The wording of paragraph
11 of UNSCR 1816 on ‘investigation and prosecution’ is not cast so as to create a
legally binding decision pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.”44 Whatever the legal merits—some Canadian Navy personnel have grum-
bled about the lack of “follow through”—this is a perplexing matter that PSCs
have not faced.45
Possible Drawbacks
Though the private presence enjoys some unique and useful attributes that states
and shippers alike might capitalize upon, PSC professionalism and capabilities are
unclear, given current industry dynamics. There is a fear that counterpiracy work
will become the next big PSC “gold rush,” with all the potential for disorder the
term evokes. Regarding the last “rush,” by some estimates 60 percent of private se-
curity companies did not exist before 11 September 2001; they found their places
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.46 Similarly, start-ups can increase the pressure
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for expansion into maritime operations, due to the small outlay required to get
into the business, given the aforementioned emphasis on contracted manpower.
Other, more established PSCs will also likely enter the maritime marketplace in
search of further opportunities and service diversification. As pointed out, for
instance, by Jim Cowling of the PSC Shipguard, “Iraq is being wound down, and
guys are looking around and latching onto piracy.”47
In many ways, the PSC expansion is occurring in a vacuum. Shippers, while
often knowledgeable of nonlethal security measures and tactics for countering
pirates, do not always have experience in managing violence; they must rely on
PSC expertise. PSCs themselves, however, have varying levels of experience in
maritime security. The ease of entering the marketplace has some qualitative
implications, as emphasized by Neptune Maritime Security’s David Rider:
“Ironically, hiring armed guards for a boat is easy. What’s difficult is hiring sea-
soned, experienced professionals at a competitive price who will ensure the se-
curity of not only the boat, its crew and cargo, but also the parent company’s
corporate reputation as well.”48 Disagreement among PSCs is also evident as to
whether unique characteristics and understandings are required regarding mar-
itime conditions, operations, and equipment, compared to security work on
land.49 Equally, some flag states have laws about the permissibility of arms
onboard but do not have regulations governing PSCs specifically.50
The potential for unmanaged growth and lack of control are troubling, be-
cause even with the hoped-for target-hardening and deterrent effect of PSC em-
ployment, it is likely that private violence will be increasingly applied. Indeed, it
has already happened: on 23 March 2010, in what has been termed as “the shot
‘heard round the seas,’” PSC personnel for the first time killed a pirate during a
thwarted attack on the MV Almezaan.51
CANADA AND REGULATION’S POTENTIAL ROLE
There is one international regulatory mechanism that might promote responsi-
ble and effective PSC/shipper engagement: the Montreux Document. Together,
the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) initiated the negotiations leading to the document. On 17 September
2008 Canada became one of the document’s first seventeen signatories. The
other states were Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, China, France, Ger-
many, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since September 2008, an addi-
tional seventeen states have announced their support for the document: Alba-
nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Greece, Italy,
Jordan, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Uganda,
and Uruguay.
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In the main, these states recognize the document’s two major contributions.
First, it identifies “hard” international humanitarian law and human-rights law
for states to follow. States are not immune from their international obligations
simply because PSCs are involved. Second, the document presents seventy-three
nonbinding “soft” standards—a tool kit of good practices—designed to guide
states in fulfilling their legal obligations.
The Montreux Document’s applicability to PSC maritime operations is
threefold. First, though the document emphasizes operations during armed
conflict, its drafters nevertheless espouse its broader applicability in peacetime
endeavors. In particular, they devised its good practices to be germane to the
wider development of responsible PSC employment independent of context. In-
deed, in their explanatory comments, the drafters explicitly identify the
Montreux Document’s practicality and usefulness regarding PSCs countering
piracy.52
Second, the document’s language is not overly limiting or exclusive. For in-
stance, the instrument focuses generally on firms providing services that “in-
clude, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such
as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons
systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security
personnel.”53 PSC counterpiracy activities can easily fall into these categories.
What is more, the document’s points on state jurisdiction are apt. It defines
“home states” as those in which a firm has “its principal place of management.”54
Many states that are document signatories are also the home states of private se-
curity companies offering counterpiracy services.55 Similarly, “territorial states”
are those states in which PSCs operate. The provisions can apply to flag states be-
cause of the sovereign responsibilities they are to exercise. As well, the drafters
champion the document’s applicability beyond relations between states and
PSCs: “The good practices may be of value for other entities such as interna-
tional organizations, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and compa-
nies.”56 Though only states can be signatories, the document’s guidance for
“contracting states” might be valuable for shippers that are PSC clients.
Third, acting on the good practices listed in the Montreux Document would
be beneficial in handling the qualitative concerns raised earlier. The good prac-
tices are ways in which state and nonstate actors can become savvy about the
PSC industry in terms of background checks, past activities, and performance
requirements. The document’s suggestions pertinent to quality control, person-
nel training, weapons systems operations, rules bearing on the use of force, and
standardization for the sake of upholding international humanitarian and
human-rights law are equally relevant to ensuring appropriate and effective
PSC activity. Similarly, the Montreux Document identifies the elements of
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international humanitarian and human-rights law that home states could in-
corporate into more general controls. These controls might be “corporate op-
erating licensing” for limited time spans, “specific operating licensing” for the
export of particular services, and “export authorization” that takes into ac-
count the proposed service, the client, and the operating context.57 Addition-
ally, the Montreux Document seeks to protect PSC employees themselves—that
is, it stresses employment standards and operational safety. States can identify
and underscore the particular requirements for the operations at sea of private
security companies, to the benefit of clients and PSC personnel alike.
Canada could work to promote the document’s applicability among states
(home and territorial/flag) and commercial shippers. To be sure, Canada was in-
strumental in pushing forward the three-year-long negotiations leading to the
document’s creation. The Department of National Defence is devising policies
on the selection, employment, and management of PSCs with the document
squarely in mind—making Canada one of the first countries to take this step.
What is more, Canadian advocacy would complement the efforts of the Swiss
government to disseminate the document’s good practices in forums like the
United Nations, NATO, the Organization of American States, and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such advocacy certainly would be
in line with the ICRC’s expectations that signatories actively promote the docu-
ment. In total, Canada could advance the document’s scope even beyond its
important humanitarian and human rights functions to cover PSC activities at
sea.
THE QUANTITATIVE CHALLENGE
One must recognize the challenge Canada and others who advocate the docu-
ment are likely to face: qualitative improvements in PSC/shipper relationships
may only lead to a limited increase in the quantitative level of these relation-
ships. From one standpoint, some shippers and industry associations are wary
about how having PSCs on board might lead to further violence, the deaths of
seafarers, and even environmental disaster. As suggested by Giles Noakes, the
head of maritime security at the Baltic International Maritime Council
(BIMCO), “While I understand the temptation, placing armed guards on board
creates a severe risk of escalation.”58 Measures undertaken by states to ensure the
capabilities and professionalism of PSCs might make the relationship called for
by the United States more appealing.
Yet from another standpoint, the very call for PSC/shipper engagement up-
sets long-held understandings about who should be doing what at sea. While
many shippers will take precautionary measures, they will draw the line at vio-
lence employed under their auspices. For them, only navies are to possess this
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potential and, in turn, bring about a degree of order on the high seas. Peter
Hinchliffe, the International Chamber of Shipping’s marine director, sums up
this opposition:
I think what navies are forgetting, and perhaps governments are forgetting as well, is
that we are not talking about the protection of an individual ship in a piece of water.
What we are talking about is the fundamental obligation of nations to provide safe
passage for world trade. So, therefore, it is totally unsatisfactory for naval authorities
to try to devolve that responsibility to innocent merchant ships.59
In this regard, a number of other maritime-related organizations oppose the us-
age of armed PSC personnel: BIMCO, the International Association of Inde-
pendent Tanker Owners, the International Chamber of Shipping, the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum, the Society of International Gas
Tanker and Terminal Operators, the International Association of Dry Cargo
Ship Owners, the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, the
Cruise Lines International Association, the International Union of Marine In-
surers, the Joint War Committee and Joint Hull Committee, and the Interna-
tional Transport Workers Federation.60 Equally, the UN’s International
Maritime Organization and the International Maritime Bureau of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce are nonsupportive.
It would appear, therefore, that normative matters might easily impede the
ostensible functionality of security privatization. The upset resulting from secu-
rity privatization in whatever form is not surprising, according to Alyson Bailes:
“[The] rules, norms, disciplines, rewards and punishments have not been
tailored to fit this type of actor for a significant and habit-forming period of histori-
cal time. It is not the intrinsic ‘newness’ of the private sector and . . . transnational
actors that explains the difficulty; rather, it is the fact that they are different from
the recently dominant players.”61 All the same, unless a large number of shippers
embrace the U.S. call, the development of a critical mass of private security ac-
tivity will be constrained. Without this mass, the PSC presence will be limited in
how effectively it can counteract both the limitations of state naval activities and
the increasing assertiveness of Somali pirates. Hence, it is evident that increasing
the PSC presence to the point of creating a strong public/private partnership
against Somali piracy will be a longer-term undertaking.
{LINE-SPACE}
Commander Waddell summed up the state of Canada’s naval efforts in the wa-
ters off Somalia as HMCS Fredericton prepared to return home: “My view is that
the work is not complete here. . . . There will be a requirement, in my opinion, to
see further deployments here to sustain the effort.”62 The extent of Canada’s con-
cern and of its past engagement leads one to contend that the Canadian
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government will likely in the future decide to send naval resources to the Gulf of
Aden to further this “work.” This decision, however, must recognize that there is
now less certainty about the growth of U.S. Navy commitment. At the same time,
relations among states, private security companies, and shippers are in flux. The
Montreux Document is an appropriate vehicle through which Canada and
like-minded states can act in order to bring about qualitative improvements in
the PSC presence at sea. But building on the American call for PSC/shipper en-
gagement will be a challenging task. Despite the current state limitations, many
shippers prefer grey hulls on the distant horizon to PSC personnel on board.
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TAMING THE OUTLAW SEA
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and
Lieutenant Commander Richard E. LeBron, U.S. Navy
The goods of the world move predominantly by sea. Across that broad globalcommons, trade generally flows freely and well. Yet there are places today
where the term “outlaw sea” applies.1 Piracy, sadly, flourishes in several key
choke point regions of the world’s sea-lanes of communications. We must tame
this outlaw sea.
To many, the word “piracy” conjures images of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century swashbuckling rebels brandishing cutlasses and flintlocks under the
ominous skull-and-crossbones flag, à la Walt Disney World’s “Pirates of the Ca-
ribbean” attraction. But to those who have been victims of their blades and bul-
lets, the word invokes a darker “profession”—and one that continues today.
Pirates and corsairs of the “Golden Age of Piracy”—feared mariners with
names like Barbarossa, “Calico Jack” Rackham, “Black Bart” Roberts, and Anne
Bonny—have captured imaginations since early-eighteenth-century periodi-
cals chronicled their crimes. But piracy is more than theft, rape, and murder on
the high seas. It is a systemic destabilizer of international norms of commerce,
economics, and trade. Piracy is also intertwined with conditions ashore. In par-
ticular, piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa today results from deep social,
political, economic, and environmental problems in Somalia. It is the fruit of
anarchy, extreme poverty, and the severe failure of the rule of law. At the prag-
matic level, however, piracy is an illicit entrepreneurial pursuit whose main ob-
jective is to maximize profit.
In other words, Somali pirates are armed opportunists who stem from a per-
missive and enabling environment formed by a weak state and who engage in a
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business enterprise subject to risk-and-reward calculations that can be influ-
enced by the international community. The international community, including
various governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as private
enterprises, has an opportunity now to work together and exert the necessary in-
fluence both at sea and ashore to shift the calculus of piracy from profitable en-
terprise to futile folly.
The United Nations, the European Union (EU), the African Union, the Arab
League, and NATO are collaborating to influence the risk-and-reward analysis
of Somali pirates. A wide range of countries—including Australia, China, Dji-
bouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia,
Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, and Ukraine—are cooperating to broadly ad-
dress the issue as well.
Though piracy manifests itself most perceptibly at sea, it is a complex and
persistent land-based problem with political, social, and economic dimensions
requiring a long-term, comprehensive solution. To bring about a lasting cure to
the cancer of piracy, particularly off the Horn of Africa, two endeavors must be
undertaken in parallel. First, the risk of failure in hijacking a vessel at sea must be
increased to the point where piracy is no longer seen as an attractive and lucra-
tive endeavor. In other words, pirates’ own calculations must yield deterrent
conclusions. Second, governance, stability, and security within Somalia must be
so improved that less risky yet reasonably profitable alternatives to piracy can be
fostered both at sea and ashore. The second task is a much more challenging
proposition than the first, given Somalia’s fragmented and unstable state.
CAPTURING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST
Lawlessness upon the sea is nothing new. Piracy is an ancient profession. Its his-
tory dates back to antiquity, preceding even the ancient Egyptians. Nautical ban-
dits have plied the waves for nearly as long as people have used the seas for trade.
The Lukka raiders, for example, launched raids from the coast of Asia Minor as
early as the fourteenth century BC; Thucydides mentions pirates in his History of
the Peloponnesian War; and Herodotus writes of how pirates kidnapped the poet
Arion of Methymna in an attempt to steal his riches.2
As is the case today in the Horn of Africa, piracy in the ancient Mediterranean
world flourished when there was an absence of central control.3 In periods when
the empire du jour—Egyptian, Greek, or Roman—was unable to maintain a
strong naval presence in the large inland sea, pirate communities spread along
its shores. Before the middle of the first century BC, piracy was a significant
problem in the Mediterranean.4 As Rome’s maritime trade of wheat and other
commodities flourished, piracy expanded. At their height pirates exerted do-
minion and control over the Mediterranean to an extent that left little room for
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free navigation or commerce.5 The economic impact was felt throughout the
Roman Republic as prices of goods—particularly of wheat, vital for feeding the
Roman people—grew out of control. Even young Julius Caesar was taken for
ransom by Cilician pirates, around 75 BC.6
It was only when Rome’s power expanded to claim the whole of the Mediter-
ranean basin—and the littorals whence pirates sailed—that piracy was eradi-
cated from the ancient world.7 Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known to history as
Pompey, was sent by the Roman people to wrest the seas from the pirates. In
combating piracy, Pompey focused on the act and its source, not exclusively on
the actor. Over a period of several months in 67 BC, with hundreds of ships and
120,000 soldiers, he swept the Mediterranean Sea and corralled the pirates in
their strongholds ashore.
Most surrendered.8 They did so because the risk of death or capture at sea in
future piratical attempts exceeded the potential rewards to be gained. But they
surrendered also because Pompey, understanding that piracy was bred in
rootlessness and social disorder, offered attractive alternatives ashore. He admit-
ted some into the small towns of the Cilicians in Anatolia, and others he planted
in the city of the Solians, also in Anatolia; to the majority he granted land in the
ancient Greek province of Achaea to call their own and cultivate.9 With this land
he afforded the former pirates an opportunity to pursue an enterprise with more
acceptable risks and rewards and so helped turn the pirates into contributing
Roman subjects.
Pompey, then, wiped out Mediterranean piracy by countering pirates at sea
and by presenting former and would-be pirates with stakes in profitable and less
risky enterprises ashore. Though Somali pirates are unlikely to be presented
with land to call their own, Pompey’s actions provide a valuable demonstration
of the balanced application of hard and soft power both at sea and ashore, one
that is no less relevant and wise in combating piracy today than it was more than
two millenniums ago.
CONTROL OF THE SEA IS VITAL
Though Pompey’s strategic vision and his expedition against piracy were suc-
cessful, not even the mighty Roman Empire ever extinguished piracy perma-
nently. As civilizations and empires ebbed and flowed and control of what Alfred
Thayer Mahan later called a “wide common” was exerted and relinquished, so
too did the threat and impact of piracy fluctuate.10 In the early Middle Ages, the
Vikings raided and plundered their way across Europe, and later corsairs from
the North African “Barbary Coast” terrorized the Mediterranean Sea. Piracy also
waxed and waned in the Far East and in the Caribbean, as trade grew and the
tides of profit rose and fell. As merchants ventured to sea and maritime trade
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expanded, pirates followed, ransacking vulnerable ships and cargo; they con-
tinue to do so to this day.
Today, however, pirates chase their prey not in galleys, sloops, or schooners
but in fast, open skiffs. They brandish not cutlasses and flintlocks but AK-47s
and rocket-propelled grenades and are aided by satellite phones, high-tech navi-
gation gear, and competent and continually evolving networks ashore. The last
few years have witnessed a rising trend in piratical attacks around the world. In
2009, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 406 attacks, compared
to 293 in 2008, 263 in 2007, and 239 in 2006. In 2009, a total of 217 incidents car-
ried out by suspected Somali pirates were reported to the IMB, making the area
off the Horn of Africa the number-one hot spot for piracy in the world.11 The at-
tacks are becoming more violent, brazen, and sophisticated. The number of in-
cidents where guns were used nearly doubled in 2009 from 2008 levels and has
tripled since 2005.12 Somali pirates have extended their reach, threatening not
only the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia but also the southern region
of the Red Sea, the strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the east coast of Oman.13
The attacks listed in the IMB report were wide-ranging; they included eighty
attacks off the east and south coasts of Somalia, 116 in the Gulf of Aden, fifteen
in the southern Red Sea, four off Oman, and one each in the Arabian Sea and In-
dian Ocean. In 2009, off the east coast of Africa alone, a total of 114 vessels were
fired upon, forty-seven vessels were hijacked, 867 crew members taken hostage,
four killed, and one missing.14 By comparison, throughout the rest of the world
six vessels were fired upon, two were hijacked, 185 crew members were taken
hostage, four were killed, and seven were missing.15 Since IMB figures are based
on self-reporting and many attacks may go unreported, the actual figures may
very well be much higher, particularly in areas where the level of international
focus on piracy is lower than it currently is off the Horn of Africa.
The year 2010 started with a bang for the twenty-four seamen of the chemical
tanker Premoni. The ship was attacked and hijacked, and its crew taken hostage
by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden on 1 January. As of the second week of Jan-
uary a total of six vessels had been successfully attacked by pirates and bandits:
Premoni; a liquified propane gas tanker in Côte d’Ivoire’s Abidjan harbor; a vehi-
cle carrier off the Horn of Africa; and a vehicle carrier, a chemical tanker, and a
bulk carrier in Southeast Asia. As of mid-April, a total of forty-eight vessels had
been attacked, or attacks had been attempted against them, off Africa’s eastern
shores. Globally, that number grows to a total of eighty-one vessels.
The annual cost of piracy is not accurately recorded, but it is not trivial, even
setting human costs aside. Piracy is estimated to cost anywhere between a billion
and sixteen billion dollars a year.16 Some countries are investing to thwart piracy
by increasing their military presences in high-risk areas. Some shipping
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companies are taking such measures as rerouting ships to bypass the Gulf of
Aden, hiring private security guards, and installing nonlethal deterrence equip-
ment. Examples of the latter are the Long Range Acoustic Device, which was em-
ployed against pirates attempting to hijack the luxury cruise ship Seabourne
Spirit in late 2005, and Secure-Ship, an innovative electrified fence that sur-
rounds the whole ship and uses a high-voltage pulse to deter boarding at-
tempts.17 But these actions all come at a price. For example, routing a tanker
from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the Cape of Good Hope adds approxi-
mately 2,700 miles to the voyage and approximately $3.5 million in annual fuel
costs.18 According to the U.S. Maritime Administration, the cost of avoiding risk
becomes more complex in the liner trades. If pirates were to become able to at-
tack cruise liners successfully and regularly, the long bypass required to avoid
them would result in the need for additional vessels to maintain scheduled ser-
vice and capacity commitments. For example, routing from Europe to the Far
East via the Cape of Good Hope rather than through the Suez Canal would incur
an estimated additional $89 million annually—$74.4 million in fuel and $14.6
million in charter expenses—without considering the added costs associated
with disruption of global supply chains.19 Also, insurance costs have soared over
the last few years. The cost of war-risk insurance premiums for vessels passing
through the Gulf of Aden, about five hundred dollars in 2007, was twenty thou-
sand dollars in 2008.20 A shipowner with a vessel worth $100 million can now re-
portedly expect to pay about $150,000 to cover its payload—a cost that is
ultimately passed on to the consumer.21
Not all is bad news, however. The rate of successful hijackings in the vicinity
of the Horn of Africa dropped in the second half of 2009, to an average of one in
nine vessels targeted by pirates, compared to one in 6.4 in 2008.22 The decrease
can be attributed to expanded control of the sea around the Horn of Africa es-
tablished through increased international cooperation and naval patrols; ex-
panded coordination of naval patrols through the use of the Mercury secure,
Internet-based communication system; shared intelligence at the operational
level; and willingness of potential target ships to respond to military guidance,
comply with recommendations, and deploy effective protective measures. If
continued, these measures, particularly self-protection by potential targets, will
likely drive the rate of successful hijackings down further.
THE CHALLENGE ASHORE
In Somalia, where nearly ten million mostly nomadic pastoralist people live with
neither a permanent national government nor a formal economy and where
pervasive and violent crime is an extension of the general state of insecurity, pi-
racy is perceived pragmatically, as an opportunity for profit.
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In a recent National Public Radio report, for example, a Somali pirate nick-
named “Boya” declared, “I’ll be a pirate until I die. . . . We understand what we’re
doing is wrong. But hunger is more important than any other thing.” Another
pirate acknowledged that “sometimes doing a bad thing is the only way to im-
prove the situation for yourself and the people you love.” That same pirate also
described how he had “worked his way up” from indigent lobster fisherman to
pirate and then, having made enough money to get his siblings out of southern
Somalia and into neighboring Kenya, had quit. He would, he asserted, never go
back to being a pirate.23
Though just two examples, the above vignettes offer a glimpse of the factors
influencing individuals to shoulder Kalashnikovs, board open skiffs, and head to
sea in search of easy prey. It also brings into focus a fundamental fact of piracy:
that at its core, piracy is a land-based challenge.
Even so, piracy is most often looked at as a waterborne problem. In fact, article
101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) de-
fines piracy as, in part, “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of dep-
redation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed (i) on the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against (ii) a
ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.”24
This definition, though adequate for the framing of law-enforcement and
antipiracy activities on the high seas, does not account for the dual challenge that
characterizes piracy. UNCLOS article 101 is focused on the symptom, the crime at
sea, and not the cause, the deplorable conditions ashore. To address the challenge
of Somali piracy, the UN Security Council has approved resolutions 1816, 1838,
1846, and 1851—all containing authority to use “all necessary means” to counter
piracy. Broadly speaking these resolutions encourage states to develop a coopera-
tive framework to oppose piracy in the region and grant specific authority to “co-
operating states” to enter Somalia’s territorial sea to repress piracy in a manner
consistent with international law. Resolution 1851 authorizes “cooperating states”
to go farther and engage in antipiracy action on Somali soil—a complex endeavor
even under the best of circumstances and one that ought to focus on building the
capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to fulfill its responsibility
to the Somali people and root out piracy and armed robbery at sea.25 That said,
none of those resolutions authorize any state to address the deplorable conditions
ashore that are arguably why individuals find piracy potentially attractive. Perhaps
it is time for the international community to focus on the root causes.
Piracy off the Horn of Africa has its sources in economic deprivation and po-
litical instability. It is a multifaceted problem that calls for a comprehensive
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solution involving actions and activities ashore as much as focused naval power
at sea. In the words of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “There is no purely
military solution to it, and as long as you’ve got this incredible number of poor
people and the risks are relatively small, there’s really no way to control it unless
you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids.”26 If
the international community believes piracy off the Horn of Africa is a serious
matter that must be resolved, it must seriously consider broad solutions that go
beyond the obvious and expedient application of naval power at sea. In counter-
ing piracy, as in most security efforts, the solution will be found in a balanced
and comprehensive approach. If piracy in those strategic waterways is ever to be
eradicated, it will take the coming together of governments, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, and the private sector in the partner-
ships necessary to deliver security, stability, sustained economic development,
and prosperity in Somalia. Hard military and law-enforcement activities are
necessary but not enough. Pompey understood the need for this balance in the
Mediterranean more than two thousand years ago; it is a fact that must not be
overlooked in the Horn of Africa today.
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATION
Recognizing that no one nation has all the resources required to guarantee safety
and security throughout the maritime domain, the international community
must commit enough maritime assets—platforms, capabilities, and ideas—to
make acts of piracy both risky and difficult to conceal, thereby treating the symp-
tom of piracy at sea. International operations such as NATO’s Operation OCEAN
SHIELD, the EU’s Operation ATALANTA, and Combined Task Force 151—all sup-
porting international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa—are excel-
lent examples of such a collaborative effort among international partners.
Certainly more ships would be helpful and welcomed, but even more valuable
would be increased inputs from overhead satellites and greater deployment of
maritime patrol aircraft and long-range surveillance assets.
There are many ways to collaborate and cooperate in conducting maritime
security operations. There are expansive capabilities outside the military. For in-
stance, Stephen M. Carmel, senior vice president of maritime services at Maersk
Line, Limited, recently wrote about employing commercial shipping in preserv-
ing maritime security.27 Carmel describes how Maersk Line—the world’s largest
container shipping company, with over a thousand ships of various types—can
offer what he called “overwhelming, persistent global presence” and a “good
vantage point from which to see what is going on in the global commons.”
Commercial shipping vessels—the very targets of pirates—can be found
throughout the area of interest. Maersk has operations in nearly three hundred
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ports around the world and makes thirty-three thousand port calls a year—one
every fifteen minutes, every day of the year.28 No single navy can make such a
claim, and no single nation can see what Maersk’s ships see every day—and
that’s just one company. The implications of these statistics are enormous. If
each one of the thousands of commercial vessels at sea were to contribute to a
partnership for maritime surveillance and reporting, domain awareness would
potentially improve by orders of magnitude, as would the ships’ own security.29
Each potential partner can bring something that can elevate the comparative
advantage at sea of antipiracy forces. The UN, the EU, and NATO must seek, cre-
ate, and leverage opportunities for maritime collaboration. But the maritime
piece is just part of the puzzle. Maritime surveillance capabilities and capacity
for maritime law enforcement and military engagement at sea must be inte-
grated with the efforts of nonmilitary government agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, and public and private ventures ashore. Ultimately, piracy must
be resolved on land, by enabling Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to
deliver security and create jobs and thereby reduce the risk of engaging in legiti-
mate enterprises ashore.
Of course, and as we have noted, this is much easier said than done. In Soma-
lia the internal challenges are daunting. Somalia’s internationally recognized
Transitional Federal Government has been unable to establish itself as the legiti-
mate regime, and most of the country is outside its control.30 Somalia’s weak
government serves as a catalyst for piracy and exacerbates the challenges of
countering pirates at sea.
The lack of capacity and domestic legislation in Somalia and an absence of
clarity as to how to dispose of pirates after they are captured have hindered inter-
national action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and in some cases led
to pirates’ being released without facing justice.31
To counter piracy at sea effectively, there must be a viable and legitimate
central authority ashore capable of enforcing the rule of law. As the com-
mander of U.S. naval forces in Europe and Africa and of NATO’s Allied Joint
Task Force Command in Naples, Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald, recently com-
mented, “Somali-based piracy . . . will not go away until a government in Moga-
dishu is stable enough to confront the problem within its borders.”32 The
nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles, Yemen, Tan-
zania, Kenya, and Somalia have all pledged their support to seizing, investigat-
ing, and prosecuting pirates off Somalia’s coast, but the solution to piracy in
the Horn of Africa ultimately lies within Somalia itself.33 It is of little help in
long-term piracy eradication if naval forces must operate in a catch-and-release
mode because it is difficult or impossible to prosecute pirates.
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STRONGER TOGETHER
In this interconnected world, international security and prosperity depend
heavily upon the sea. Skillful cooperation and collaboration at sea and ashore
are vital components to ensuring the free and lawful use of the world’s water-
ways. Piracy in the Horn of Africa presents the international community with a
complex and multidimensional challenge but also with a golden opportunity to
come together and work collaboratively to solve it.
Beyond naval assets, the international community has an opportunity to take
a comprehensive approach to countering piracy, one that focuses on a broad
range of issues including deterring and disrupting piratical activity at sea; cap-
turing pirates and bringing them to justice; developing regional and interna-
tional agreements to prosecute suspected pirates effectively and humanely and
legally punish them when found guilty; enabling Somalia’s Transitional Federal
Government to extend and enforce the rule of law; and encouraging the eco-
nomic development of Somalia over the long term. Countering piracy off the
Horn of Africa is an effort that must reflect international will, must focus on
building the capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the
governments of neighboring countries, and be coordinated centrally and skill-
fully (by an internationally sanctioned body) so as to achieve a holistic effect.
The European Union, given its recent successes with Operation ATALANTA and
its growing commitment to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, seems a
logical international body to lead this effort.
Broadly speaking, the international community must undertake projects to
build the capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to extend the
reach of the rule of law. Additionally, investment in developing the capacities of
the other countries in the region to detain, prosecute, and punish pirates is key.
NATO in particular can play a role in this regard in developing partner
capacity to combat piracy, and it is expected to do so within the framework of
the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, in a low-cost and
noncontentious way. Simultaneously, international humanitarian work ashore
must be encouraged and protected—an increasingly complex endeavor. The
combination of conflict, drought, floods, and disease that has ravaged the
country for decades has created a humanitarian catastrophe for some 3.64 mil-
lion Somalis—more than half the population—who are in need of livelihood
or humanitarian support. This environment of extreme penury and human
displacement, where one in five children under five years old is acutely mal-
nourished, adds to internal instability and serves as a catalyst for illicit activi-
ties, such as piracy, that in turn can further destabilize the region. The creation
of alternative livelihoods through public/private partnering ashore, as well as
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afloat, is vital. From the enablement of subsistence farming through irrigation
to the development of environmentally sustainable coastal fish farms, to envi-
ronmental remediation to support both agriculture and aquaculture, to the
generation of microloans to facilitate the creation of small business—the
range of possibilities is enormous and limited only by the imagination and will
of the international community.
Beyond the low-water mark, control of the sea and maintenance of maritime
domain awareness are essential to the eradication of piracy and armed robbery
at sea. Programs now ongoing and initiatives currently being staffed within
NATO’s Allied Command Operations are squarely aimed at exploiting potential
synergies in parallel with, and in support of, the EU and coalition maritime
forces, as well as several national initiatives. Efforts include the close coopera-
tion and exchange of information related to antipiracy efforts between various
players within NATO and between NATO, the EU, the UN, the African Union,
and the Arab League. Continued cooperation is paramount and must be ex-
panded. We must achieve fusion in existing command-and-control structures,
to include the use of space-based surveillance assets, NATO AWACS (airborne
surveillance and control) aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Other ideas in-
clude the “tagging” of vessels identified as legitimate commercial and private
craft, employment of convoys and escorts, a tactical shift to blockading pirates’
points of embarkation, and, in cooperation with commercial entities, the use of
more effective nonlethal, nonmilitary piracy countermeasures aboard merchant
and passenger vessels. All of these options would serve, in combination, as com-
plementary efforts to make acts of piracy more risky and therefore less likely to
succeed.
Understanding that piracy is neither an at-sea problem alone nor a challenge
with a single and isolated solution will go a long way toward taming the “outlaw
sea.” In addressing the root cause of piracy, the European Union, empowered by
international consent and in partnership with the broader international com-
munity, must wisely consider, as the Greek historian Plutarch suggests, that
“man by nature is not a wild or unsocial creature, but is transformed by the un-
natural vice; whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place
and life.” Upon that consideration it should do as Pompey did and give pirates a
taste of an “honest life by dwelling in towns and tilling the ground” or by casting
their nets and harvesting the fruits of the sea.34 The solutions to piracy will not
likely be delivered by warships at sea alone; rather, they will emerge from a care-
ful balance of security and development both afloat and ashore.
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CHINA’S “ANTIACCESS” BALLISTIC MISSILES AND
U.S. ACTIVE DEFENSE
Marshall Hoyler
Relations between Taiwan and China have improved recently. At the sametime, U.S.-Japanese relations have worsened, partly as the result of dis-
agreements over Futenma Marine Air Station on Okinawa. As a result, the
prospects of fighting between the United States and China over Taiwan and of
U.S. reliance on Okinawa bases to supplement carrier airpower in the course of
such a fight appear far-fetched, disastrous for the states concerned.
Of course, military professionals and the defense analytic community need to
think through unlikely and unwelcome scenarios.1 To that end, various analysts
have contributed to a lively discussion of Chinese “antiaccess” systems designed
to keep the United States at bay in the event of conflict.2 These systems include
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance) assets like over-the-horizon (OTH) radar and in-
creasing numbers of satellites, a more modern air force, more submarines with
better weapons, and both cruise and ballistic missiles to hold at risk our ships at
sea and our air bases ashore.3 This article examines ballistic missile threats to
carriers and air bases and the adequacy of U.S. active
defenses.
China seeks the capacity to find U.S. aircraft carri-
ers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and
to attack them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic
missiles).4 China must overcome serious technologi-
cal challenges to field the systems needed to do these
things. The United States faces the prospect that
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China might overcome these challenges, perhaps as soon as five years from now.
To attack fixed targets like American air bases in Japan, China has already devel-
oped a family of road-mobile, solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missiles.5 One of
these missiles, the CSS-6, has the range to attack Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, a
U.S. Air Force facility that is in many ways the best air base ashore for U.S. opera-
tions against China.6
The current U.S. response to these developments relies heavily on active defense
—that is, deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABMs). To defend ships at sea, the
United States is investing in Aegis/Standard Missile ABMs, and to defend air bases
ashore, in Patriot PAC-3 ABMs. The Navy originally developed Aegis ballistic-
missile defense (BMD) to protect assets ashore, such as seaports of debarkation.
Given China’s ASBM efforts, however, many officers see the counterASBM mission
as an important role for Aegis BMD. Indeed, the commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Admiral Patrick Walsh, recently characterized missile defense as “essential to
our ability to operate freely.”7
MY ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL
The U.S. ABM investments just described deserve critical scrutiny: asymmetries
in the competition of Chinese ballistic missiles versus U.S. antiballistic missiles
make it unlikely that active defense alone will succeed. To see why, we need to re-
view China’s ASBM system threat to ships at sea and China’s short-range ballis-
tic missile (SRBM) threat to U.S. air bases.
Active Defense against the ASBM System. What is the asymmetry in the ASBM
versus ABM competition? On one hand, China can easily determine how many
ABMs the United States is building and compute the limited number that each
ABM-configured Aegis ship will likely have aboard. Should it succeed in devel-
oping ASBMs that work and systems that can detect, locate, and track U.S. air-
craft carriers, China can overcome active defenses by launching more ASBMs
than the United States can possibly intercept.8 It can do so with relative ease even
if Aegis/ABM systems have high single-shot kill probabilities, because Beijing’s
entire ASBM inventory is available.
The United States, on the other hand, can devote only a subset of its ABMs to
protecting carriers from the ASBM threat. Even if the Navy makes heroic efforts
to increase the fraction that is forward deployed in the western Pacific, China
will retain its “home field” numeric advantage. The United States cannot “buy
its way out” of this problem by acquiring larger numbers of Standard Missile 3s
(SM-3s). First, China can add additional ASBMs to its inventories at substan-
tially lower costs than those the United States would incur by adding offsetting
numbers of ABMs.9 Second, if China proves able to meet the difficult technical
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obstacles required to mount ASBM attacks, it should be readily able to sur-
mount the easier technical challenges involved in fielding dirt cheap decoys that
can lead astray already-scarce ABMs.
Suppose that Chinese C4ISR is able to detect, locate, and identify carriers
within ASBM range and a Chinese salvo proves able to overwhelm Aegis BMD
defenses. Does it follow that the penetrating ASBMs will succeed in hitting U.S.
carriers? Not necessarily. Much depends on the area of uncertainty (AOU) that
China faces, given its C4ISR capabilities, and on the “seeker footprint” of the
guidance radars on each ASBM warhead reentry vehicle. If the AOU is large and
seeker footprints are small relative to that AOU, China’s inventory may be too
small to fire the number of ASBMs needed to get a hit. For this reason, the Navy
needs to do all that it cost-effectively can to increase the size of the AOU and
thereby force China to commit large numbers of ASBMs to cover it.
Active Defense of Air Bases against Ballistic Missiles. Depending on how a Tai-
wan contingency unfolds, U.S. land-based aircraft might perform important
roles. However, their potential contribution diminishes the farther those bases
are from the Taiwan Strait. If available for use, Kadena Air Base on Okinawa
would easily prove the most valuable.
China has 350 to 400 CSS-6 ballistic missiles capable of reaching Kadena. A
fraction of those missiles might put it out of action, in either of two ways: they
might deliver unitary warheads that crater runways, or they might deliver cluster
munitions that destroy unsheltered aircraft on the ground. This prospect is es-
pecially worrisome for “big wing” aircraft like AWACS (the Airborne Warning
and Control System), tankers, and the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, since
they are too large to place in shelters.10 China’s best choice would appear to be a
combination attack—cratered runways to fix aircraft in place for destruction by
follow-on cluster munitions.
The U.S. Army has based a Patriot battalion armed with the PAC-3 ABMs at
Kadena. Whether the PAC-3 can prevent Chinese missiles from putting Kadena
out of action depends on factors impossible to predict with certainty. These fac-
tors include China’s decision at the time about what fraction of its missile inven-
tory to devote to Kadena attacks and also U.S. choices about what fraction of the
global PAC-3 inventory to send to Kadena. That said, China enjoys, again, a
“home field” advantage in that its entire CSS-6 inventory is available, whereas
the United States needs PAC-3s in distant theaters, like the Persian Gulf.11
What’s Next? I provide below the evidence behind each of the assertions in the
argument just summarized. First, I focus on the ASBM problem. I recap the
hurdles—mainly technical but also organizational—that China would have to
overcome to field an ASBM system. Next, I review Department of Defense
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(DoD) projections of Chinese ASBM and American antiballistic-missile inven-
tories. I discuss what ASBM-versus-ABM exchanges might look like, given those
inventories.
Next, I discuss the CSS-6 threat to Kadena.12 Given the potential contribu-
tions of land-based aircraft, I compare Kadena to other western Pacific U.S. air
bases. I discuss the numbers of CSS-6s needed to put Kadena out of action and
compare CSS-6 inventories to those of PAC-3 ABMs.
Against this background, I discuss U.S. choices. I argue against planning to
“thin the (ASBM) herd” by attacks on Chinese soil. Instead, I argue that the
United States should devote more effort to developing and rigorously testing
passive defenses and to fielding those that look likely to perform well in defeat-
ing China’s ASBM system and its ballistic missiles that threaten air bases ashore.
If passive defense of ships or land bases appears inadequate to offset the limita-
tions of active defense despite such efforts, I argue, the United States should con-
sider a wider range of alternatives to defend its interests in the western Pacific.
BALLISTIC MISSILES VS. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: CHINA’S ASBM
PROGRAM AND U.S. ACTIVE DEFENSE
China has to overcome a series of tough technical challenges to enable ASBM
strikes on carriers at sea. Recent analyses have outlined these challenges in
detail.13
The first tasks for an ASBM system are to detect a carrier, identify it, and lo-
cate it with enough precision to launch missiles. In principle, China might per-
form these tasks from such platforms as fishing boats or merchant ships,
submarines, surface ships, or manned and unmanned maritime reconnaissance
aircraft. China might also rely on its developing OTH radar. However, though
some combination of these systems might work in the future, few observers
judge them adequate today. (Of course, one or more of these systems might suf-
fice even now. For example, a carrier might pass close to a Chinese submarine, as
USS Kitty Hawk did in October 2006.)
Analysts Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin have reviewed the potential contri-
bution of various kinds of satellites and identified strengths and limitations of
each. They say that satellite-borne ELINT (electronic intelligence) and SIGINT
(signals intelligence) systems could provide “long-distance early warning.”14
However, their apparently exhaustive list makes no mention of ELINT satellites.
I conclude that China now has few such satellites, if any. As long as that is true,
China will be able perform ELINT/SIGINT missions for only part of each day (a
large number would be required to keep potential carrier operating areas under
continuous surveillance). That limitation matters because the United States can
H O Y L E R 8 7
NWCR_Autumn2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Friday, August 13, 2010 2:49:20 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
93
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2010 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
tell when SIGINT satellites come within range of carriers. During those periods,
the United States can use emission control (EMCON) to defeat SIGINT.15 The
shorter those periods, the better for the United States, because EMCON can
sharply reduce a carrier’s operational effectiveness.
Of course, China needs other capabilities to enable its satellite constellation to
provide targeting-quality data to ASBM launchers. Hagt and Durnin observe that
“China . . . lacks C4ISR infrastructure—such as information processing, band-
width capacity, and network support—needed for wide-area surveillance.”16 In
addition, they note “organizational and bureaucratic barriers impeding the abil-
ity of disparate space assets to perform highly time-sensitive missions,” such as
precise location of a moving carrier far at sea.17 Similarly, Thomas Ehrhard and
Robert Work state that “even when PRC [People’s Republic of China] engineers
fit all of the technical pieces together, it will take even more time for the PLAN,
PLANAF, and PLAAF [respectively, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Naval
Air Force, and Air Force] to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures nec-
essary to convert their disparate systems and combat methods into a truly effec-
tive joint operational network.”18
Despite these obstacles, Hagt and Durnin apparently regard a space-based
system as China’s best hope for detecting, locating, and tracking carriers in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, they assert that if everything goes as well for China as
they think possible to imagine, “a system competent to provide near-real-time
regional coverage could be five years away.”19
A second set of technological challenges confronts China even if it can get
targeting-quality data to the mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs) of
its ASBM and launch weapons promptly. Those challenges involve building an
ASBM whose reentry vehicle (RV) seeker can identify and track the carrier and
guide the RV to hit it. For example, “reentry into the atmosphere . . . would pro-
duce a plasma shield, making homing by radar and infrared difficult.”20 Other
technical obstacles include development of “materials needed to protect sophis-
ticated guidance systems during reentry; the ability to function in an environ-
ment of higher speed and more severe temperature dynamics than in earlier
applications; and the ability to distinguish a target at unusual angles of attack at
the distances required for reentry.”21
How Many Missiles?
Chinese analysts identify a third major set of technological hurdles—those in-
volved in penetrating U.S. active defenses.22 Those analysts are unduly pessimis-
tic concerning this problem. To see why, we need to consider the numbers in
each side’s inventories.
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How Many ASBMs Will China Field? China’s ASBM will use the DF-21D air-
frame, which will enter production this year.23 Over the past four years China has
produced DF-21s of earlier models at the rate of nine to fifteen per year.24 In light
of increased funding for SM-3s that DoD announced earlier this year, it is plau-
sible that China will produce DF-21Ds at the higher of these rates. If so, and if it
earmarks ten DF-21Ds for testing, China will have eighty ASBMs by the end of
2015.25
How Many ABMs Will the United States Have? The Navy has configured eigh-
teen Aegis ships (fifteen Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and three Ticonderoga-
class cruisers) for anti–ballistic missile missions worldwide and will add six
more.26 It will equip such ships with two ABM models of its Standard Missile:
the SM-2 Block IV and the SM-3.27 The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic
missiles beyond the atmosphere. The SM-2 Block IV is an interim missile, based
on the SM-2 airframe, originally intended for “air-breathing” targets. It will in-
tercept reentry vehicles in their terminal phase.
The Navy had forty SM-2 Block IVs at the end of 2008.28 It originally an-
nounced an inventory target of a hundred of these missiles. More recently, se-
nior officials have mentioned targets of seventy or eighty missiles.29 The Navy
had thirty-eight SM-3s at the end of 2008. As a result of an ABM-investment in-
crease announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April 2009, the Navy
intends to have an inventory of 220 SM-3s by the end of 2015.30
How Many ABMs Will Be Available to Counter the ASBM Threat? The Navy
faces demands for ballistic-missile defense in several places. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the Navy will need seventy-two SM-3s to defend
Europe against Iranian missiles.31 U.S. Central Command has said that it needs
Aegis BMD capability to defend friends in the Middle East. Given North Korea’s
ballistic-missile program and hostile rhetoric, the Navy will likely need to devote
some Aegis BMD capability to countering that threat. Since Iran and North Ko-
rea field relatively unsophisticated ballistic missiles, let us assume that the Navy
decides to devote its SM-2 Block IV missiles to these missions; further, to estab-
lish a bounding case favorable to active defense against ASBMs, let us assume
that the Navy allocates none of the inherently scarce SM-3s to Middle East or
UNorth Korea missions. (Japan’s posture makes it especially plausible that the
United States would earmark only SM-2 Block IV ABMs against North Korea
—Japan has acquired Aegis/BMD ships and plans to buy SM-3 Block II
missiles.)
Given the demands just described, what allocation of Aegis BMD ships ap-
pears plausible? The Congressional Budget Office assumes that DoD would
need nine ships, including three deployed forward, for the defense of Europe
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against Iran.32 For purposes of this analysis, I assume the Navy would need to
maintain at least one Aegis BMD ship forward deployed in or near the Persian
Gulf for Middle Eastern defense and at least three additional Aegis BMD ships to
support this rotation (i.e., to keep one ship on station continuously). Similarly,
I assume one Aegis BMD ship forward deployed in the Sea of Japan, but (owing
to relative proximity to U.S. ports) only two additional ships to support the
rotation.
Table 1 summarizes the 2015 regional allocation of Aegis ships and ABMs,
given the assumptions just described. It shows that the Navy would devote thir-
teen Aegis BMD ships to countering Iran and three to North Korea. This would
leave eight for a Chinese contingency. Similarly, the Navy would devote seventy-
two SM-3s to European defense and all seventy or eighty SMK-2 Block IVs to the
Middle East or North Korea roles. Of the 220 SM-3s produced by 2015, therefore,
the Navy could earmark 148 for China. If the Navy allocated those missiles to six of
the eight China-rotation ships, each would have twenty-four or twenty-five
aboard. (Of course, the total number available for China contingencies might be
lower if larger numbers were devoted to the counter-Iran European-defense
mission.)
What Might ASBM-vs.-ABM Exchanges Look Like?
To answer this question, we need to consider the targeting problem that each
side faces and to make explicit some simplifying assumptions. First, I assume
that the U.S. Navy would enjoy perfect warning and perfect positioning. In other
words, I assume that Aegis ships would know of ASBM launches virtually in-
stantaneously and that they would then direct radar energy exactly where it
should be directed. In possible future combat, of course, they might not enjoy
these advantages.
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Combatant
Command
Threat ABMs Aegis BMD Ships









PACOM DPRK 0 3 1
PACOM PRC 148 0 8 2–3
Inventory Totals 220 70–80 24 7–8
TABLE 1
ASSUMED 2015 ALLOCATION OF ABMS AND AEGIS BMD SHIPS
Note: EUCOM = U.S. European Command; CENTCOM = U.S. Central Command; PACOM = U.S. Pacific Command; DPRK = North Korea.
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Second, I assume that absent enemy countermeasures, each side’s missiles
would perform well. I assume that the ASBM would have a high probability of
hit against a correctly identified and located carrier and that in turn the SM-3
would have a high probability of hit against a correctly identified and located
ASBM reentry vehicle. Compared to actual historical experience involving large
numbers of guided missiles, these estimates appear optimistic.33
The U.S. Navy’s Targeting Problem. The Navy would almost certainly fire two
ABMs against each of the incoming ASBMs.34 Doing so would of course increase
the probability of a successful intercept. However, with only twenty-four or
twenty-five ABMs aboard, each Aegis ship escorting a carrier would at that rate
be able to engage at most thirteen ASBMs. Even if each ABM individually per-
formed as well as the Navy could reasonably expect, the fourteenth would get
past active defenses.
So what should we expect if an ASBM-vs.-ABM clash were to occur in 2015,
which some judge the earliest that Chinese satellites would provide data suffi-
cient for an attack?35 As noted earlier, China might plausibly have eighty ASBMs
available by that time. If so, the United States would have to have 160 ABMs on
hand—more than the 148 ABMs in its entire “China inventory”—to fire two
against each incoming antiship missile.
Suppose that China produced fewer than ninety DF-21Ds by 2015 or used so
many in testing that it had too few to overwhelm U.S. defenses as just described.
In that case, it could seek to increase the odds in its favor in other ways. First, it
might fire earlier-model DF-21 missiles alongside its DF-21D ASBMs. (It could
have almost thirty such earlier-model missiles available for use in this way.)36
Second, China might deploy other kinds of decoys. For example, Chinese engi-
neers could design ASBMs to deploy aluminum-coated Mylar balloons during
the exo-atmospheric phase. The actual warhead would be inside one of the bal-
loons; the other balloons would have lithium batteries to simulate the heat es-
caping from the balloon with the warhead, making it virtually impossible to
distinguish the warhead from the decoys.37 Third, it might develop penetration
aids aside from decoys. For example, Chinese engineers could defeat a hit-to-kill
intercept by enclosing the ASBM warhead in a cooled shroud, making it difficult
for the infrared sensors of the ABM “kill vehicle” to detect. Finally, it might
choose some combination of the above approaches or adopt them all. Again: the
fact that many kinds of penetration aids are quite cheap relative to ABMs is one
reason why the United States cannot “buy its way out” of this problem.
Unfortunately, the public record provides little reason to be confident that
the SM-3s now being produced can defeat the kinds of countermeasures just
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described. Indeed, that record strongly suggests that tests of Aegis/SM-3’s ability
to distinguish decoys and defeat other countermeasures have not yet been con-
ducted. (Two pieces of evidence deserve note. First, of over sixteen tests and
nineteen cumulative SM-3 firings, the Missile Defense Agency [MDA] or the
Navy publicized every test’s objectives save one. Tests against decoys or counter-
measures were never mentioned. Second, BMD critics frequently cite counter-
measures and decoys in explaining their skepticism. This means SM-3
developers have strong incentives to announce such tests. That they have not
strongly suggests that the United States has not yet conducted any, let alone
tested SM-3s with the frequency needed to build confidence, given the variety of
possible countermeasures.)
China’s Targeting Problem. Imagine that China overcomes each of the techno-
logical and organizational hurdles identified earlier and that its ASBM system
passes a series of tough operational tests. Next, assume that China’s sensors de-
tect, identify, and locate a carrier and that it decides to shoot. In such a situation,
China would need to consider two aspects of system performance in deciding
how many ASBMs to launch. Since the carrier will have moved by the time
ASBMs are fired, China would have to estimate the size of the area of uncertainty
it faces. Next, China would have to decide how many midcourse seekers would
be needed at least to cover that AOU. Finally, China would need to estimate the
probability that those seekers would correctly identify the carrier despite the
possible presence of other high-radar-cross-section ships.
The first sidebar’s analysis implies that China’s AOU would be a circle with a
radius of at least thirty-one kilometers. The second sidebar shows that much de-
pends on the RV seeker’s “footprint”—the area on the surface that the seeker can
search to find its target. If China were in fact able to field a seeker with a
one-hundred-kilometer-radius footprint, only one RV penetrating U.S. active
defenses would be adequate to cover the entire AOU. On the other hand, a
twenty-kilometer-radius footprint would mean that China would need at least
six penetrating RVs to do so. If the AOU proved substantially larger, which
might happen if Chinese leaders deliberated at length before deciding to shoot,
far more RVs (and accordingly ASBMs) would be needed.
An Assessment
The facts reported above suggest that the United States cannot counter the
ASBM threat by buying more SM-3s. Were it to try to do so, China could offset
these efforts by investing in decoys and other countermeasures; it might even be
able to increase ASBM production. However, the United States might counter
the ASBM threat by developing hardware and operational concepts that increase
9 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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ESTIMATING THE AREA OF UNCERTAINTY
As noted earlier, Hagt and Durnin say that China’s satellite systems might be
able to collect data sufficient to detect, locate, and identify an aircraft carrier
(CV) within ASBM range by 2015. (They note, however, China will have too
few satellites to track the CV continuously.) They point out that data from re-
porting satellites would have to be transmitted to a ground station for pro-
cessing. They note that the U.S. data link system has greater bandwidth than
China’s; even so, they say, it would take the United States five minutes to
transmit such data. Given these observations, I assume this transmission
would take more than five minutes but use that figure as a lower bound. Once
transmission was complete, the ground station would need time to process
the data and estimate the CV’s location. In addition, ASBM-carrying TELs
would need ten to fifteen minutes to prepare to fire. If we assume that those
TELs would be told to begin those preparations soon after the ground station
received needed data, we might conclude (optimistically for China) that fif-
teen minutes would be sufficient for both ground-station data analysis/sensor
fusion and TEL launch preparation. If the TEL fired on completing those steps,
the ASBM would require another twelve to fifteen minutes to fly to the target.
At a minimum, therefore, from thirty-two to thirty-five minutes would elapse
between the time that satellites gathered necessary data and when the ASBM
hit. At thirty-five knots, the carrier could travel roughly thirty-one kilometers
in that time.
Note that the timeline just computed implicitly assumes that China’s po-
litical leaders have given orders to its military to fire as soon as it has precise
carrier-location data. This assumption may well prove wrong if the United
States and China were not yet shooting at each other. In that case, China’s po-
litical leaders might want to be notified when a CV was identified and located
within range, so that they could decide whether to attack, on the basis of
their up-to-the-minute assessment of the political situation. If so, a delay
while the politicians decide what to do is quite likely. The longer that delay,
the greater the chances that the AOU would grow so large that Chinese satel-
lites would have to locate the CV again.
HOW MANY ASBMS ARE NEEDED TO COVER THE AOU?
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) expects China’s ASBM’s warhead reentry
vehicle to use an on-board high-altitude radar seeker to look for the carrier
and to correct its trajectory accordingly. As the RV gets closer to earth, ONI ap-
parently expects, active radar would take a “second look” and guide the
ASBM’s RV until it can rely on a “passive” seeker to guide it the rest of the way
to the target.*
Given the process just described, Chinese weaponeers need to know the
ASBM RV radar seeker’s “footprint”—the size of the area on the earth’s sur-
face that it can search. Even if the United States had no active defenses, China
would need to plan to shoot enough ASBMs so that, taken together, their
seeker footprints would cover the AOU.
Hagt and Durnin report that Chinese analysts have referred to a “‘kill ra-
dius’ (the distance the target could deviate from initial position and still be
struck)” for a carrier targeted by an incoming ASBM. They cite three different
Chinese kill-radius estimates: twenty, forty, and a hundred kilometers. It is un-
clear whether the Chinese analysts who made the twenty- and forty-kilometer
estimates did so based on seeker capabilities or arrived at these figures some
other way. Of course, “kill radius” as just defined only applies if the ASBM’s
seeker can cover the entire circle. Therefore, table 2 uses these figures as the
radii of “seeker footprints,” to illustrate the minimum number of RVs re-
quired to cover the first sidebar’s thirty-one-kilometer minimum-radius AOU
and, for comparison, a sixty-kilometer AOU. (I used hexagonal approxima-
tions to make these estimates and rounded upward.)
* This description is based on the ONI illustration in Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic
Strike Capability, p. 21.
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the size of the AOUs that China sees and that drive up the chances that Chinese
seekers will direct RVs to the wrong targets or fail in other ways.
CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILES VS. U.S. AIR BASES ASHORE: CSS-6
VS. KADENA
Land-based aircraft could make important contributions in the event of conflict
over Taiwan. Big-wing planes like tankers and AWACS would act as “force multi-
pliers” for fighter/attack aircraft operating from both land bases and carriers.
Why Focus on Kadena? A recent RAND analysis asserted that the U.S. Air Force
can conduct air operations most efficiently from bases no more than five hun-
dred miles away from the target.38 Kadena, at 460 miles, is the only U.S. air base
within five hundred miles of the Taiwan Strait. Table 3 provides relevant data
concerning the next-closest U.S. bases.
The “distance to the strait” column understates Kadena’s advantage com-
pared to Osan and Kunsan. Both Korean bases are more vulnerable to Chinese
attack, since they are roughly four hundred kilometers from the closest Chinese
territory; Kadena is more than six hundred kilometers distant. In addition, if
big-wing aircraft were to operate from Korean bases, they would likely not fly
directly to operating areas east of Taiwan. Such a flight path would place these
planes dangerously close to China and make them vulnerable to attack by Chi-
nese fighters. Of course, a more circuitous route would reduce the time they
could spend on station in support of carrier- or land-based fighter/attack air-
craft. In addition, such a route would reduce even further the amount of fuel
that tankers could deliver.
How Many CSS-6s Would Put Kadena Out of Action? Suppose that China
sought to crater Kadena’s runways. Given highly accurate missiles, it might do
so with as few as twelve unitary warheads.39 Six warheads could divide each
3,700-meter runway into three segments, none of which would be long enough




RV Seeker “Footprint” Radius Estimates
20 km 40 km 100 km
31 6 1 1
60 13 6 1
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF RVS REQUIRED GIVEN AOUS OF VARIOUS SIZES
Continued from page 92
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Calculations based on RAND Corporation analyses show that forty CSS-6
warheads configured as cluster munitions could completely cover all the areas
where big-wing aircraft would stand between landing and takeoff.40 (Some
fighter-sized aircraft could survive such an attack, because Kadena has fifteen
hardened shelters.) Of course, the effectiveness of a cluster-munition attack de-
pends on how many large aircraft are on the ground at the time. Satellites could
presumably report when many are present, and China could launch CSS-6s soon
after.
China’s best approach would appear to be a combination attack. First, it could
fire missiles to crater runways and prevent aircraft from taking off. Next, it could fire
missiles with cluster munitions to destroy unsheltered aircraft. (Of course, China
would do well to develop and employ still other weapons to help its ballistic-missile
attack succeed. For example, it might employ antiradiation missiles [ARMs] to at-
tack Patriot radars.)
If the United States were willing to bear the costs associated with preparing
for a war that most observers judge unlikely, it could make preparations that
would reduce Kadena’s vulnerability to attacks like those just described.
Rapid-repair kits might enable ground personnel to restore runways to operable
condition. Additional shelters would permit F-15s and F-22s to ride out attacks.
Whether the U.S. Air Force would be willing to budget for such passive defenses
is an entirely separate question, of course. (Fliers prefer buying airplanes to buy-
ing concrete. They sometimes act like they need to buy planes just in case but
will somehow know to buy concrete just in time.)41 In any case, shelters for
big-wing aircraft seem prohibitively costly.
H O Y L E R 9 5




Fixed-Wing Aircraft Distance to Taiwan
Strait (km/mi)
Kadena 2 3,700 m F-15, E-3 AWACS, P-3, RC-135V/W Rivet
Joint, RC-135U Combat Sent and WC-135
Constant Phoenix, F-22*
740/460
Osan 1 2,743 m F-16, OA-10 1,360/845
Kunsan 1 2,743 m F-16 1,263/785
Iwakuni 1 2,440 m F/A-18, F-35† 1,424/885
TABLE 3
U.S. AIR BASES ASHORE CLOSEST TO TAIWAN
Notes:
* F-22s from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, routinely deploy as units to Kadena.
† The Marines reportedly plan to operate F-35s from Iwakuni.
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What Is the ABM-vs.-CSS-6 Balance at Kadena? Kadena’s Patriot battalion re-
portedly has four missile batteries armed with the PAC-3 ABM. Patriot batteries
nominally have eight launchers apiece; each PAC-3 launcher has sixteen mis-
siles. Even if the Kadena PAC-3 battalion has no reloads for its launchers, these
figures imply an inventory of 512 (i.e., 4 × 8 × 16) missiles. DoD reports that it
will have bought 791 PAC-3 missiles by the end of fiscal 2010;42 accordingly, a
Kadena inventory of 512 missiles would constitute roughly two-thirds of all U.S.
PAC-3 missiles worldwide.
The Army has fourteen Patriot battalions. Not all are armed with the PAC-3
missile. Even so, it does not seem plausible, especially in light of the Iranian mis-
sile threat, that a single battalion on Okinawa would have two-thirds of all
PAC-3 missiles. So let us assume that only 264 PAC-3s (roughly a third of the to-
tal) are based there.
Suppose we also assume that Kadena’s Patriots enjoy perfect warning and en-
gage incoming Chinese CSS-6s with two PAC-3s apiece. If so, these ABMs could
engage 132 Chinese missiles. If each PAC-3 enjoyed a 0.7 probability of kill (Pk),
Kadena’s ABMs would destroy all but twelve of these 132 incoming missiles. The
133rd missile and all that followed would be unopposed.
Given these assumptions, China could crater Kadena’s runways and destroy
all unsheltered aircraft by firing 172 CSS-6s. DoD reports that China has 350 to
400 CSS-6 missiles and is building from twenty to forty more each year.43 Thus,
inventory numbers alone suggest that China has a “home game” advantage in
the competition of CSS-6 vs. PAC-3 analogous to the advantage it enjoys in the
contest of ASBM vs. SM-3. (Of course, China would need far fewer CSS-6s if it
destroyed Patriot radars with ARMs.)44
Of course, much depends on circumstances impossible to predict. If a Taiwan
crisis were to arise after missile attacks on friends of the United States in the
Middle East, for example, Kadena might have fewer PAC-3s than assumed above.
What Role Might THAAD and MEADS Play in Defense of Air Bases Ashore?
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a hit-to-kill Army missile sys-
tem designed to shoot down short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in their terminal phases. THAAD has been in development since 1992 but
only recently entered production. According to the Missile Defense Agency, “The
THAAD missile is uniquely designed to intercept targets both inside and outside
the Earth’s atmosphere, making the use of countermeasures in their terminal
phase difficult against THAAD.”45 If that prediction proves accurate, each
THAAD missile deployed to protect Kadena will enhance active defense effective-
ness there.
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The MDA will deliver twenty-five THAAD missiles to operational units in fis-
cal year (FY) 2010. In the near future, MDA expects production of forty-eight
THAAD missiles per year.46 If most or all were devoted to defending Kadena,
they would make active defenses more effective than otherwise. However, since
THAAD will be available in relatively small numbers for several more years,
these missiles might better be devoted to the defense of Andersen Air Force Base,
on Guam.47
The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a joint U.S., German,
and Italian project originally intended to replace the Patriot air-defense system.
It was to “provide a robust, 360-degree defense against the full spectrum of bal-
listic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles,
tactical air to surface missiles, as well as rotary and fixed wing threats.”48 If such a
system were to be developed successfully and were then deployed in sizable
numbers, it too might contribute to Kadena’s defense. However, the Army has
reportedly concluded that MEADS is too costly and unlikely to perform as
needed.49
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CHOICES
The “battle of the inventories” argument just made rests on DoD reports of Chi-
nese missile production to date and projections about future ABM production,
on competing demands for ABMs, on RAND analyses of Kadena vulnerability,
and on the judgment of many analysts that China will prove able to field an ef-
fective ASBM system. The upshot is that active defenses likely cannot adequately
counter the threat posed by China’s “antiaccess” ballistic missiles.
If U.S. ABMs cannot defeat enemy countermeasures, of course, active de-
fenses will prove even more inadequate. The variety of countermeasures China
might field and the apparent failure to test ABMs rigorously against them makes
the case for “business as usual” ABM acquisition even weaker. Given the limits of
active defense, the United States needs to assess other ways of protecting carriers
and air bases ashore. It must make such an assessment in light of the large costs
and (as we have seen) limited benefits of buying all the ABMs called for in cur-
rent plans. Indeed, the United States should decide which other initiatives for
carrier and air-base defense deserve increased funding and effort, even at the
cost of decreased funding and effort for active defense.
Such initiatives fall into two broad categories. On one hand are measures such
as attacks on Chinese missile launchers. On the other hand are passive defense
measures. Detailed discussion of these options is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Instead, I provide examples of possible approaches and comment on costs
and benefits. I argue against approaches involving attacks on Chinese soil and
for the reinvigoration of passive defense.
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Aggressive Measures to Supplement Active Defense
Given the “home field” advantage that China enjoys in the ballistic missile–
vs.–ABM competition, the United States could choose to try to “thin the herd”
of missiles that China could effectively fire. Such alternatives deserve analytic
scrutiny.
Attacks on Missile Launchers. This approach to reducing the ASBM and CSS-6
threat has some obvious downsides. One involves technical feasibility. China’s
ASBMs and CSS-6s are fired from mobile transporter-erector launchers. This
means that the United States has to find TELs before it can strike them. That is
hard to do. In both Persian Gulf wars, the United States was not able to find Scud
launchers despite overwhelming air superiority. American aircraft over China
would be outnumbered in the air and face numerous surface-to-air missiles, so
hunting for TELs would be even harder. The United States might well be unable
to diminish substantially China’s ASBM inventory advantage by attacking
launchers.
Another possible downside involves political constraints. To have the best
chance of offsetting China’s inventory advantage, the United States would need
to attack Chinese launchers before they began firing. However, it is hard to
imagine American political leaders granting permission for preemptive attacks
against an adversary with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles.
When faced with such an adversary during the Cold War, the United States took
great care to avoid fighting the Soviet Union directly. It did not conduct attacks
on Soviet territory and relied on proxies even when combat occurred elsewhere,
like Afghanistan. It is hard to see American political leaders behaving differently
as a means of compensating for inadequacies in ABM capabilities. After all, one
reason for investing in missile defense is to give political leaders options apart
from direct attacks on nuclear-armed adversaries.
Attacks on Chinese Command and Control (C2). Suppose that the United States
could deny China the ability to send launch orders promptly once a carrier was
identified and located or at least could delay such messages. Doing so would in-
crease the size of the area of uncertainty and thus the number of missiles the at-
tacker would have to fire to be successful. Thus, successful disruption of Chinese
C2 might help to offset “Red’s” inventory advantage.
Whether C2 attacks would face the same political constraints as launcher at-
tacks depends on the technology employed. If the United States were able to dis-
rupt command and control without kinetic attacks on Chinese soil (e.g., via
cyberspace attack), American political leaders might go along. Otherwise, attacks
against C2 might encounter the same political resistance as attacks on TELs.
9 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Attacks on Chinese ISR Assets. As noted earlier, one way to decrease the effec-
tiveness of China’s ASBM inventory is to increase the size of the AOUs that
China’s missileers face. Imaginable ways to do so include attacks on Chinese sat-
ellites or on OTH radar ashore. As with other “thin the herd” approaches, the
feasibility of such attacks depends on both technical and political factors. Advo-
cates of such attacks to compensate for active-defense shortcomings face a sub-
stantial burden of proof.
Passive Means of Supplementing Active Defenses
Fortunately, the United States might well compensate for the limits of its active
defenses in ways that do not involve the risks just described. Doing so would in-
volve vigorous development and testing of passive defenses and energetic de-
ployment of those that show promise.
The Case for Reinvigorating Passive Defense at Sea. Of course, the fact that ac-
tive defense is inadequate does not prove that passive defense will work. How-
ever, it does mean that if the Navy is serious about possible conflict with China,
it should reallocate resources from active to passive defense. The Navy should
use increased passive-defense spending to support a rigorous program of hard-
ware development, operational testing, and change in peacetime operating pro-
cedures. Such initiatives will permit the United States to assess more accurately
the extent to which enhanced passive defense can check the ASBM threat.
Efforts to reinvigorate passive defense at sea would likely include severe radar
and communications emissions control, use of decoys and deception emitters,
development and deployment of obscurants, and adoption of operational pat-
terns that China would find hard to predict.50 The United States should not only
develop the hardware needed to permit such operations but publicize the fact.
Indeed, the nation should consider pretending to embrace certain passive de-
fenses, even if they have drawbacks that would make commanders reluctant to
use them in wartime.
Reinvigorated passive defense should, of course, increase the area of uncer-
tainty that Chinese systems confront and thus drive up the odds that the ASBM
system would prove unable to perform its missions. Even if convincingly pre-
tended rather than genuine, such efforts might also erode Chinese confidence
and induce costly investments to restore that confidence. Finally, such initiatives
might persuade the Chinese not to launch ASBM attacks in situations where
they might otherwise have done so.
Reinvigorated passive defenses will come at a cost. One retired naval intelli-
gence officer puts the point this way:
It is very demanding to maximize a CVN’s [nuclear-powered aircraft carrier’s] oper-
ational effectiveness while minimizing its signature. Given the advanced sensors that
H O Y L E R 9 9
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China says that it is fielding, the U.S. Navy will have to take countertargeting very se-
riously—much more seriously than it currently does or did during the Cold War.
Rigorous countertargeting will have to be standard operating procedure, not a peri-
odic and half-hearted event that is readily suspended for safety of operations. In par-
ticular, sufficiently effective countertargeting operations entail increased casualty and
equipment risks in peacetime operations from operating in what is essentially a war-
time mode. If the U.S. Navy is going to operate ships within the range arc of these ad-
vanced missiles and their targeting sensors, it must fully train for it, invest heavily in
passive defense/countertargeting systems, and be ready to accept increased risk and
potentially higher peacetime loss rate (both people and equipment).51
Of course, the United States could continue to spend money as planned and to
shortchange passive defense. Unfortunately, the result might well be to make
U.S. carriers far more vulnerable than they would be if we allocated our efforts
differently.
The Case for Enhanced Passive Defense of Air Bases Ashore. Military-spending
advocates often argue that only real capability deters a serious opponent. If that
is true, the United States needs to assess the prospects that increased efforts at
passive defense would enable air bases like Kadena to survive determined and re-
peated Chinese attacks.52 Of course, passive defense of (inherently fixed) land
bases is in critical respects more difficult than passive defense of (inherently mo-
bile) ships. So it is entirely possible that passive defense investments would pay
off at sea and fail ashore.
That said, what kinds of passive defense investments should the United States
consider, if it is serious about using the U.S. Air Force in a conflict with China?
(Indeed, if it does not take that prospect seriously, why does it need the F-22?)
Several deserve mention.
• RAND reports “weakly protected fuel storage” at Kadena; the United States
should evaluate the costs and payoffs of various fixes.53
• The United States should consider building additional hardened shelters
for fighters. If it fails to do so, relatively modest ballistic-missile invest-
ments would enable China to destroy large numbers of extremely costly
F-22s.
• If U.S. intelligence concludes that Chinese CSS-6s are sufficiently accurate
to sever runways with modest numbers of warheads, the United States
should evaluate the costs and benefits of having enough rapid-runway-
repair kits on hand to restore runways after repeated cratering attacks. Of
course, all kits should be able to pass realistic tests—for example, will the
concrete “set up” in a timely way during the rainy season?
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The vulnerability of big-wing aircraft means the United States should con-
sider unorthodox alternatives. For example, it should evaluate whether to
build hardened shelters for the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a twin-engine turbo-
prop aircraft, and buy E-2Ds for land-based use. Although they are normally
based on carriers and are in some respects inferior to the land-based E-3
AWACS, folding-wing E-2Ds can do something that an E-3 cannot do if caught
on the ground by a ballistic-missile attack—occupy a shelter and survive a
cluster-munition bombardment.
But does a cost-effective substitute for big-wing tankers exist? This issue de-
serves analytic scrutiny, in light of the Chinese ballistic-missile threat to U.S. air
bases in Korea and Japan. Attacks on these bases (or denial of permission to use
them) could mean that U.S. tankers would have to operate from Guam, 1,565 ki-
lometers from the Taiwan Strait. Even massive investments in larger tanker fleets
to operate from Guam might not solve the problem. China could respond to
such developments by developing the means (e.g., ballistic missiles, or cruise
missiles from submarines) to attack “big wings” on Guam.
If Chinese ballistic-missile threats to U.S. carriers and air bases evolve along the
lines described above, the United States needs to compensate for the shortcom-
ings of active defense. Certain kinds of attacks might “thin the herd” of threaten-
ing missiles; others involve prohibitive risks.
Passive defense efforts appear more promising, especially in helping carriers
survive. Even so, the vulnerability of big-wing aircraft may prove an insoluble
problem. If so, destruction of tanker aircraft would reduce the effectiveness of
both carrier fighter-bombers and land-based ones.
In the worst case, a rigorous program of hardware development, changes in
peacetime operations, and operational testing might lead the United States to
conclude that reinvigorated passive defense cannot adequately offset the inade-
quacy of active defense. Such an outcome would not mean that the future is
hopeless. It would mean that the United States should consider a broader menu
of alternatives. For example, the nation might respond by stepping up efforts to
develop very-long-range, stealthy, carrier-based unmanned combat aircraft, as
suggested by Thomas Ehrhard and Robert Work.54 Or it might help Taiwan de-
velop a “porcupine defense,” as suggested by William Murray.55 That approach
might well enable Taiwan to hold out for several months or longer, even if sud-
den Chinese missile strikes put its air force and navy out of action. The United
States might pursue both these alternatives and develop others equally
promising.
Strategy involves weighing costs and benefits. Given the increased costs and
risks implied by China’s emerging missile forces, the United States needs to
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consider more broadly how best to protect its interests in the western Pacific.
More of the same—active defense—is unlikely to work.
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ful CSS-6 attack. For example, cruise missiles
pose another potential threat to unsheltered
aircraft. (For more detail on that threat, see
John Stillion and David Orletsky, Airbase
Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile
and Ballistic-Missile Attacks [Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1999], pp. 15–17.) Of course,
the all-too-plausible prospect that Kadena
and other Japanese bases will not survive to
make a difference in U.S.-Chinese combat
over Taiwan raises a political uncertainty. In
combination with other factors, this prospect
may lead Japan to deny the United States per-
mission to use its bases.
12. The CSS-6 delivers a 500 kg payload at a
range of 600 km. The distance from Kadena
to the closest point in mainland China is
about 640 km. So Chinese missileers will have
to reduce the payload somewhat to extend
the CSS-6’s range. For an analysis of trading
off payload to increase ballistic-missile range,
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netic transmissions. Subcategories of SIGINT
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tions intelligence).
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units, such as carriers, restrict their electronic
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talions with seventeen launchers apiece.
Stokes, China’s Evolving Conventional Strate-
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Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Wash-
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ment before the Senate Armed Services
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some capability against the longer-range
intermediate-range and intercontinental
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ballistic missiles that Block I missiles cannot
hit. (Missile details come from Ronald
O’Rourke, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
[Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, updated 21 November 2008], pp. 6,
8.)
28. O’Rourke, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense,
p. 10.
29. The Missile Defense Agency’s director men-
tioned a goal of “approximately 70” SM-2
Block IV missiles in June 2009. See Lt. Gen.
Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile
Defense Agency, [Testimony] Before the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009,
111th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9, available at
www.mda.mil/. For the figure of eighty, Rear
Adm. Alan B. Hicks, “Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall
Institute” (3 August 2009). Slide 10 of this
presentation says that the U.S. Navy will
“modify 70–80 SM-2 Block IV missiles.”
30. Hicks, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Over-
view for the George C. Marshall Institute,”
slide 3. The slide contrasts the objective of
147 SM-3 missiles in the FY 2009 “President’s
Budget” (PB09) with the newer objective of
218 in PB10. The 220 figure includes 218
SM-3 Block I, IA, and IB missiles and two
SM-3 Block IIA missiles. In discussing the
now-superseded goal of 147 SM-3s by 2015,
the Missile Defense Agency’s FY 2009 “Bud-
get Estimates Overview” (p. 20) provided ad-
ditional detail about the SM-3 types that will
constitute the first 147 delivered: “The pro-
gram will still deliver a total of 147 SM-3 mis-
siles, but the first 94 will be Block I/IA
missiles, not the 75 as proposed in PB 08.”
31. Michael Bennett and Kevin Eveker, Options
for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget
Office [hereafter CBO], February 2009), p.
21. CBO mentioned the seventy-two-missile
SM-3 requirement before DoD announced its
decision to rely only on sea-based ABMs to
counter the Iranian threat. However, CBO
assumed seventy-two SM-3s in estimating
implementation costs for such a decision.
CBO envisioned ten SM-3s aboard six of the
nine ships devoted to this mission and an ad-
ditional twelve as spares. CBO also envi-
sioned using SM-3 Block IIA missiles, which
will not enter production until 2015. So it
seems safe to assume that at least seventy-two
of the less-capable Block I missiles would be
required for deployments begun sooner.
32. CBO assumed the Navy would use a modi-
fied version of the Littoral Combat Ship for
this role. Table 1 reflects the assumption that
the Navy would rely on ABM-configured
Arleigh Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga
cruisers.
33. Historically, the combat performance of
guided missiles has fallen short of what is ex-
pected based on peacetime test results. For
example, RAND data show that the AIM-7’s
combat Pk in Vietnam was 0.08, compared to
prewar estimates of 0.7. See John Stillion and
Scott Perdue, “Air Combat, Past and Future,”
RAND Corporation Briefing, August 2008,
slide 19.
34. Culora, “Strategic Implications of Obscur-
ants,” p. 75.
35. Hagt and Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic
Missile,” p. 105.
36. U.S. Defense Dept., Military Power of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 2009 (Washington,
D.C.: March 2009), p. 66, says that China has
sixty to eighty DF-21s, which DoD calls
CSS-5s. The 2008 report (p. 24) says that
“upwards of 50” of these missiles are reserved
for nuclear missions. If that is correct, China
might have as many as thirty (80 − 50) con-
ventional DF-21s available.
37. See Andrew M. Sessler et al., Countermea-
sures: A Technical Evaluation of the Opera-
tional Effectiveness of the Planned US National
Missile Defense System (Cambridge, Mass.:
Union of Concerned Scientists/MIT Security
Studies Program, April 2000), p. 44. This
study describes a large number of decoy and
penetration-aid strategies for defeating
exo-atmospheric interceptors.
38. Stillion and Perdue, “Air Combat, Past and
Future,” slide 14.
39. The Taiwanese National Ministry of Defense
estimates that an SRBM-delivered 500 kg
unitary warhead can create a runway crater
ten meters deep and twenty meters wide. (See
Bernard Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects [London: Routledge, 2006], p. 116.)
I assume that such a crater is a cone with
depth equal to radius and that displacement
from such a warhead is proportional to war-
head size. Given those assumptions, I
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extrapolate that a 436 kg warhead could pro-
duce a crater 9.5 meters wide. Given highly
accurate delivery, six such warheads could
crater and sever one of Kadena’s runways at
two different points.
40. This estimate rests in part on two RAND
analyses. In their 1999 Airbase Vulnerability
study (p. 14), John Stillion and David
Orletsky estimate that a 500 kg warhead
could deliver 825 bomblets for a destruction
area nine hundred feet in diameter. In their
2008 “Air Combat” briefing, John Stillion
and Scott Perdue state that thirty-four mis-
siles with submunition warheads could
“cover all parking ramps at Kadena” and
“damage, destroy, or strand 75 percent of air-
craft based there” (slide 10). Since I assume a
smaller (436 kg) warhead would enable the
CSS-6 to reach Kadena, I assume fewer
bomblets (721) and a smaller destruction di-
ameter (842 feet). Roughly forty of these
smaller cluster warheads would cover the
same area as the thirty-four 500 kg ones. See
Stillion and Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to
Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-
Missile Attacks, and Stillion and Perdue, “Air
Combat, Past and Future.”
41. In the late 1970s, the U.S. Air Force argued
for buying more F-15s because of the Soviet
threat. However, it was reluctant to invest in
shelters at the same time, even though un-
sheltered F-15s on the ground would have
been sitting ducks.
42. U.S. Defense Dept., Program Acquisition Costs
by Weapon System: Department of Defense
Budget for Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington,
D.C.: May 2009), pp. 3–33.
43. DoD’s Military Power report for 2009
counted 230–270 CSS-6s in 2005 and
350–400 in 2009. These figures imply pro-
duction of as few as eighty (350 − 270), or as
many as 170 (400 − 230), over four years.
44. William Murray describes various ways
China might attack PAC radars on Taiwan. It
could use similar systems (or develop longer-
ranged ones) to do so on Okinawa. William
Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strat-
egy,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 3
(Summer 2008), p. 18.
45. Missile Defense Agency, The Missile Defense
Program (Washington, D.C.: 3 August 2009),
p. 12, available at www.mda.mil/.
46. Ibid., p. 15.
47. China’s inventories of missiles capable of be-
ing modified to hit Andersen are much
smaller than its inventories of CSS-6s. Unless
this situation changes, small numbers of
THAAD missiles might contribute more to
protecting Andersen than they could contrib-
ute to protecting Kadena.
48. U.S. Army Dept., 2007 Posture Statement
(Washington, D.C.: 14 February 2007), avail-
able at www.army.mil.
49. Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon Resists Army’s
Desire to Stop Development of MEADS Mis-
sile System,” Washington Post, 9 March 2010.
50. For an imaginative suggestion about how the
Navy might exploit relatively cheap Army-
developed obscurants to protect ships from
missile attack, see Brett Morash, “Naval
Obscuration” (Naval War College research
paper, Newport, R.I., 21 June 2006). For an
assessment of how the United States might
benefit from developing and deploying effec-
tive obscurants, see Culora, “Strategic Impli-
cations of Obscurants,” pp. 73–84.
51. Personal communication, 21 September
2009.
52. Continued American failure to make serious
investments in Kadena passive defenses
might conceivably affect Japan’s willingness
to permit U.S. combat operations from its
soil. Why should Japan offend its nuclear-
armed neighbor China if doing so will help
the United States only temporarily, until
CSS-6s put Kadena out of action?
53. Of course, a thorough analysis of Kadena sur-
vivability would have to consider its entire lo-
gistics supply chain. Thus, hardened fuel
storage ashore might not be a worthwhile in-
vestment if China could easily attack the
ships used to resupply fuel. Carriers also de-
pend on ships for fuel resupply, but again,
carrier mobility makes interdiction much
harder for China.
54. See Ehrhard and Work, Range, Persistence,
Stealth, and Networking, pp. 147–60.
55. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strat-
egy,” p. 13.
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THE MOST DARING ACT OF THE AGE
Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy
As the American military confronts the challenges of the twenty-first centurythere is a great deal of discussion of counterinsurgency, hybrid conflict, and
irregular warfare. In military history none of these concepts are new. Much of
the recent scholarship and writing on these forms of warfare has focused on to-
day’s operations ashore, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are
significant implications for naval warfare as well. The leaders of the sea services
stated in the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” that “preventing
wars is as important as winning wars.”1 If the U.S. Navy is going to embrace this
belief as it sails deeper into the twenty-first century, development of naval irreg-
ular warfare will become vital to its future success and relevance.
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that the best use of a navy is to find and
defeat an opponent’s fleet, but from the earliest history of the republic the U.S.
Navy has been involved in operations other than fleet-on-fleet engagements.2
These irregular operations, in the “green” (littoral) and “brown” (riverine) wa-
ters of the world, have been conducted on a global scale, no matter the size or
shape of the U.S. fleet. In 1839, during the Second
Seminole War, the “Mosquito Fleet,” under the com-
mand of Lieutenant John McLaughlin, conducted
joint counterinsurgency operations in the Everglades,
working with Army units.3 For almost half a century
shallow-draft American gunboats patrolled the rivers
of China, before being organized into the Yangtze Pa-
trol Force in 1921.4 In the 1960s and 1970s thousands
of sailors served in the Coastal Surveillance Force
Lieutenant Commander Armstrong is a naval aviator
who has served as an amphibious search and rescue and
special warfare pilot and an advanced helicopter flight
instructor. He is currently serving with Helicopter Sea
Combat Squadron 28. He holds a master’s degree in
military history from Norwich University and has writ-
ten on airpower and naval history. His articles and re-
views have appeared in numerous journals, including
Strategic Insights, Defense & Security Analysis, and
the Journal of Military History.
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(Task Force 115), the River Patrol Force (TF 116), and the Mobile Riverine Force
(TF 117), conducting brown- and green-water operations and counterinsur-
gency missions along the coasts of South Vietnam.5 These are just a few exam-
ples, taken from the long history of irregular warfare in the U.S. Navy.
In January 2010 the Chief of Naval Operations released “The U.S. Navy’s Vi-
sion for Confronting Irregular Challenges.”6 The document recognizes the need
to “define the strategic and operational tenets and approaches for our navy to
apply across our general purpose and special operation forces.” These tenets and
approaches must be founded in the historical lessons of over two centuries of ir-
regular U.S. naval operations. The current counterinsurgency doctrine devel-
oped jointly by the Army and Marine Corps takes great pains to study and
embrace the history of the mission.7 As the Navy comes to terms with its role in
modern, asymmetric conflict, it too will return to its past.
In early 1804 the United States found itself embroiled in the first foreign test
of American power and resolve, a test that it was failing. After a single irregular-
warfare mission, however, everything changed. A bold raid led by Lieutenant
Stephen Decatur against Tripoli harbor to burn the captured frigate USS Phila-
delphia changed the direction of the conflict and raised American prestige
throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. Admiral Horatio Nelson, who was
in command of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean at the time, called the at-
tack “the most daring act of the age.” This example of early American irregular
warfare can suggest important principles for the twenty-first century as the
Navy looks to redevelop its ability to conduct asymmetric missions.
DISAPPOINTMENTS AND DEBACLES
It did not take long after gaining its independence for the United States to be-
come involved in its first overseas conflict. At the turn of the nineteenth century
the northern coast of Africa—the Barbary Coast, as it was known—was made
up of the sultanate of Morocco and the regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli,
all of which owed allegiance in one form or another to the Ottoman Empire.
These tributaries, for the most part autonomous, were the homes of a developed
culture of piracy and slave trade that stretched as far back as the fall of the Ro-
man Empire. During the eighteenth century over 150,000 European Christians
had been captured into slavery or held for ransom by the Barbary powers. By the
time of the American Revolution a well established system of tribute was in exis-
tence by which the trading nations of Europe paid “tribute,” protection money,
to the Barbary rulers in exchange for the safety of their merchant ships. The cor-
sairs of the Barbary Coast, entrepreneurial men of the sea, recognized that now
that the United States was free from Great Britain, American merchant ships no
longer fell under the protection of the Royal Navy or the tribute paid by the
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British Crown. Mediterranean raiders from the Ottoman tributaries of North
Africa fell upon the extensive American merchant trade that passed near their
shores, taking ships and cargo as booty and sailors for ransom.8
In May 1801, the pasha of Tripoli made it official when, after demanding over
two hundred thousand dollars in tribute, he declared war on the United States of
America. In response President Thomas Jefferson sent a series of naval squad-
rons to the Mediterranean to protect American merchant shipping. The first de-
ployment, which began in 1801 under Commodore Richard Dale, was marked
by frustration and failure. The force, termed a “Peace Establishment,” operated
under strict rules of engagement. American warships were allowed to intervene
only when they directly witnessed an attack on an American merchant by a cor-
sair.9 The primary success of the squadron came at Gibraltar, where it discovered
Tripoli’s naval commander anchored there with two vessels. Dale ordered Cap-
tain Samuel Baron to lie off the harbor with USS Philadelphia, bottling up the
small Tripolitan force. The corsairs eventually gave up waiting for Philadelphia
to leave, dismantled their ships, and discharged their crews.10 Meanwhile, Dale
dispersed his three other ships across the Mediterranean, where they conducted
convoys and cruised singly for corsairs. In the end they had little to show.
A second mission left Hampton Roads in 1802, under the command of Com-
modore Richard Morris. Although the president and Congress had relaxed the
rules of engagement, “Morris’ squadron behaved more like a touring company
than a naval force.”11 Morris brought his wife along for the trip and spent plenty
of time ashore with family. William Eaton, the American consul at Tunis (who
would in 1805 lead the American attack on Derna), asked in a letter, “What have
they [the squadron’s crews] done but dance and wench?”12 Morris’s deployment
was even less successful operationally than Dale’s, despite having more ships and
its more aggressive rules of engagement. This inactivity and reports of the
squadron’s behavior that reached Washington resulted in Morris’s relief and of-
ficial censure. In 1803 Commodore Edward Preble was dispatched to the Medi-
terranean with a third American squadron.13
The first great challenge that Preble encountered was the capture by
Tripolitan forces of the forty-four-gun frigate Philadelphia under Captain Wil-
liam Bainbridge while negotiating with the Moroccans. In November 1803
Bainbridge had spotted a coastal raiding craft “very near the shore” running to-
ward the harbor of Tripoli.14 Philadelphia gave chase, and the vessel hoisted
Tripolitan colors. Bainbridge ran in as close to shore as he felt comfortable, care-
fully checking his charts, which indicated forty-two feet of water beneath his
keel. As the Tripolitan ship neared the entrance to the harbor Philadelphia was
obliged to bear off the wind, allowing the Tripolitan to escape, and ran aground
on unmarked rocks in twelve feet of water.15
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The Americans were unable to refloat the ship, even after casting the ballast
and the majority of the guns overboard and cutting away the foremast. Gun-
boats sailed from Tripoli harbor and began to shell the grounded ship. Accord-
ing to the ship’s officers, “every exertion was made, and every expedient tried, to
get her off and defend her.”16 Nonetheless, fearing for the safety of his crew as the
enemy shells began to gain accuracy, Bainbridge surrendered his command to
the Tripolitans. Local knowledge of the tides and currents allowed the enemy to
float the ship and carry its prize and three hundred prisoners into Tripoli.17
Preble was faced with a difficult situation. The international prestige of the
United States, and the Navy in particular, plummeted after the capture of Phila-
delphia. After the bumbling of the first two squadrons, American naval leader-
ship appeared at best foolish, at worst incompetent. Preble was faced with two
choices: either to mount an invasion of the city of Tripoli to retake Philadelphia
and free Bainbridge and the prisoners or to develop a plan to destroy the frigate
at its mooring in Tripoli harbor.
Reports indicated that Philadelphia lay deep in the harbor, “within pistol shot
of the whole of the Tripolitan marine, mounting altogether upward of one hun-
dred pieces of heavy cannon, and within the immediate protection of formida-
ble land batteries, consisting of one hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy
artillery.”18 In the harbor a mixed fleet of nineteen gunboats, two schooners, two
galleys, and a brig, with over a thousand Tripolitan sailors, lay at anchor or were
moored to the quay. It was also estimated that the guns of the harbor fortress
were supported by twenty-five thousand troops encamped in the city. Preble’s
squadron at the time was made up of only seven ships and eight gunboats. In-
cluding the small detachments of U.S. Marines on board he could muster a total
of 1,060 men.19 Preble realized that there was little chance of success in mount-
ing an invasion of the pasha’s regency with the forces he had at his disposal.
A BOLD YOUNG OFFICER
The solution to the capture of Philadelphia came in the form of irregular war-
fare. Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, in command of the fourteen-gun schooner
USS Enterprise, had recently captured a small Tripolitan ketch, Mastico. Origi-
nally built as a bomb ketch for Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt, the small ves-
sel had been purchased by Tripolitan merchants and converted to a commercial
vessel; now, it easily blended with local craft.20 Its capture was still recent and
likely to be unknown in Tripoli’s harbor. Decatur saw an opportunity.
The young lieutenant approached the commodore in the squadron’s Sicilian
base at Syracuse, where the flagship, USS Constitution, and Enterprise were both
in port. Sending the American squadron in close enough to ensure the Philadel-
phia’s destruction by bombardment would place its ships in too great a danger
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from the massed enemy guns. Nor did the Americans have enough force for a
full assault on the city. Decatur suggested that, with men from Enterprise as crew,
the captured ketch could slip into Tripoli’s harbor, then board and recapture
Philadelphia.21 Once he was in control of Philadelphia the lieutenant intended to
sail it clear of the harbor and back into the service of the United States.
Preble considered the plan of the promising young officer and realized that it
just might work. On 31 January 1804 the commodore renamed the captured
ketch Intrepid and ordered Decatur to take command of an expedition against
Tripoli harbor. Decatur was authorized to load stores for thirty days and draw a
crew of seventy-five sailors and Marines. Preble instructed Decatur to take only
volunteers, for the mission would be dangerous; he sent him five midshipmen
from Constitution, as well as the flagship’s Italian pilot. He also ordered the brig
USS Syren, sixteen guns, commanded by Lieutenant Charles Stewart, to accom-
pany Decatur and provide support as required. The commodore was clear in the
purpose of the mission: he wanted Philadelphia destroyed—not recovered, as
Decatur had proposed. His formal orders to Decatur stated, “The destruction of
the Philadelphia is an object of great importance”; they gave strict instructions
that “after the ship is well on fire, [Decatur was to] point two of the eighteen-
pounders, shotted, down the main hatch, and blow her bottom out.”22 Attempt-
ing to sail the frigate clear of the harbor would pose too great a risk to his men,
no matter how gallantly they were led.
Decatur took two days to load the stores, weapons, and explosives before In-
trepid set sail in the company of Syren. The sixty-ton bomb ketch, designed as a
coaster and generally unfit for long, blue-water voyages, had a difficult
250-nautical-mile crossing. Also, the men aboard Intrepid discovered, after
they were under way, that many of the stores they had been issued were putrid
and unusable. On 7 February, as they approached the North African coast, a
gale struck the two American ships; Intrepid’s small size and poor construction
nearly doomed the expedition. They survived the storm and the poor provi-
sions, but word now spread that the force might have been discovered. The
confidence of the men was severely tested. Lewis Heermann, a Navy surgeon
asked by Decatur to join the mission, wrote later that among the men these
challenges “laid the foundation of apprehensions of eventual failure.”23
A DARING ATTACK
On 16 February, under a noonday sun, Intrepid approached within sight of Trip-
oli harbor. The weather had improved following the gale, but the horizon did
not look promising and the crew suspected a second storm was coming. Decatur
called a council of his officers to discuss their situation: dwindling stores, poor
weather approaching, and a crew that was beginning to lose morale. They came
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to the conclusion that they could not wait for Syren, which had separated from
Intrepid after the storm and agreed to meet later that evening with boats to help
screen Intrepid’s retreat after the mission. The winds were favorable for both a
smooth entry into and exit from the harbor, and the storm clouds appeared to be
a day off. Decatur ordered his crew to clear the decks and make ready for battle.
The men concealed themselves, mostly below, and at nightfall Intrepid made
its approach into the harbor. Salvatore Catalano, the Italian pilot sent by Preble,
had sailed the Mediterranean for decades and knew the harbor well. He guided
the ketch through the anchored ships, the relatively massive hull of Philadelphia
easily visible in the lights of the city. As Intrepid approached the frigate a sentry
called out; Catalano called back in a local language, a Mediterranean sailor’s pa-
tois of mixed dialects, and talked the vessel alongside. Intrepid made fast to Phil-
adelphia, and the Americans struck.
The boarding party, made up of sixty sailors and Marines, poured from below
decks and scaled the side of the frigate. Midshipman Richard Morris, who would
later command USS Adams in the War of 1812 and be promoted to commodore,
was the first to reach Philadelphia’s deck, “in a spirit of gallant emulation,” fol-
lowed closely by Midshipman Thomas MacDonough, who was to be the hero of
the battle of Lake Champlain.24 The Americans fell upon the Tripolitan guards
with swords and knives, under strict orders from Decatur not to use firearms, for
fear of alerting the rest of the harbor. The attack went like clockwork, as each of
the men went rapidly about his assigned task. Twenty guards were killed, and
one was taken prisoner; the men then began setting up the combustibles. Several
Tripolitans, however, had escaped in a boat that was moored on the opposite side
from Intrepid or had jumped overboard; the alarm went out across the harbor,
and the fortress opened fire.25
Catalano glanced around the harbor. The winds continued to favor their es-
cape; the tides, current, and layout of the harbor were better than he had antici-
pated. He found Decatur and explained that they might be able to bring the
frigate safely out of the harbor after all, even without its foremast and with only a
skeleton crew. The lieutenant, however, had his orders.26 Philadelphia—which
his father, Captain Stephen Decatur, Sr., had commissioned in 1801—had to be
destroyed.
Decatur ordered fires set in the storerooms, gun room, cockpit, and berth
deck. The lieutenant ordered the men back aboard Intrepid as cannon shot from
the fortress flew overhead. The rapidly spreading flames poured from the
hatches and ports as Decatur himself crossed back to the ketch. When he cast off,
the fire had begun to climb the frigate’s rigging. Under Catalano’s guidance In-
trepid began to make its way to the channel, firing its four guns and muskets.
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As Intrepid cleared the harbor it was joined by Syren’s boats, which had fol-
lowed orders despite Intrepid’s earlier than expected attack and now covered the
escape. Philadelphia, engulfed in flames and its cable burned through, drifted
through the harbor, finally coming to rest against the fortress.27 In the confusion
there was little attempt to chase the escaping Americans. Syren’s men aug-
mented the crew of Intrepid and transferred fresh stores as a gale began to close
in. Together the American ships weathered the storm and began the long transit
back to Syracuse.
NAVAL IRREGULAR WARFARE
Alfred Thayer Mahan taught naval officers that “the study of history lies at the
foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”28 While Decatur’s
daring attack on Tripoli harbor cannot be exactly duplicated in modern naval
operations, there are principles of naval irregular warfare that can be derived
from the episode. As the Navy attempts to move forward with its “vision for con-
fronting irregular challenges,” it is important that historical principles become
part of the discussion. Important as they could be to the success of future opera-
tions, however, these historical principles should not be considered rules or
equations that will guarantee successful results. Principles determined from his-
tory are, as Mahan suggested, “not so much fetters, or bars, which compel [our]
movements aright, as guides which warn when [we are] going wrong.”29
It has been suggested that Decatur’s raid can be seen as the Navy’s first “spe-
cial operation.” This is not the case according to today’s doctrine, which defines
special operations and special warfare as “operations conducted by specially or-
ganized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve mili-
tary, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional
military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.”30 While the mis-
sion was certainly unconventional and aimed to achieve a military objective in a
hostile area, it was not carried out by a “specially organized, trained, and
equipped” force. The crew of Intrepid was made up of volunteers hastily gath-
ered from other American naval vessels. They brought with them standard
training in early nineteenth-century naval warfare and had no specially de-
signed equipment. The mission, then, is best classified as “irregular warfare”
rather than an example of “special operations.”
The strike against Philadelphia can be described as a “cutting-out expedi-
tion.” These missions were not uncommon in the age of sail, and numerous ex-
amples can be drawn from American naval history. In 1778 Captain John Paul
Jones, commanding USS Ranger, attempted to capture HMS Drake while at an-
chor in the roads at Carrickfergus, Ireland.31 In 1812 Lieutenant Jesse Elliot
would cut out the brigs Detroit and Caledonia in one of the first naval operations
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on the Great Lakes during the War of 1812.32 These missions were not tradi-
tional, open-water ship duels or squadron engagements. However, they were
conducted by what today would be called a “general-purpose force,” making
them perfect examples of irregular warfare in the early American period.
The first principle of naval irregular warfare that is demonstrated by
Decatur’s raid emerges from the fact that Intrepid’s expedition was part of a con-
ventional operation and was directly supported by regular naval forces. The
Tripolitan corsairs refused squadron-level engagements and frequently ran
from single-ship battles as well. The American squadron in the Mediterranean
had established local command of the sea.33 Decatur’s chances of success were
much higher because of the local dominance established by Preble’s conven-
tional naval forces.
More directly, without the assistance of USS Syren the mission would likely
have failed. Most of the combustibles used to burn Philadelphia were prepared
aboard Syren and transferred to Intrepid for the attack.34 The larger warship
stood by to provide protection during Intrepid’s escape and support during the
storms that they soon encountered. Commodore Preble wrote in his reports that
Syren had been vital to the success and that Lieutenant Stewart’s “conduct
through the expedition has been judicious and highly meritorious.”35
Naval irregular warfare, then, while it can be carried out by special operations
forces, is an appropriate and important mission for conventional naval forces. It
requires fleet support, but at the same time it directly contributes to the fleet’s
mission.
When applying this principle to modern naval affairs it is important to high-
light the balance required. A fleet must be able to achieve and maintain com-
mand of the sea. However, it is just as important to be able to use that command
once achieved—for, among other vital purposes, irregular warfare. As Sir Julian
Corbett pointed out in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, naval forces are key
elements of limited wars, which commonly require irregular capabilities.36 The
U.S. Navy has worked to expand its irregular-warfare capability, forming for that
purpose the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). But some mem-
bers of the Navy seem to believe that this simple organizational act is “the an-
swer”—that irregular warfare can simply be left to forward-deployed sailors
from NECC. Its personnel, in fact, often feel cut off from the greater Navy.
NECC cannot do it alone; the support, and even conduct, of naval irregular war-
fare by the general-purpose force is critical to “leveraging the maritime do-
main.”37 Rear Admiral Phillip Greene, the director of the Navy Irregular Warfare
Office, has written in an “op-ed” piece on the website Defense News, “What is of-
ten described as irregular warfare is actually part of the regular mission set for
the Navy.”38
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The type of ship used in the attack points to a second principle of naval irreg-
ular warfare. Mastico, as Intrepid had been named prior to its capture, was main-
tained according to what today are called “commercial standards,” for merchant
service along the coastal littorals and shallows of North Africa. While armed, it
did not carry the heavy armament of a warship; neither did it have the heavy dis-
placement or deep draft that would have limited its ability to escape from Tripoli
harbor. The grounding of Philadelphia demonstrated the risks of using large
warships, designed for fleet engagement, in the littorals.
Intrepid had its own limitations. Its construction quality and its design as a
coaster created risk when it crossed the open Mediterranean during storm sea-
son. Twice storms nearly swamped it. Intrepid’s light armament required the
commodore to send Syren for fire support. Vessels designed to operate close to
shore or that offer amphibious capability are vital to irregular warfare but are
risky to use for traditional open-water missions or in the line of battle; they must
be used judiciously.
“The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges” calls for new
platforms and systems, and in turn a reallocation of resources, to conduct irreg-
ular warfare properly.39 There appears to be a willingness to make the required
changes to acquisitions plans. Changes that merit more study and possibly some
form of implementation, if the Navy takes irregular warfare seriously, might be
along the lines of “Influence Squadrons” or the “New Navy Fighting Machine.”40
Also, the Navy frequently highlights the multimission capabilities of the Arleigh
Burke–class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), arguing that the vessels could
serve the fleet’s irregular-warfare requirement.41 At the dawn of the nineteenth
century too the U.S. Navy had a large, multimission vessel that was technologi-
cally advanced and the envy of other nations—Joshua Humphreys’s “fast frig-
ates.”42 However, USS Philadelphia was one of those frigates; Decatur’s raid was
necessary because large, multimission combatants are not always the answer for
fighting in the littorals. The new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a start, a recogni-
tion that equipment and shipbuilding are important to meeting irregular-
warfare challenges, but not the end.
A third principle of naval irregular warfare is that a particular quality of lead-
ership is needed—“empowered” and aggressive junior officers. Stephen Decatur
was one of several rising lieutenants whom senior officers and government offi-
cials considered as the “young officers” who would perpetuate “the glory and
triumphs of the American flag.”43 Less than five years prior to the burning of
Philadelphia he had been promoted from midshipman. He had been in com-
mand of small vessels for less than two years when he approached Commodore
Preble with his plan. That is, Stephen Decatur had nothing to lose by suggesting
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this irregular mission—he was years away from consideration for further pro-
motion that might have been jeopardized by a failure.
Junior officers have frequently been sources of innovation and creativity, but
today there is a temptation, due to modern communications and information
technology, for senior commanders to take larger roles at the tactical level. P. W.
Singer has written about the “rise of the tactical general,” warning of its negative
impact on initiative and effectiveness.44 Due to the very nature of irregular mis-
sions—dispersed but part of a larger plan—it is vital that creative problem solv-
ing and leadership among junior officers be encouraged and rewarded. Whether
the leader of a boarding team off the coast of the Somalia or a helicopter aircraft
commander conducting counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, tactical
leaders’ actions can have strategic effects in so-called hybrid conflicts. If these
“strategic junior officers” are micromanaged, they will lose initiative, and the ef-
fectiveness of irregular warfare will suffer.
Besides the temptation of modern technology to micromanagement, the di-
rection of force structure and shipbuilding also appears to be limiting the devel-
opment of daring and capable junior officers. The intention to replace the
Navy’s patrol craft and minesweepers with the LCS has removed the last oppor-
tunity for command at sea for lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. The LCS,
deemed too valuable to entrust to such inexperienced officers, will be assigned
to officers in the grade of commander. Generations of senior naval officers have
learned to balance aggressive leadership and risk from their experience in com-
mand of small ships—not just Stephen Decatur but also Chester Nimitz and the
current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen.45 At a
time when some serving and retired officers feel that the Navy’s leadership cul-
ture is taking risk-aversion to an extreme, daring and creative junior officers are
unlikely to survive failure or to be rewarded for success.46
A fourth and final principle of naval irregular warfare is that local and cul-
tural knowledge, whether from members of the U.S. Navy or through local part-
nership, is vital for the success of missions like Decatur’s raid. Without Salvatore
Catalano and his knowledge of the local customs and language, it would have
been nearly impossible for Intrepid to get alongside Philadelphia without raising
an alarm first. Catalano was a Sicilian merchant seaman, a native of Palermo,
who had worked the routes between Tripoli and Malta for over a decade.47 His
firsthand knowledge of the tricky shoals and shallows of Tripoli harbor was cou-
pled with his mastery of the local maritime dialect, a mix of Arabic, Berber, and
other Mediterranean languages. He had served as a pilot aboard Constitution
and Enterprise, with the blessing of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. During the
Barbary Wars the cooperation of the Sicilians and the British at Gibraltar and
Malta represented key partnerships for the Americans, providing not only
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secure supply bases but also gunboats that would be used in Commodore
Preble’s attack on Tripoli later in 1804.48
Today the employment of local sailors like Catalano offers an option, one
that underlines the importance of maintaining theater-security relationships
around the globe. Partnership with local forces can produce the knowledge
necessary for success. A second source of this important knowledge is cultural
expertise from the U.S. military’s intelligence and foreign-area-officer com-
munities. These specialists are growing in numbers and are vital to the plan-
ning and execution of irregular missions. These communities must continue
to grow in order to support ships that are headed to theaters where irregular
missions can be expected. Irregular-warfare missions are frequently joint af-
fairs as well, as seen in the early demonstration of the “Navy–Marine Corps
team” in Decatur’s raid. While there may be no naval unit with the specializa-
tion or local knowledge required for a particular mission, experts from the
other services or interagency resources may be able to provide them.
NAVAL IRREGULAR WARFARE: PAST AND PRESENT
When the Chief of Naval Operations released “The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Con-
fronting Irregular Challenges” he called on the service to identify and develop
the doctrine, tactics, and equipment required to face the asymmetric challenges
of the twenty-first century. An examination of America’s naval past provides nu-
merous examples of naval irregular warfare. American naval strategy prior to
the Spanish-American War was not based on the decisive fleet engagement but
on gunboat diplomacy, blockade, commerce raiding, riverine campaigns, and
amphibious warfare. In the twenty-first-century context of naval power, much
of America’s early naval heritage would be considered irregular warfare or a hy-
brid of irregular and conventional campaigns.
In order to develop modern irregular-warfare strategies and operations suc-
cessfully, the U.S. Navy needs to look to the past. The First Barbary War demon-
strates four important principles for success in irregular warfare. It must be part
of a greater naval strategy and be supported by regular forces. Vessels must be
suited to the littoral environment, where these missions commonly occur. Lead-
ership at a low level in the chain of command will ensure that missions do not
become encumbered with oversight that can disrupt the effectiveness of the unit
on scene. Finally, local cultural knowledge or partnership will help ensure that
the specific expertise required for mission accomplishment is available. By re-
membering these principles as it plans for irregular-warfare missions and cam-
paigns, the U.S. Navy will be better prepared to engage in the asymmetric and
hybrid conflicts of the twenty-first century.
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FOUR LESSONS THAT THE U.S. NAVY MUST LEARN
FROM THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION
Angus K. Ross
There is only one thing harder than getting an old idea out of a military
mind, and that is to get a new one in.
SIR BASIL H. LIDDELL HART
Four years ago, on 14 June 2006, at a Current Strategy Forum held at the Na-val War College, the then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Mi-
chael Mullen, challenged the audience to think about a new strategy for the U.S.
Navy.1 Recalling the enthusiasm and fresh thinking that had surrounded the de-
velopment of the World War II ORANGE plans against Japan and a later, Cold
War, naval strategy, he urged that the time was ripe to take an equally fundamen-
tal look at the needs and constraints of the modern age and to codify a possible
maritime contribution to emerging national objectives. Early work in this direc-
tion has produced the joint Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard document “A Co-
operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (hereafter CS-21), which was
released in October 2007.2 It is fair to say that the paper has had mixed reviews,
and it is not the author’s intent here to add anything to that debate. Instead, it is
hoped that this article—by taking the “Cooperative
Strategy” simply as a broad statement of how sea
power might be used in the next twenty years or so to
defend the nation’s global interests and noting that
any discussion of forces and force structure had been
explicitly discouraged in its formulation—might help
stimulate the next stage of the inquiry.3 This stage will
need to address the tough questions of how, if at all,
the U.S. Navy needs to adjust its “institutional fabric”
in order to embody the principles contained in the
document. Put simply: Will the essence of American
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ing and a bachelor’s degree in marine zoology and
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sea power, as we have come to know it, need to change, and if so, how? It is also
important to appreciate at this stage that the Navy’s institutional fabric, while it
certainly contains force structure, is much more than mere platforms and capa-
bilities. The way the Navy sees itself within the global context, the missions it
sees as important, how it educates and develops its manpower, and even how it
goes about convincing other institutions of its worth all will need patient reflec-
tion before the process can be called complete.
As a way of getting started, however, it might be instructive to look at how
others have responded to previous times of great change in history—if only to
see in advance some of the pitfalls. Since a general consensus has us moving to-
day from an “industrial” to an “information” age, an obvious place to look might
be the equivalent “watershed” era, the onset of the industrial age in the late nine-
teenth century. The aim should be to look for broad parallels: to see if there is
anything that we can learn from their experiences that might better inform the
modern debate and help us to avoid mistakes like those made at that time. There
should be nothing prescriptive in this, since every time period has its own
unique, prevailing set of personalities, politics, and geostrategic circumstances
that, to a large extent, dictates the scope and scale of the possible responses. That
said, there are certain recurring problems in these processes, the study of which
can definitely improve our overall understanding of the dynamics at work. Fi-
nally, while the ultimate need for a joint approach is accepted, one of the key
functions of service thinking is to look at problems from the perspectives of in-
dividual services and environments, so as to ensure that their own, unique con-
tributions are identified and that joint provisions can be made accordingly.
There is therefore value in defining a possible naval contribution at an early
stage. This work therefore focuses exclusively on strategic thought as it pertains
to possible naval operations.
Specifically, this article will look for parallels with the case of the Edwardian
Royal Navy under Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher in the 1904–1908 time frame
(figure 1).4 This is a period and service that inevitably commands attention from
modern American strategists. Although similar technological and strategic
pressures were being felt all over the world, here was a naval power that had long
enjoyed a position of maritime primacy; had a well established, tried, and tested
maritime strategy for dealing with the global commons; and yet was facing a
combination of fiscal and technological changes that threatened its traditional
way of fielding and using its power. In short, with the twin prospects of a slowing
economy and a massively increasing imperial defense budget, Great Britain was
facing a need to make economies in its naval spending while at the same time
confronting huge new challenges as the world’s premier sea power.
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Although reasoned strategic exposés were rare in the late Victorian era, the
Royal Navy’s long-standing approach to its responsibilities prior to Fisher’s ar-
rival can best be summarized as follows. The most fundamental naval role was of
course the defense of the home islands against an invasion from Europe. This
was to be entrusted to a fleet of battleships based in the English Channel, al-
though it could be reinforced if necessary from the other powerful battleship
fleet in the Mediterranean or the reserve fleet, as appropriate. For Britain, there-
fore, battleship primacy was of the utmost import, and the nation went to great
lengths to maintain a superiority in these platforms such that “it should at least
be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries.”5 This “two-power
standard,” as it became known, meant in practice that the bulk of the resources
allocated to the Royal Navy were channeled into battleship building, particularly
when facing the very real threat of the combined fleets of France and Russia. Un-
fortunately, it also meant that naval strategy and the procurement of battleships
became somewhat synonymous, particularly with politicians, with the overall
detriment of the quality of naval strategic thought.
Equally, it is important to appreciate that the battleship building policy was
also inextricably linked to Great Britain’s overwhelming superiority in ship
building. Britain was one of the first powers to industrialize, and having a clear
need for overseas trade, its shipbuilding and shipping lines had taken an enor-
mous lead over the rest of the world, such that by the late nineteenth century
British-built or -owned ships accounted for some 80–90 percent of oceanic
trade. Obviously the infrastructure generated to produce such a large fleet
amounted to so massive a latent capacity in shipbuilding that it was possible for
the British to produce complex warships more cheaply overall and far more
quickly than anyone else. This advantage meant that a part of the late Victorian
naval policy was the deliberate encouragement of batch building and conserva-
tism in design—the theory being that should an opponent develop an innova-
tion of interest, the Royal Navy, provided it could analyze the merits of the
advance in time, was well placed to respond appropriately and field its own ver-
sions of the improvement at a quicker pace than the nation that had originally
conceived the idea.
The development of empire in the second half of the nineteenth century,
however, caused some difficulties with this policy, and it is true to say in general
that the navy failed to keep pace. In particular, the defense of the overseas pos-
sessions themselves and the considerable commerce that ran between them were
two areas that became increasingly important as secondary naval missions and
yet were ill matched with this battleship preponderance. In fact, and as John
Beeler has described, prior to the advent of the Royal Sovereign class in the 1890s,
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a true oceangoing capital ship was simply not feasible from a technological point
of view, even assuming that sufficient funds were available.6 This dilemma led to
an additional need for whole classes of “cruising ironclads”(or “cruisers,”as they
became known), an essentially new type but one whose speed and endurance
produced a demand for it also as a scouting vessel for the battle fleet. Though
these vessels were considerably cheaper at the outset than capital ships, they
were destined to grow in complexity and size as their utility became evident. It
should also be remembered that these classes were “over and above” the contin-
uing need to meet the “two-power” obligations in battleships.
As a result of these fiscal pressures, there was a natural tendency to use the
older, less sophisticated classes of cruisers on the imperial beat as “station”cruisers
—following the rationale that a cruiser that was obsolescent for a scouting com-
mission in a fleet pitted against first-class European opposition could still serve
with credit abroad, where the likelihood of its encountering sophisticated oppo-
nents was considerably reduced. For a while this policy worked well, but with the
advent of faster, long-range, armored cruisers developed by France specifically
for distant-waters operations in the 1890s, the days of a ship living out its twi-
light years in glorious isolation abroad looked to be numbered. Unfortunately
too, by this time the massive growth of the imperial responsibilities had led to
many scores of these vessels being so employed; the prospect of replacing all
these types in short order with first-rate, armored cruisers was a daunting one. It
was this development more than any other that led to an increased financial
draw on the naval budget and all the attendant scrutiny that this involved.
A recent analytical brief highlights this period as one in which the world was
policed by an “undisputed global navy” (that of Great Britain) but offers little
insight into how the Royal Navy actively attempted to offset these fiscal chal-
lenges by novel strategic thought.7 Worse still, by simply inferring that the Brit-
ish government “chose to limit its foreign and security policies to meet the
German threat” it drastically oversimplifies the extensive debate that raged at the
time and so risks dismissing useful lessons that might be learned from this ex-
ample. In part, therefore, that work, among others, has provided inspiration to
look at this period more closely.
{LINE-SPACE}
While the need for savings was always an integral part of Fisher’s plan, it is vital
to recognize that for him the main objective was always the continuance of Great
Britain’s primacy as a maritime power. A fervent navalist with a strong sense of
patriotic duty, he differed from most of his naval colleagues in that he had real-
ized early on that the economies being demanded were necessary for the nation’s
continuing health.8 In short, if maritime primacy were to be preserved, the only
responsible way forward for the navy was to accommodate these savings by
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adopting a radically different vision
of future naval warfare—a vision he
believed that advances in technol-
ogy were on the verge of delivering.
Specifically, Fisher worried about
the continuing soundness of each of
the three main naval missions men-
tioned above. The “anti-invasion”
battle fleet looked to be increasingly
threatened in coastal waters by the
torpedo, while the station cruiser
and commerce protector abroad
were similarly under threat from the
sheer speed and reactivity of the
modern armored cruiser squadrons
then under development by France
and Russia. Worse still, however, was
the manpower situation. In essence,
and because of the growth in the
numbers of these older cruisers
scattered around the world, a large
percentage of the navy’s available
manpower was committed abroad
on stations where it could learn little
about the techniques and drills asso-
ciated with modern warfare, or any-
thing of fleet maneuvers. To Fisher
this was an unforgivable waste in an
era where naval warfare was increas-
ingly characterized by extreme suddenness.9 He believed that the Royal Navy
simply could not afford to keep such a high percentage of its human capital es-
sentially “untrained” in the art of modern naval warfare; besides, he needed
these men at home in order to man the revolutionary new fleet he was about to
develop.
As a result of these concerns, Fisher set to work on a truly comprehensive re-
form program that sought to prepare the Royal Navy for the new era. Underpin-
ning these reforms was the idea that Great Britain could no longer afford, nor
was it necessarily tactically sound, to provide a dedicated platform type for each
of these three naval missions. The available speed and endurance of modern
ships was opening the door to more general-purpose types. Furthermore, by the
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judicious use of the new
technology and better
training, he believed, it
was possible to change
radically the way in which
these missions were ad-
dressed and still provide
the savings demanded by
the Treasury. Although
space does not permit a
full discussion of these
interdependent reforms,
the most pertinent here
was a revolutionary new
naval strategy centered
around the twin technol-
ogies of the submarine and the “battle cruiser” (such as HMS Invincible, pic-
tured in figure 2), a fast and lightly armored capital ship with a huge offensive
punch, designed specifically for the global needs of imperial defense.10 It was on
these battle cruisers that the offensive part of Fisher’s strategy depended: in
short, if these vessels could be made fast enough to react in a timely fashion to
events abroad and powerful enough to prevail against all modern vessels over-
seas, it should be possible to recall and replace all the station cruisers (and a sig-
nificant amount of the battle fleet) with “reactive” squadrons of naval power
projection and garner all the efficiency savings as a result.
Sadly for Fisher, and although he was successful with a great many of the ad-
ministrative parts of his reform package, a combination of unforeseen circum-
stances and pressures ultimately prevented him from radically changing the
strategic ethos of the Royal Navy, or at least within a strategically useful
timescale. As a result, many of the technologies and platforms being developed
for his purposes seemed strangely out of place once they appeared. The inevita-
ble consequence was that they were misemployed by a staunchly traditional Ad-
miralty, unwilling to accept the need for change. Perhaps the most obvious
victims were the battle cruisers, which, instead of heading up fast “flying squad-
rons” of global commerce protectors as Fisher had intended, were relegated to
the traditional battle fleet, organized as a fast division with the mission of hold-
ing contact with a fleeing enemy.11 This role, which ignored their intended stra-
tegic rationale and constrained them to lower speeds, made them acutely
vulnerable to the better-protected battleships, and the results, in retrospect,
should have been obvious. Paradoxically, though, Dreadnought (figure 3),
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Fisher’s first revolutionary platform, designed to showcase some of the very
technology that would—in his mind, anyhow—put the battle-fleet idea out of
business, went on to thrive as a type.12 Whole classes of “dreadnoughts,” as they
came to be known, were built by most of the leading naval powers of the day, de-
spite the fact that the traditional battle line, as a strategic tool, was increasingly
suspect, both in scope and substance. {FIG 3A OR 3B ABOUT HERE}
The reasons why Fisher’s radical new naval strategy failed to catch on make il-
luminating reading for today’s would-be reformers. While some of the techno-
logical circumstances are clearly unique to that age, many of the broader
strategic and institutional pressures have parallels in all time periods, and our
recognition and understanding of them can therefore help us to prevent their
worst effects in the future. Specifically, the issues of excessive reliance on tech-
nology, the need for strategic flexibility, the need for full and comprehensive dia-
logue, the danger of “lazy” assumptions, and the problems of personalities and
distractions—all played parts in the failure of Fisher’s strategic revolution, and
all remain salutary lessons as relevant today as ever. The very fact, however, that
this revolution was attempted by the world’s
premier navy in order to maintain its posi-
tion of maritime primacy makes it an essen-
tial reference point for those intent on
similarly preserving the maritime primacy of
the United States a century later. It is, after
all, arguable that by not accepting the need
for an innovative approach, Great Britain
overstretched itself financially in attempting
to apply time-honored solutions to an alto-
gether more taxing, industrial-age naval sce-
nario. As a result, the British were to be poorly
placed to recover from the shock of the world
wars, and their loss of naval primacy was vir-
tually assured.
THE FISHER REVOLUTION, IN A NUTSHELL
Any brief résumé of the main points of the Fisher revolution and how they have
been interpreted by the historians must begin with the work of Arthur J. Marder.
A historian with a diplomatic background, Marder approached British naval
policy from the assumption that the larger, grand strategic premises had already
been established beyond reasonable doubt. His landmark, five-volume treatise
on the Fisher years (1961) has a single big theme, a theme that can be summa-
rized as follows.13 Prior to the arrival of Fisher as First Sea Lord, Marder argues,
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the Royal Navy was in the doldrums. Overwhelmed by the pace of technological
change and lacking any cohesive strategic direction as the Russian and French
naval situations changed (as we shall see), British naval policy wavered. Fisher,
with an eye toward an expansionist Germany, managed in short order to reform
the navy comprehensively and drag it into the industrial age in time to meet the
challenge. The main vehicle in his modernization program was Dreadnought, a
battleship of a design that embodied his twin ideals of speed and hitting power
and that he felt Britain’s superior shipbuilding resources could produce more
quickly and cheaply than could any other nation’s. Marder’s key assumption is
that Germany had already been identified as the main imperial threat to be
countered. Thus in his view, the containing of its emerging battle fleet was what
dictated the course of Royal Naval policy and gave Fisher’s reforms, including
Dreadnought, their true meaning.
Comprehensive though Marder’s treatment is, certain aspects of contempo-
rary documents hint at a different interpretation. Chief among these was the
disquieting fact that Fisher, in both private and official correspondence, seemed
to indicate that the role of the battleship as the sole arbiter of naval power was
becoming questionable on a number of counts. For one, he cited the increasing
range of the Whitehead torpedo and the consequence that the whole concept of
operating heavy ships off an enemy coast in waters infested with torpedo craft
and submarines was becoming unacceptably risky.14 When the only way to
threaten a battleship had been with a more powerful exemplar of the same type,
battleship primacy had made sense, but to Fisher’s way of thinking, those days
were now long past. The advent of fast torpedo craft and the long-range torpedo
had effectively put the proud battle fleet within the killing reach of even small
navies on limited budgets, leaving its rationale problematic.15 Fisher therefore
looked for what we would call today a “capabilities based” appraisal: a hard look
at the fundamental necessities of the sea fight and how these might best be
provided—perhaps by the adoption of a completely different set of plat-
forms. For Fisher, of course, the two essentials in any sea fight were speed and
hitting power.16
More recent scholarship has asked questions that Marder did not address. Jon
Sumida, in a crucial analysis of the impact of finance and technology on British
naval policy (1989), makes the case that it was the impending fiscal crisis that
Great Britain faced in the early years of the last century and the consequent lim-
its on naval spending that pointed to a radical rethinking of how the naval mis-
sion should be resourced.17 In short, it had become impossible to continue the
construction of up-to-date warships in the numbers and varieties required to
protect all of Britain’s maritime interests. The choice was therefore simple: ei-
ther the Royal Navy would have to drop some commitments, prioritizing its
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efforts, or else it would have to look for imaginative ways of doing more with
less. This impending crisis was perhaps most ably summarized by Lord
Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty: “They [the Sea Lords] must cease to
say ‘This is the ideal plan; How can we get enough money to carry it out?’ They
must say instead ‘Here is a sovereign; How much can we squeeze out of it that
will really count for victory in a naval war?’”18
At about the same time, the parallel development of the submarine has been
taken up by Nicholas Lambert, who in a series of articles and a book (1999) has
provided another of the connections that make Fisher’s intended strategy hang
together.19 In doing so, he convincingly explores the strategic problems facing
Fisher. What sort of fleet was necessary to defend all of Britain’s maritime inter-
ests in this changed era, and how might this best be provided for on a declining
budget? Lambert concludes that Britain had three main imperatives—to defend
the homeland, to protect the empire, and finally to safeguard the vast network of
interconnected global trade routes. As explained earlier, Fisher realized that the
conventional approach to these needs—that of employing three specialist plat-
forms, the battleship, the “station cruiser,” and the armored cruiser—was no
longer affordable or even tactically sound. The battle fleet was becoming in-
creasingly vulnerable to the torpedo in the shallow waters around the homeland,
while the speed and range of modern heavy warships meant that less-capable
cruisers scattered on stations around the world on basically diplomatic duties
were increasingly at risk. These vessels were neither strong enough to fight nor
fast enough to run away from the fast squadrons of armored cruisers that could
now threaten them.20
Fisher’s solution was elegant and simple, and it played to the new naval
strengths of the day. If submarines and torpedoes were making the shallow seas
unacceptably risky for the battle fleet, then Britain should move its battle fleet
out of harm’s way and rely on the same, new technologies to pose an equivalent
threat to any potential invader. In essence, the coastline of Great Britain was to
be entrusted to a sea-denial flotilla of torpedo craft, but mainly submarines.
Similarly, if the sheer mobility of modern steamships was threatening the station
cruiser on the empire “beat,” the answer was to develop faster, more powerful ar-
mored cruisers that could respond, in squadron strength and quickly, to events
in vital regions. The key here lay in utilizing the enormous advantages possessed
by Britain on account of its many key possessions overseas, something that sepa-
rated it from all competitors. If based at what he called the “five keys that lock up
the world” (the imperial fortresses of Gibraltar, Singapore, Alexandria, Dover,
and the Cape of Good Hope), Fisher reasoned, squadrons of these new battle
cruisers would provide all the necessary naval strength that Britain might re-
quire on a regional basis.21
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In this way, and because of the improved reaction times and combat power
embodied within the battle cruisers, Fisher further deduced that the navy could
do away with all the numerous station cruisers altogether—in effect, consolidat-
ing its naval power into a few squadrons of fast, powerful ships. Basically, the
Mahanian idea of concentration at the center in a fleet of powerful battleships
was being flipped onto its head. In Fisher’s plan the sea-denial strategy protected
the center, releasing large capital ships for a more active defense of the vulnera-
ble periphery and the vital trade routes across the global commons.22 In other
words, naval concentration was still achieved not at the center but on the periph-
ery, which, in Fisher’s view, made more sense for an industrial nation that was
uniquely dependent on an import economy. In so doing, two new platforms,
submarines and (what Fisher originally called) “super” cruisers, would have to
be developed and perfected to replace the three traditional types that had per-
formed these missions. The great selling point was, of course, savings; subma-
rines were considerably cheaper than heavy ships, and the “super” cruisers,
though expected to be expensive, particularly in manpower, were effectively to
replace all varieties of cruisers and battleships as well.
Fisher’s own clarity of purpose notwithstanding, it is nevertheless inescap-
able that Great Britain did not radically alter its naval strategy, or at least not
within a timescale that would have given such a shift real strategic value.23 In-
stead, it plunged headlong into yet another round of battleship escalation, while
at the same time attempting to maintain parity across the board in all classes of
naval vessels. The results were predictable, and financial exhaustion was averted
only by the onset of a European war and the consequent readjustment of na-
tional priorities. In this light, it is unfortunate that naval historians have tended
to analyze this period in terms of the merits or otherwise of a supposed “dread-
nought revolution” and not, as might arguably have been more correct, as the af-
termath of a failed “battle cruiser revolution.”24 It is argued here that only by
looking at it from this latter perspective will the correct institutional lessons on
handling change be drawn. So what exactly went wrong, and why?
TECHNOLOGY, TIMING, AND THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC
UNCERTAINTY
Given the problems encountered with the battle cruiser’s fire-control system ac-
curacy at long range, it is tempting to conclude that this was just another in the
long line of instances where technological promises came to naught, thus leav-
ing a strategy without its necessary enabler. While there are certainly aspects of
this in the Fisher story, it would be a gross oversimplification if accepted without
regard to the changing strategic situation. After all, the British were certainly in-
novating at the time, producing revolutionary advances in gunnery,
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submarines, and propulsion, and all with remarkable rapidity. Second, British
industry was doing a commendable job of actually delivering these technologies,
as workable weapons systems and in time to make a difference strategically—or
at least, it was doing a better job than the competition, which is, after all, the cru-
cial point here. It would therefore be not only wrong but misleading simply to
dismiss these successes as irrelevant. Far more important to our understanding
of the dynamics involved, though, are the reactions of policy makers in the Ad-
miralty to these technological promises. Did they, in fact, pose the right strategic
questions in order to make the best possible use of what was likely and realistic
in the near term?
Using a related case, Erik Dahl, writing in these pages, examined whether the
controversies surrounding the French “Jeune École” movement of the late 1800s
might hold any lessons for a transforming American military today, and specifi-
cally for the proponents of network-centric warfare (NCW), which seems to
have been the main naval contribution to the transformation arguments thus
far.25 This is a useful and convenient starting point for the type of debate being
advanced here, although by simply concluding that the Jeune École was “ahead
of its time technologically” and that its proponents were guilty of “misjudging
the pace of change in naval warfare,” Dahl may have missed an opportunity. Spe-
cifically, he seems to have overlooked the most fundamental and important les-
son that can be drawn from the whole Jeune École experience—that in times of
great political and strategic uncertainty, such as we again face today, it does not
pay to develop a navy with too narrow a strategic focus or too specialized a mis-
sion set. After all, the only irrefutable historical consequence of this whole event,
as Dahl recognizes, was surely that the French, in their intermittent pursuit of a
specialized form of warfare against a single opponent (Great Britain), failed to
foresee that were the grand-strategic situation to change, their innovative fleet
was likely to be rendered strategically irrelevant and their nascent military-
industrial complex would have insufficient time to adjust.26 In effect there-
fore, they were not asking the right strategic questions in the appropriate global
context. This is essentially what caused the French navy to flounder for forty
years and France to lose its position as a leading naval power.
To some extent, but with one important exception, Fisher’s battle-cruiser
idea suffered from a similar strategic “overspecialization,” and once again this
was revealed by an unanticipated strategic shift. In the three decades prior to
these ships’ conception, both the French and the Russians, whose navies had
been hopelessly outclassed by the British battle fleet and who lacked the re-
sources to compete in this realm, had made a considerable effort to challenge
Great Britain instead by preparing for commerce raiding on the global com-
mons. Here they had correctly assessed that their enemy would be much weaker.
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By building a whole series of fast commerce destroyers, these powers, whether
acting alone or in an alliance together, had posed a threat that was to give the
battleship-centric British considerable headaches.27 Great Britain’s early answer
had been simply to outbuild these two powers in similar armored cruisers, and it
was this program, on top of the maintenance of a superior battle fleet, that had
led to the fiscal crisis so ably described by Sumida. However, by 1905 France was
becoming increasingly aligned with Britain, in fear of the rising Germany, and
Russia was temporarily out of the naval picture, having suffered devastating
losses in the Far East. This left only Germany, and lacking the necessary global
infrastructure of bases, it was in no position to threaten Britain’s global com-
merce in the way that France and Russia once had, although it unquestionably
had the technology. In fact there is considerable evidence that the German naval
strategists had long before discounted a naval war against British trade.28 Regret-
tably for Fisher, however, this all happened too quickly for the naval procure-
ment cycle.
The truly unfortunate part of this story is that notwithstanding the merits of
the strategic thinking that had underwritten their development, by the time
Fisher’s battle cruisers actually emerged some four years later, these quirks in in-
ternational politics had made them seem strangely irrelevant. Naval affairs were
once again, if perhaps artificially, dominated by an enhanced version of an alto-
gether more familiar brand of naval power—the dreadnought battleship. Could
or should this reversion have been foreseen? The answer would seem to be quali-
fied: yes and no. Yes—the British had taken a calculated risk that the future
would, as envisioned, require a more proactive role for their navy on the global
commons. In developing a more specialist capability to that end they had es-
chewed their tried and tested policy of letting the others do the innovating while
trusting in their markedly superior shipbuilding abilities to mount an appropri-
ate response within the requisite time frame.29 Even at the time, there were many
who believed that this was the wrong strategic choice.30
But, with due deference to their lordships, and going back to the exception
mentioned earlier: no—Great Britain was different. It was the premier maritime
power of its day, and thus the traditional “wait and see” approach might not have
been the best one under the circumstances. The French, who were attempting to
compete from a position of naval inferiority, had to always respond, to a certain
extent, to whatever stance the more powerful navies took, but the British had no
such encumbrance. They were uniquely free to make naval strategic choices, se-
cure in the knowledge that whatever steps they took, they could invariably drive
their competitors into areas that were even less advantageous to them. This, after
all, is one of the advantages of supreme military power: it gives you strategic
choices and allows you to select those that cause the maximum disruption for
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your rival. The British therefore, facing as they were a whole series of difficulties
related to the uncertainties of the era, may in fact have erred by not relying on
this hard-won strategic safety net more thoroughly. Arguably it was time for
them to maximize their innovation, while they still stood a chance of finding a
more durable way to retain their primacy.
Perhaps the one concrete mistake that they did make, however, was to provide
a skeptical Admiralty Board with an altogether familiar and superficially con-
vincing alternative, that of enhancing the battle fleet itself with Dreadnought-
type battleships. Had the members of the Fisher team had the courage of their
leader’s convictions and gone solely for the battle cruiser, without an “interim”
battleship design, it is interesting to speculate what the competing naval powers
would have done in reply.31 Germany, with its battleships becoming vulnerable
to the planned British submarines and therefore possibly irrelevant for support-
ing any projected invasion of the British Isles and with its global naval infra-
structure unable to support capital ships in distant waters, would have been in a
quandary for sure. Arguably, however, and given what we now know, the worst
case for the British would have seen the Germans rising to the challenge and
competing, hull for hull, but in battle cruisers. The intriguing question, though,
remains: Would this have served them well strategically, as against the British,
and if not, what might they have done about it? While we can never know for sure,
there is an interesting possibility that, with no immediate prospect of resolution of
the foreign-base issue, the Germans might have been more willing to entertain
the sort of naval limitations that were being discussed in the margins of the
Hague Conference of 1907. These speculations aside, the essential point is that
this sort of analysis makes excellent fodder for those contemplating today the
best path for the U.S. Navy. Like the Royal Navy in the Edwardian era, the U.S.
Navy is today’s premier naval power and therefore shares its predecessor’s
unique freedom to make strategic choices that are inconvenient for their rivals.
Moreover, in Fisher’s time there is no doubt that technology’s fickle side
played a role. After all, if these lightly armored “super” cruisers were to prevail in
combat against armored cruisers and older battleships, they would need to de-
liver knockout blows from beyond the reach of their opponents. However, while
they could use their speed advantage to position themselves, the ability to score
hits from long range had been proving elusive, to say the least. Significantly,
however, Fisher believed that once again technology was fast coming up with the
answer. His gunnery background and enthusiasm for the long-range accuracy
problem told him that a true-course calculator being developed by Arthur Pol-
len, the “Argo clock,” was about to provide a revolutionary solution to the prob-
lems of long-range hitting.32 It is important to appreciate that the whole
rationale of a lightly protected ship striking with impunity depended completely
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on this fire-control problem being solved in short order.33 In essence, there could
be no effective battle cruisers without first having an accurate, long-range gun.
Thus Pollen’s invention, or an equivalent, was absolutely vital to Fisher’s plan. As
it happened, through a combination of technical difficulties, delays, and paro-
chial competition, the issue of long-range hitting was not completely solved un-
til the battle cruiser as a warship type had already been deemed questionable at
best.34
In sum, given the patent difficulties surrounding accurate predictions of in-
ternational politics and the likely effects this might have on strategy, not to men-
tion the problems of matching technological expectations with real and tangible
results, arguably the only points a modern strategist can take away are fairly gen-
eral. For example, it is unquestionably a historical fact that armed forces that be-
come overspecialized with respect to a given foe under unique but temporary
strategic circumstances (e.g., the French above) run the risk of being “mar-
ginalized” should those circumstances change. This is simply the result of the
time it takes to procure new tools to fit the new strategic imperatives, as com-
pared to the rapid development of those new imperatives in the first place. This
argues for the retention of a more general, although arguably less efficient, over-
all capability set. Equally, however, there seems to be a strong argument that en-
courages large powers, particularly those in predominant positions, to “force the
pace” by maximizing their innovative capabilities. By pursuing more efficient
strategies, they can push their competitors, who must compete from different
baselines, into even more unfavorable circumstances than their own. At first
glance, these approaches may seem like polar opposites—“damned if you do,
damned if you don’t”—but perhaps they are better looked at as balancing fac-
tors, guidelines that can help but should not be used too prescriptively.
LAZY ASSUMPTIONS, SECRECY, AND THE NEED TO BE A
“LEARNING” INSTITUTION
A second set of difficulties surrounds a somewhat contradictory problem that is
nevertheless inescapably linked to the situation described above. It is the situa-
tion raised when a nation’s strategists make intellectually “lazy” assumptions—
essentially holding that their current strategic thought, doctrine, and tactics will
be perfectly adequate to deal with the new situations, technologies, and circum-
stances they are facing. In other words, they tell themselves that there is nothing
fundamentally different about the emerging situation that might require a fresh
viewpoint or anything radically different to be done militarily. This, of course, is
merely reinforced by the natural bureaucratic inertia of large institutions like
navies. The danger is that strategists might misinterpret or, worse, overlook the
potential advantages being offered by the new technologies and tactics in the
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light of the changing circumstances. In short, they may convince themselves
that the new opportunities offer only incremental or evolutionary improve-
ments to the way in which business has always been conducted when in fact
real alternatives are at hand that could generate disproportionate and asym-
metric advantages. They therefore miss their chance, through a sort of “hege-
monic complacency.”
In this case the Royal Navy, preoccupied with the minutiae of naval technol-
ogy and the prospects for a second Trafalgar, seemed to be very slow as an insti-
tution to recognize that the industrial age had changed the entire notion of naval
warfare forever, with particular implications for a nation with the world’s largest
navy and a global trade dependency. From this point onward, naval decisions
were going to depend less on decisive engagements at sea per se than on how
such engagements might impact the broader and more mundane business of
safeguarding the nation’s economy and generating necessary combat power in
its widest sense. In short, the business of exercising “command of the seas” had
widened considerably. For a country for which naval might underwrote its very
survival as a great power, this was a surprising oversight.
Fisher may have appreciated the need for a radical change, but he certainly
made it no easier for the institution to move in this direction by shrouding his
thoughts in secrecy and forming committees of like-minded individuals to give
his projects the merest fig leaves of objectivity and legitimacy. Disdainful of ex-
plaining himself to anyone, Fisher kept his ideas close to the chest.35 This was
presumably an element of control, so that until the last moment, he might work
in the margins to “engineer” the endorsements he wanted. Whether this prefer-
ence was motivated by concern for security or for more personal gain it is impos-
sible to say. What is clear, however, is that it was unusual, if not unprecedented, in
British naval policy making. It certainly had an adverse effect on public aware-
ness and perception of the naval issues of the day, a consideration that in Great
Britain’s case was significant.36 Inevitably too, it generated resentment and sus-
picion, particularly from Fisher’s peers with other ideas, a tension that was even-
tually to impair his ability to function as an effective leader of the navy.37
One option that might have helped him clarify the various technological, in-
stitutional, and manning pressures would have been a formally constituted na-
val staff. The idea had been mooted for a number of years; Fisher himself had
long talked of such a thing in connection with the development of war plans, go-
ing as far as to propose an additional member of the Admiralty Board who
would be “absolutely dissociated from all administrative and executive work and
solely concerned in the preparation of the Fleet for War.”38 It was fast becoming
clear that, with the increasing administrative burden of training and equipping
an industrial-age navy, the First Sea Lord’s traditional responsibility for both
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those matters and the fleet’s war plans and readiness was simply too much for a
single man, no matter how capable. However, Fisher, once established as the
First Sea Lord, was not at all helpful in the establishment of a “War Plans Divi-
sion” at the Admiralty; in fact, he is on record as opposing such a move.39 The
reasons for this change of heart are unclear, although it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that it had at least something to do with the inevitable loss of author-
ity for the titular “head of the navy.” Instead, Fisher persevered with his unoffi-
cial committees, which, though easing the physical burdens involved, did
nothing to foster a corporate sense of shared responsibility as an official staff
would have done. Worse, they failed to “institutionalize” or guarantee the devel-
opment of strategic thought when the First Sea Lord was otherwise occupied.
In this light, and despite his early support for a naval war college, he never
took advantage of the assistance that might have been possible from this body,
nor did he seem interested in its teaching or developing naval strategy for his
later consideration.40 Instead, he seemed satisfied with infrequent correspon-
dence with members of the faculty who shared his viewpoint, as a way of gaining
their endorsements. The net result was that there was little or no connection
between the bright young minds in the service and the business of developing na-
val strategy per se. In fact, the crucial value of informed strategic debate was not
inculcated in the navy as a whole, and its absence continued to elicit little com-
ment. Put another way, the Edwardian Royal Navy was not a “learning institution”
—one in which the input of ideas high and low on the command chain is both
encouraged and expected, and one where the appropriate mechanisms are
firmly in place to ensure the widest possible dissemination. This was a critical
shortcoming that, when coupled with Fisher’s penchant for secrecy and “behind
the scenes” activity, did not serve the institution well when it was trying to make
sense of changes of such magnitude and complexity.
In the end, these failings became self-fulfilling prophecies. At the crucial
juncture, when the battle-cruiser strategy needed its fullest possible explanation
and support, Fisher was fatally distracted by chronic and increasingly virulent
disagreements with his senior admiral afloat, Lord Charles Beresford. Although
brought to a head over the issue of war plans, the disagreements went far deeper
and centered on an increasing resentment by senior officers of the overbearing
and imperious way in which the office of the First Sea Lord could drive through
a program of reform without a healthy and active debate in service circles.41 For
the battle-cruiser idea, this turbulence was fatal, as there was no one else to carry
the torch. Similarly, and because the rationale of the new industrial-age mission
of commerce protection had not been debated widely, the logic of Britain “forc-
ing the pace” in this direction, on the grounds that Britain would benefit more
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than its competitors, was lost on the wider naval establishment. As a result, the
fact that the difficulties suffered by the French and Russians had only created a
temporary, not a lasting, interlude was not appreciated. In short Britain, follow-
ing an outdated imperative, missed the opportunity to take a huge initiative in
naval strategy, one that it was uniquely placed to capitalize upon.
Finally and before concluding, mention has to be made of a seemingly valid
counterpoint to all of this—the simple fact that despite not having responded in
a particularly innovative fashion to the technological promises of the age, Great
Britain surely won the naval arms race and successfully headed off the threat
from imperial Germany. In fact, it can also be argued that had the reformers ac-
tually been more successful and the Admiralty managed to divert more money
toward submarines in particular, the net result might have been—given the ar-
guably exaggerated estimates of the capabilities of submarines for sea denial at
the time—more and not less vulnerability to concentrated naval pressure in
home waters. While it is almost impossible to predict accurately the outcome of
the submarine contest that might have resulted, the two happy outcomes men-
tioned above owe more to the strategic limitations imposed on Germany by its
“risk fleet” strategy than they ever did to any British activity. Great Britain was
indeed lucky that its opponent turned out to be, if anything, even less prone to
accept naval strategic innovation beyond the battleship than Britain was. Had
this not been the case, and had it faced a set of strategists as globally aware and
agile as those in some quarters of the French navy, events might have turned out
quite differently. In other words, Britain’s success in the First World War oc-
curred in spite of, and not because of, the quality of its naval thought.
WHAT CAN THE U.S. NAVY LEARN FROM THIS CASE?
To achieve maximum impact in a complex and multifaceted subject, the four
main recommendations that have been discussed above are restated in a deliber-
ately simplified way, paired for convenience, and rendered in a rather unconven-
tional “bullet” form.
Avoid “Lazy” Assumptions; Become a “Learning Institution”
Although a lot of historians have criticized the Edwardian Royal Navy for a
“paucity of professional thinking,” this charge rather misses the mark.42 As ide-
ally this article has shown, there seemed to be no shortage of the right ideas
around, but somehow the authors of those ideas, Fisher included, were simply
unable to convince the institution of the need for a fundamental shake-up in na-
val thinking. As a result, the navy as a whole did not see itself in a new light—as
performing different types of missions to effect the same ends. Looked at an-
other way, it was not a “learning institution,” capable of the necessary analysis
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and discussion to support the large leaps of faith needed to confront the new age.
In fact, the key point of the late Victorian engineering revolution—namely, the
hugely increased mobility of large steamships—was almost completely missed by
the Admiralty. The result was a disappointing and expensive merger of the new ca-
pabilities into the existing, obsolete service rationale, a compromise that ulti-
mately left the nation poorly placed to regain the initiative a few decades later.
This is a lesson that the U.S. Navy simply has to grasp. As the British case
proves, once an institutional failure of this sort takes place, it is almost impossi-
ble to recover. This is because the long timeline needed for the development of
the new capabilities, coupled with the massive expenditures required, set against
a finite, and often declining, defense budget, effectively poses a “one shot”decision
—sink or swim! When the merits or otherwise of your first move finally become
clear, the parameters will have moved on still farther—and you will be either on
the “power curve” or hopelessly behind it. If you are behind, the only future
seems to be a loss of primacy and ultimately of strategic relevance, which is ef-
fectively what happened to the Royal Navy after the First World War. In this light,
the nation that maintains a healthy amount of both technological and doctrinal
innovation in all mission areas is most likely to be best poised to reap the even-
tual benefits.
As for Technology, Innovate—but Don’t Overspecialize
The U.S. Navy of the twenty-first century obviously needs to nurture and de-
velop a more questioning professional service culture. The key is widespread
and thorough professional education right across the strata of decision makers,
such that a culture of risk taking and evaluation at all levels is encouraged. This
is not to say that the Navy should throw money at a whole range of increasingly
outlandish projects in the hope that “something sticks”—far from it! It should,
however, critically and continuously assess the potential scope of each advance
and how it might affect America’s position, doing “just enough” research to keep
the country consistently better placed than others to make a hard move when ei-
ther the technology matures or changing circumstances demand.
Perhaps the most important point for the U.S. Navy to grasp is the strategic
freedoms conferred by its position as the premier sea power. As the possessor of
the world’s largest navy, the United States is in a uniquely advantageous posi-
tion; its sheer size and the natural inertia within the system will continue to
shield it while it makes these transitions, something that is simply not true for
any other nation. For its competitors, by contrast, a rapid achievement of sys-
tems parity with the U.S. Navy (or a key superiority, in some specific area—for
example, antiship missiles) is the goal, and any research that might threaten this
is automatically shunned. This makes these nations innately less able to respond
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to change, no matter how innovative they may appear on the surface—because
they are constrained by an overriding pressure that is simply absent from the
American considerations.
The British were halfway there, in that they were innovating, but their poorly
educated and parochial officer corps was simply incapable of collectively mak-
ing the necessary switch in thinking from the battle line to global power projec-
tion as the key naval mission area. The U.S. Navy cannot afford to fall into the
same trap, basically assuming that its sheer size—for all its benefits that we have
noted—somehow confers an exclusive and inherent “right” to the rather differ-
ent type of sea control outlined in CS-21.
Finally, and inexorably linked to the above, there is the question of how to ap-
proach emerging technology. This article has highlighted the difficulties of rely-
ing on radical and unproven advances during periods of strategic uncertainty.
However, beyond the purely mechanical difficulties of predicting when given
technologies will mature, there is the broader issue of the sorts of questions the
strategist should be exploring. There has been a tendency in the past few decades
to develop mission sets that make the best use of available equipment, rather
than seeking technological solutions that best address the widest range of possi-
ble strategic outcomes. Put another way, in our eagerness to find answers to “to-
day’s problems” and incorporate new technologies, it is possible to become too
fixated on a specific mission set, against a particular foe—and then be essentially
outmaneuvered by a shift in the broader strategic environment. We would then
find our military optimized for operational and strategic circumstances that are
no longer very pertinent to national interests. This is the classic “being overly
prepared to fight the last war,” or the war that you want to fight, as has been seen
time and time again in history. To a certain extent this is an inevitable conse-
quence of the human learning process, one that is unlikely to be entirely elimi-
nated, but we nonetheless need to be on our guard, particularly when opinions
become excessively polarized as a part of the surrounding political debate.
In the end, though, the case we have examined was not simply another in-
stance of good intentions let down by technology. It is a salutary warning of the
powerful and often unforeseen impacts that a combination of human elements,
changing strategic imperatives, and the characteristically erratic and risky
promises of technology can have upon even a well structured and mature strate-
gic plan. Such institutional and bureaucratic considerations are of crucial im-
portance; they can collectively undermine even the best “classical” strategic
ideas, just as surely as can the passage of time. After all, Fisher was, in the words
of Marder, “an extraordinary man, not to be judged by normal standards.”43 A
gifted administrator, blessed with immense moral courage and an insatiable
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energy and drive, even he was diverted from his well considered strategic quest
by this insidious combination. How much more vulnerable are we likely to be
ourselves! For these reasons, therefore, we must take time to analyze such mo-
ments from history lest we be destined to repeat their mistakes in our own time.
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23. In the later stages of his first monograph,
Lambert demonstrates that in the eleventh
hour before the First World War (January
1914), Winston Churchill, the cabinet, and
the Admiralty worked out a possible “deal”
that would largely substitute submarines for
at least two of the battleships ordered in the
1914 naval estimates. Some historians main-
tain that this episode demonstrates that
Fisher was actually successful in changing
Royal Navy strategy. But it was “too little, too
late.” The dreadnought race had already run
its course, and the High Seas Fleet and the
soon-to-be-renamed Grand Fleet were locked
in a strategic “face-off” that had effectively
paralyzed innovative strategic thinking on ei-
ther side. See Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval
Revolution, pp. 295–300.
24. An exception here would be Charles Fair-
banks, Jr., who makes this very point. See his
“The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution:
A Historiographical Essay,” International His-
tory Review 13, no. 2 (May 1991), pp. 246–72,
esp. p. 247.
25. Erik Dahl’s “Net-centric before Its Time: The
Jeune École and Its Lessons for Today,” Na-
val War College Review 58, no. 4 (Autumn
2005), pp. 109–35. The words jeune école
mean, literally, “young school.” This was a
group of reform-minded, midgrade officers
in France, who, under the leadership and tu-
telage of Adm. Théophile Aube, were angry at
the complacency and inactivity in the naval
leadership and anxious to implement reforms
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emphasizing merit over birthright. This
group also looked to restore France’s mari-
time pride by challenging Great Britain. Their
methodology was to target areas where Brit-
ain was weak, specifically focusing on tor-
pedo attacks to weaken the blockading battle
line and on commerce raiding against Brit-
ain’s huge merchant fleet. Central to their
concept was decentralization, whereby youn-
ger officers, in command of smaller and more
lethal ships, were to have more say in the di-
rection that the navy took. In strategic terms,
their concentration on the secondary effects
of a collapse in the shipping-insurance mar-
ket was masterful. With Great Britain carry-
ing considerably more than 50 percent of the
whole world’s sea trade, it stood to reason
that its economic interests would suffer dis-
proportionately high penalties from any loss
of confidence in the ocean-trading market.
26. Ibid., pp. 122–25. Although Dahl does not
recognize that it was primarily the shifting of
focus from Great Britain to Germany, in
terms of the likely naval opposition, that re-
ally doomed the Jeune École rationale, he
does explain that the school ultimately failed
in its quest to restore the French navy to
prominence.
27. The armored cruisers of the Russian Rurik
and French Jeanne d’Arc classes were typical,
and had the nations worked in conjunction,
squadrons of these ships in the Pacific, Medi-
terranean, and Atlantic would have posed a
credible threat, at least insofar as their capa-
bilities were understood by the British Admi-
ralty. For a good summation of this threat,
see Theodore Ropp, The Development of a
Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871–
1904 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1987), pp. 240–53, 284–98.
28. Alfred von Tirpitz, the incoming naval minis-
ter, in a memorandum to the kaiser dated 15
June 1897 and entitled “General Consider-
ations on the Constitution of Our Fleet ac-
cording to Ship Classes and Designs,” had
expressly ruled out commerce raiding as a
suitable strategy against the British. He
termed it “hopeless, because of the shortage
of bases on our side.” See Jonathan Steinberg,
Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of
the German Battle Fleet (London: Macdonald,
1965, and New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp.
208–23.
29. For a historian with this opinion, see John
Brooks, “Dreadnought: Blunder, or Stroke of
Genius?” War in History 14, no. 2 (April
2007), pp. 157–78. Brooks makes the point
that in the strategic context of 1905, evolu-
tionary designs for the battleships and cruis-
ers of the 1905–1906 estimates would have
made more sense, and he speculates, with the
benefit of hindsight, that they might have de-
layed and reduced the intensity of the dread-
nought race between Britain and Germany.
30. See, for example, an article by William H.
White (a previous director of naval construc-
tion and the designer of the Royal Sovereign
class of battleships, which had set the pattern
for the genre prior to the advent of Dread-
nought), “Admiralty Policy and the New Na-
val Estimates,” Nineteenth Century 59 (April
1906), pp. 601–18. On page 613 he makes the
point that with cordial relations with France
and the United States and with Russia in the
doldrums, the present was not the time to
force the pace: “Our unrivaled shipbuilding
powers enable us to pause and judge the situ-
ation, because even starting at a later time
than the others, Britain can still build a useful
superiority faster than anyone else.”
31. There is evidence in Fisher’s correspondence
that although he always personally believed
that the leap to the battle cruiser could be
made without an interim stage, he was finally
in a minority of one in his Committee on
Ship Design in the fall of 1904. See a letter
written to the journalist Arnold White in
1908, in FGDN, vol. 2, pp. 188–89. Some ear-
lier references from Lord Selborne, minuted
on his copy of Fisher’s “Naval Necessities,”
and intended for Fisher, may also have been
relevant here; words to the effect that “the
Japanese don’t seem to agree with you about
battleships [their demise]” may have cau-
tioned him. Fisher Papers, vol. 1, p. 41.
32. The crucial point is that Fisher was surely
aware of these advances before he made his
dreadnought decisions in 1905. Looking back
through his correspondence, although the
earliest mention of it comes from 1906, it is
clear that the Admiralty had been interested
in the device since 1904 and was largely satis-
fied with the inventor’s claims. John Jellicoe,
a Fisher protégé and fellow gunnery officer,
had been instrumental in promoting Pollen’s
equipment; it is therefore inconceivable that
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Fisher had not been kept informed of prog-
ress. See Fisher’s letter to the new First Lord,
Lord Tweedmouth, recommending that the
apparatus receive national patent protection,
in FGDN, vol. 2, p. 87.
33. For a thorough description of the Pollen ap-
paratus, see Jon T. Sumida, “British Capital
Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dread-
nought Era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hunger-
ford Pollen, and the Battlecruiser,” Journal of
Modern History 51, no. 2 (June 1979), pp.
212–17. See also John Brooks, “All Big Guns:
Fire Control and Capital Ship Design,” War
Studies Journal 1 (1996), pp. 36–52. Sumida’s
summation has largely been corroborated in
the more recent Norman Friedman, Naval
Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the
Dreadnought Era (Annapolis, Md.: Naval In-
stitute Press, 2008).
34. For an explanation that supports the prag-
matic conclusion that the Fisher team was
right to proceed with the battle cruiser on the
basis that “no insuperable difficulties could
exist in the solving of the long range fire con-
trol problem” see Brooks, “All Big Guns,” pp.
36–52. For an explanation that takes issue
with this, as well as with numerous other
technological points, while explaining the
“Dreyer table” controversy, see a review essay
by Jon Sumida, “Gunnery, Procurement, and
Strategy in the Dreadnought Era,” Journal of
Military History 69, no. 4 (October 2005), pp.
1179–87. These two papers represent the cur-
rent positions on either side of the unre-
solved interpretation of the fire control story.
35. See for example his famous quote in a letter
to Arnold White. “The one great rule in life is
NEVER EXPLAIN! Your Friends don’t want
an explanation. They believe in you. The
friends who want an explanation ain’t fit to be
friends. Your enemies won’t believe any expla-
nation! I never in all my life have ever yet ex-
plained, and don’t mean to!” FGDN, vol. 2,
pp. 388–89.
36. In this light, it is important to appreciate that
British naval policy in this period was a sub-
ject of intense interest to the professional
classes. Leaders (editorials) in newspapers,
debates in both houses of Parliament, and
columns in society magazines were regularly
devoted to the “naval issues” that were per-
plexing amateur and professional alike. It is
also fair to say that the Admiralty took note
of (and used) these avenues regularly—par-
ticularly under Sir John Fisher.
37. See in particular an anonymous article, “A
Retrograde Admiralty,” Blackwood’s Edin-
burgh Magazine 177 (May 1905), pp. 597–
607. It was widely attributed to Rear Admiral
Sir Reginald Custance, lately the Director of
Naval Intelligence, who was extremely critical
of Fisher’s methods. Custance criticizes
Fisher for deliberately undermining the au-
thority of the other Admiralty Board mem-
bers, in particular the Controller of the Navy,
a junior member but the one charged with
the material health of the fleet. He was there-
fore effectively turning the board into a per-
sonal dictatorship. He also offers contrary
opinions on each and every one of Fisher’s
main reforms. There is evidence that the arti-
cle particularly incensed Fisher. Similar senti-
ments are also seen in the well researched
article by William White, “Admiralty Policy
and the New Naval Estimates,” cited above.
White condemns the secrecy surrounding
Dreadnought as dangerous and indeed super-
fluous to military security, summing up, “A
policy withdrawn from discussion and criti-
cism is not likely to be the best.”
38. For a perceptive look at the whole issue of a
naval war staff and Fisher’s schizophrenic be-
havior in this regard, see Paul Haggie, “The
Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher
Era,” Journal of Contemporary History 8, no. 3
(July 1973), pp. 113–31, esp. p. 115, and
FGDN, vol. 1, p. 232.
39. Haggie, “Royal Navy and War Planning in
the Fisher Era,” p. 116.
40. Ibid., p. 130.
41. The anonymous “A Retrograde Admiralty,”
cited above, was typical.
42. Bryan Ranft, in “The Protection of British
Seaborne Trade and the Development of a
Systematic Planning for War, 1860–1906,”
accuses the late-Victorian Admiralty of an
“alarming poverty of thought.” See Bryan
Ranft, ed., Technical Change and British Na-
val Policy, 1860–1939 (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1977), pp. 3–4. This has been a
popular sentiment with historians in the
wake of the First World War, and while much
can be attributed to a revulsion, natural at the
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time, for all things military, it should also be
remembered that a part of the specific remit
of the First Lord was to review, comment
upon, and explain the professional merits or
otherwise of the various plans and strategies
of his service.
43. FGDN, vol. 1, p. 12.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
UNCOVERING NO SUCH AGENCY
John R. Schindler
Aid, Matthew M. The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the
National Security Agency. New York: Bloomsbury, 2009.
432pp. $30
The National Security Agency (NSA) has been for decades America’s largest,
best-funded, and most secretive intelligence service. Since its establishment in
1952 as an independent agency under the Department of Defense (DoD),
charged with providing signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information security
for the U.S. government, NSA has operated essentially in silence.
The wall of secrecy surrounding nearly all that the agency does has deterred
most scholarly inquiry. While it has been generally known that the NSA provides
the lion’s share of intelligence to the DoD, details have been lacking by design.
Before the publication of James Bamford’s The Puzzle Palace in 1982 there was
no monograph available, and that gossipy tome, culled largely from NSA unclas-
sified newsletters, left unanswered most questions about what the agency really
does. For historians and anyone wishing to assess NSA’s effectiveness as the
world’s most powerful SIGINT collector and analyst,
the knowledge gap has been yawning.
Along comes Matthew Aid, a first-rate researcher
who some years ago took upon himself the large task
of telling a story that his subtitle describes as “untold.”
There is a bit of cheek in this, as in the entire Aid en-
terprise, since the story he tells has already been told
in great detail by the NSA itself—specifically, by its
Center for Cryptologic History (CCH), which has
John R. Schindler is professor of national security affairs
at the Naval War College and a senior fellow at Boston
University’s International History Institute. He holds a
PhD in modern history and has published widely on in-
telligence, terrorism, and security studies. Prior to join-
ing the NWC faculty in 2005, he served with the
National Security Agency as an intelligence analyst and
counterintelligence officer. The opinions expressed here
are his own.
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produced hundreds of historical studies, mostly classified, recording and ana-
lyzing virtually everything of note that the U.S. Cryptologic System has pro-
duced. The cryptologic history publications stand out in the U.S. Intelligence
Community for their customarily impeccable honesty about the agency’s suc-
cesses and failures. In recent years, NSA has declassified and released numerous
CCH monographs, in whole or in part; in the last five years what is available in
the public domain about NSA and its operations has expanded unprecedentedly,
and these newly available CCH books and articles are the cornerstone of Aid’s
work.
That said, the author is to be applauded for his years of digging in archives
and tracking down virtually everything published in English about the NSA. No
one can fault Aid for lack of thoroughness—his basic history is clear and rings
true. If the story he recounts is not exactly untold, it should nevertheless be of
high interest to any student of modern military or diplomatic history, and there
is plenty of fodder for both lovers and haters of the agency. The reporting is not
generally acid etched, and Aid is not attempting especially to disparage the NSA
(as Tim Weiner did to the Central Intelligence Agency in his absurdly biased Leg-
acy of Ashes, 2007). The NSA saga, as handed down by CCH through Aid to the
reader, is meandering and complex.
Upon its foundation, NSA had little access to high-grade Soviet cipher sys-
tems, thanks to the compromising in 1948 of a briefly successful program
known as BOURBON by the Soviet spy Bill Weisband, who told Moscow about it.
Thereafter, NSA spent years and millions of dollars recovering from this setback,
slowly and with difficulty. Seldom during the Cold War was NSA able to provide
the timely, detailed, and high-grade intelligence on the Soviet Union that Amer-
ican and British SIGINT agencies had gathered on Germany and Japan during
World War II. The author admits that this had less to do with NSA’s shortcom-
ings than with very good Soviet encryption and communications security, in ad-
dition to persistent espionage compromisings of U.S. SIGINT programs from
the 1940s through the 1980s. What the code breakers achieved, with great effort,
was too often undone by traitors.
NSA support to American war fighters presents a similarly mixed bag. Tacti-
cal support to deployed units by national-level agencies, which is taken as a given
today in Iraq and Afghanistan, hardly existed during the Korean War and was
still in its infancy during Vietnam. Aid correctly praises NSA for its outstanding
SIGINT support to American soldiers and Marines battling insurgents in Bagh-
dad and Kandahar, but he is otherwise starkly critical of the agency’s efforts in
recent years. He paints in unduly harsh terms a “lost decade,” 1991 to 2001, when
the NSA, like so much of the Department of Defense and the intelligence com-
munity, struggled for relevance and redefinition after the Cold War victory.
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However, that portrayal is charitable and balanced compared to Aid’s depiction
of NSA’s war on terror.
According to The Secret Sentry, NSA has become a profound threat to Ameri-
can freedoms and civil liberties that, in its spare time, does SIGINT and infor-
mation assurance. This would be news to anyone who has worked in the U.S.
Cryptologic System since the mid-1970s. The overarching need to protect civil
liberties even at the expense of intelligence collection and production is hammered
into the heads of all junior analysts: “We have a frightful number of lawyers,” ex-
plained General Mike Hayden, NSA director from 1999 to 2005 (and CIA direc-
tor from 2005 to 2009) and an impressive leader and manager who is profiled
too critically in Aid’s work.
In the last chapter the book veers into current events in a polemical fashion
that is at odds with the scholarly tone that mostly prevails. There is so little avail-
able regarding supersensitive SIGINT counterterrorism operations since 9/11
(the operations are so tightly compartmented that even most NSA analysts
know little if anything about them) that any unclassified conclusions seem pre-
mature at best.
At bottom, The Secret Sentry offers a detailed, if selective, analysis of the NSA
and its coverage outside the post-9/11 era, one that is generally fair if not always
balanced. Aid seems to want to find fault with the NSA, deeming it throughout
its history as either “going deaf ” or unable to analyze the information it collects
in such abundance, or both—although he frequently offers praise for the
agency’s many intelligence successes since 1952.
This subtle bias leads to the most curious fact of this curious book. The dog
that fails to bark, here, is Aid’s own history with the NSA, a salient story that the
author fails to disclose, even though it was reported by the Washington Post in
2006. Twenty-one years earlier, Matthew Aid, as an Air Force analyst and Russian
linguist assigned to an NSA field site in the United Kingdom, was arrested,
court-martialed, and convicted of unauthorized possession of classified infor-
mation and impersonating an officer. Sergeant Aid had been taking top secret
code-word materials home with him, which earned him over a year in prison
and a dishonorable discharge. When one knows his past, the author’s detailed
understanding of SIGINT and detectable bias against NSA become less
mysterious.
While Aid’s disreputable personal history with the National Security Agency
does not discredit his scholarship, it does raise questions of agendas and mo-
tives. At a minimum, the facts ought to have been disclosed by the author. One
wonders why his publisher did not consider such a sensational backstory to have
any relevance, particularly for an author professing to reveal hidden truths.
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The Secret Sentry is a serviceable and generally readable “biography” of the
NSA, written by a determined researcher whose feelings about the agency can be
charitably described as complex. Readers, however, would be better served by re-
ferring to the original, now declassified, CCH publications from which so much
of this book is derived.
On grounds of full disclosure, this reviewer wishes to note that he too served
with the National Security Agency for nearly a decade, as an intelligence analyst
and counterintelligence officer. During my time of service I had no involvement
with the Aid case.
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PAUL JOHNSON’S BRIEF LIFE OF CHURCHILL
Henry M. Rector
Johnson, Paul. Churchill. New York: Viking, 2009. 181pp.
$24.95
Paul Johnson’s most recent biography of Winston Churchill provides a thumb-
nail sketch of the British statesman’s life and achievements. At only 166 pages of
text, it cannot do justice to the epic scope of Churchill’s roles both as a peacetime
statesman and as a war leader, but it does offer judgments, some of them in im-
plicit counterpoint to recent revisionist treatments of Churchill’s career.
Johnson writes that although Churchill, as Britain’s prime minister during
World War II, was nothing less than the savior of Britain, he was also the benefi-
ciary of certain conditions that were not of his own making. By the outbreak of
war, for example, public opinion had turned against the military “brass hats,”
whose management of World War I had taken a catastrophic toll on British lives.
This meant that despite the resentment of some military leaders, Churchill had a
relatively free hand in strategic and military matters. He also benefited from na-
tional unity. After the pacifism of the 1930s was discredited, the British people
grasped that they were in a struggle for national survival and rallied around the
prime minister and a national government, including all parties.
Churchill was personally suited to wartime leadership in ways that none of
his contemporaries could equal, and his strategic communication skills and
work ethic were unrivaled. Also, Johnson credits Churchill with personal ini-
tiative in wartime policies that were crucial to the Allied victory. First, his in-
novation and expertise in airpower enabled him to organize a crash program
for British air superiority. Second, Johnson argues that Churchill was correct
to prioritize early offensive campaigns in North Af-
rica and the Mediterranean. In addition to securing
Allied access to oil in the Middle East and eventually
removing Italy from the Axis, these campaigns di-
verted German assets and attention from the pri-
mary theater, Europe. Third, Churchill was adept
in his management of alliances. After Germany
launched Operation BARBAROSSA, Churchill did
not let his implacable hostility to Bolshevism prevent
him from forming an alliance with the Soviet Union.
Henry Rector, a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S.
Department of State, is a June 2010 graduate of the Col-
lege of Naval Warfare. He is currently serving as Deputy
Director of the State Department’s Office of Caribbean
Affairs. His previous overseas U.S. embassy postings in-
clude Timor-Leste (as Deputy Chief of Mission), Ja-
karta, Berlin, Haiti, and Copenhagen. He holds a BA in
German and French from Rhodes College and an MA in
West European studies from Indiana University, and
studied at the universities of Tübingen and Kiel in
Germany.
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And, famously, Churchill artfully cultivated President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and American amity well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. No one except
Churchill, Johnson writes, could have made these indispensable contributions
to the Allied victory, which Churchill believed to be assured upon America’s
entry into the war.
Johnson argues that Britain’s allies share blame in two matters for which
Churchill has often been criticized. The first is the air campaign against Ger-
many. He writes that Churchill pursued the bombing, including civilian targets,
enthusiastically and was supported in this wholeheartedly by the British public.
Although the bombing campaign did not significantly impair German indus-
trial output until the outcome of the war was already clear, Johnson argues, it
was nonetheless justified. This was because after the July 1943 attack on Ham-
burg the air defenses for western Germany that became necessary were provided
at the cost of air superiority on the eastern front. Johnson goes on to describe the
February 1945 bombing of Dresden as “an atrocity” but argues that Churchill
carried this out mainly in fulfillment of a commitment made to Stalin at Yalta.
Johnson also maintains that the United States shares blame for the conse-
quences of delays in launching the Normandy invasion. This delay, Churchill’s
critics argue, allowed the Red Army to advance far into Central Europe, ulti-
mately bringing those territories behind the Iron Curtain. Churchill, recalling
the failed Dardanelles expedition in World War I, was reluctant to proceed with
the invasion until he had an overwhelming force at his disposal. After D-day, the
Allies could not make up the time that assembling this force had cost, and Chur-
chill could not overcome Eisenhower’s insistence on a ponderous “broad front”
advance into Central Europe. This meant that the Red Army got to Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, and Budapest first.
Johnson has little to say about a subject that has been a focus of Churchill’s re-
visionist critics, namely, his role as architect of Britain’s special relationship with
the United States. He does note that Roosevelt was “oversuspicious of Churchill
and undersuspicious of Stalin” and offers the contrarian view that “the death of
FDR . . . came as a relief, especially as Harry S. Truman, brisk, decisive, much
better informed on strategy, proved infinitely easier to deal with.”
Of course, Churchill had already secured a place in the history of British strat-
egy and warfare before his service as prime minister in World War II. Johnson
assesses Churchill’s role in two of the most controversial episodes of his
pre–World War II career.
The first of these was the disastrous Dardanelles expedition of 1915, which
Churchill masterminded as First Lord of the Admiralty. Johnson blames the fi-
asco on the operation’s irresolute implementation by military commanders.
However, in Johnson’s account, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was the real
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villain of the piece. Asquith, already contemplating jettisoning Churchill as the
price of a new coalition government, refused to allow Churchill to assume com-
mand, as he had done during the siege of Antwerp in October 1914. Asquith was
only too eager to fire Churchill once the Dardanelles expedition turned into a
shambles.
Johnson’s take on this episode is incomplete, however. It is certainly true that
the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, was at his most erratic dur-
ing the planning for the operation and that the war minister—Field Marshal
Herbert Kitchener, Earl Kitchener—who had authority to commit ground
troops, vacillated in his support. Likewise, the in-theater commanders were in-
ept. However, Churchill should have foreseen that his plan was too daring to be
attempted without more robust backing and implementation, and this arguably
justified his dismissal.
Johnson also faults Churchill for dismissing a potential Japanese threat dur-
ing the interwar period. As chancellor of the exchequer, Churchill put the Royal
Navy on a tight budget. In an uncharacteristic lapse of imagination and insight,
Churchill made no objection when the government of David Lloyd George
allowed the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty to supersede the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, which the Japanese saw as disadvantageous. Johnson de-
scribes Churchill’s categorical rejection of any Japanese threat during these
years as a “complete mystery” and attributes British vulnerability in Asia be-
tween 1940 and 1942 directly to it. This lack of foresight ultimately led to the
sinking of two capital ships and the fall of Singapore.
Johnson reserves his greatest scorn for blunders that Churchill committed in
British domestic politics, particularly in the 1930s. Chief among these was his
impassioned, quixotic defense of Edward VIII during the abdication crisis of
1936, which culminated in Churchill’s disastrous intervention in the House of
Commons. This impaired his credibility at a time when he was about to deliver
his unwelcome, if prescient, warnings about Hitler’s ambitions.
Since Johnson’s take on Churchill’s career is not particularly original, his of-
fering differs from other biographies mainly in its brevity, and therein lies its de-
ficiency. Nevertheless, Churchill is a readable study for those who are daunted by
the overwhelming scale of other works on this twentieth-century giant.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FACES OF LEADERSHIP
Williams, Dean. Real Leadership: Helping People and Organizations Face Their Toughest Challenges. San
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2005. 296pp. $29.95
There seems to be no shortage of disap-
pointing leaders these days. Tony Hay-
ward of the BP oil well disaster, General
Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, and
our Wall Street CEOs are recent exam-
ples. The thoughtful book Real Leader-
ship offers insight into why these
accomplished leaders stumbled: their
leadership mind-sets and behaviors
were poignantly inadequate given the
situational context and complexity.
Dean Williams, of Harvard’s Kennedy
School and member of Harvard’s Cen-
ter for Public Leadership, draws from a
wide range of academic experience and
research. Many of the author’s perspec-
tives are notably influenced by Harvard
colleague Ronald Heifetz, who has writ-
ten and lectured extensively about
adaptive leadership.
Early in the book Williams introduces
the concept of “counterfeit leadership.”
Counterfeit leaders offer superficial,
quick-fix solutions for complex prob-
lems. They are prolific launchers of
“false tasks” that do little to improve
the situation, distract the organization
from facing reality, and diffuse the lead-
ers’ moral obligations. These leaders
habitually stay within their comfort
zones by relying on positional power
and factional loyalty. They sidestep the
essential work of executing meaningful
change. Counterfeit leaders are not in-
tentionally deceitful, but rather, as in
theater, they act out popular scripts to
accommodating audiences.
In contrast, “real leaders” provide wis-
dom and energy. They take responsibil-
ity for mobilizing people to confront
reality, which requires that they engage
in the tough task of provoking people
to modify their values, preferences, tra-
ditions, and priorities.
The process of Real Leadership is quite
pragmatic and demands three commit-
ments: deep understanding of reality
(“diagnostic competence”), self-
knowledge (“personal case”), and con-
stant reassessment (metaphorically
called “mirrors”). Williams places a
great deal of emphasis on thorough,
reality-centered diagnostics.
The book explains six types of specific
leadership challenges. These six catego-
ries are not meant to imply definitive
boundaries but rather to differentiate
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unique leadership situations. Each lead-
ership challenge presents a diagnostic
profile and recommends intervention
strategies. For example, one category is
called the “activist challenge.” This is a
situation where the organization refuses
to acknowledge or respond to changes
in reality though its performance or
survival depends on it.
This is an informed, well structured,
and immensely readable book about
adaptive leadership. It is pragmatic,
while providing keen perspectives and
insights. A deeper discussion of power
and authority and their influence on
adaptive leadership would have been
beneficial, but the book’s refreshing di-
versity of illustrative leadership exam-
ples is a rich contribution.
Although this work was published five
years ago, its content is still relevant
and applicable, perhaps even more than
ever, because of increasing disillusion-
ment with contemporary leadership. It
prompts us to consider critically
whether some closely held values and
assumptions are paradoxically detri-
mental. (An excellent and recent book
about adaptive leadership is The Prac-
tice of Adaptive Leadership, by Ronald
Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty
Linsky, Harvard Business Press, 2009.)
HANK KNISKERN
Naval War College
Schmitt, Gary J., ed. The Rise of China: Essays on
the Future Competition. New York: Encounter
Books, 2009. 191pp. $21.95
Gary J. Schmitt is a resident scholar at
the conservative Washington think tank
the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI), where he is also the director of
the Program on Advanced Strategic
Studies. Prior to coming to AEI he was
a member of the professional staff of
the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, serving as the committee’s
minority staff director.
As its title indicates, this edited volume
examines various facets of China’s rise
to Asian and global eminence and the
implications of that rise for established
powers, led by the United States. This
work not only performs a service by ex-
ploring the contours of Chinese power
but furnishes a barometer suggesting
how right-leaning China scholars think
about U.S. strategy toward a newly as-
sertive Beijing. This book constitutes an
excellent primer on East Asia’s future
and America’s place in the region.
Among the contributing authors are
well-known China hands like Ashley J.
Tellis (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace) and Dan Blumenthal
(AEI’s U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission). Despite the
authors’ hawkish reputations, however,
the book takes a determinedly mea-
sured tone, which constitutes one of its
most appealing traits.
Schmitt leads off by observing that it is
not the rise of China but of the People’s
Republic of China that inspires
forebodings in Asia and the West. The
swift rise of any power disturbs the ex-
isting equilibrium, making for uncer-
tainty and friction. The ascent of the
United States to world power over a
century ago gave rise to testy Anglo-
American relations for a time, before
British leaders concluded that the Royal
Navy could not maintain a squadron
in the Western Hemisphere strong
enough to overpower the armored,
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steam-driven fleet being built in Ameri-
can shipyards.
The result was a grudging British retreat
from the New World. Then as now, his-
torical, political, and cultural affinities
lubricated the gears of Anglo-American
diplomacy. If London and Washington
found it hard to manage their relations,
how much harder must the challenge be
that lies before liberal America and au-
tocratic China—how to sort out their
differences without undue rancor. The
type of regime matters. How Sino-
American relations will unfold in the
coming years is far from clear.
For me the most forward-looking and
thus most interesting chapters are con-
centrated toward the book’s end.
Schmitt, for example, examines the
prospects for multilateralism in Asia, a
region long typified by a hub-and-
spoke alliance system centered on the
United States. Schmitt downplays the
potential for an Asian NATO but main-
tains that the region is halfway to an
Asian variant of the Helsinki Accords,
which set the rules for the late Cold
War. If this is so, Asian multilateralism
could possibly enfold Beijing, fostering
regional concord. AEI demographics
expert Nicholas Eberstadt observes that
the Chinese nation is graying and that
Beijing’s one-child policy is taking its
toll on the most productive age groups.
Taken together, the essays gathered
here suggest that straight-line projec-
tions of China’s rise are apt to mislead.
This book is strongly recommended for
newcomers to China studies, as well as




Koplow, David A. Death by Moderation: The U.S.
Military’s Quest for Useable Weapons. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010. 263pp. $28.99
Death by Moderation is a focused, aca-
demic work that starts with the premise
that conditions in today’s world have
shown the limitations of increasingly
powerful weapons in achieving U.S. na-
tional goals. In response to that prob-
lem, the U.S. military is attempting to
develop weapons that are less powerful
and more accurate—and therefore
more “useable,” in the author’s words.
After several chapters that set the
stage—issues involving revolutions in
military affairs, deterrence, and the law
of armed conflict—a series of chapters
deal with particular types of usable
weapons. The author has chosen five
such weapons: precision-guided muni-
tions, low-yield nuclear weapons, smart
antipersonnel land mines, antisatellite
weapons, and nonlethal weapons. There
is also a discussion on cyber war, al-
though not in a separate chapter. The
book ends with the chapter “What to
Do about Useability,” in which Koplow
provides answers to his many questions.
The chapters begin with a scenario, ei-
ther historical or hypothetical, as a
framework for the following discussion.
Given the constraints of space, Koplow
does an excellent job of describing the
technical details of the weapons under
review. When applicable, he reviews
their actual uses in combat. He places
particular emphasis on whether or not
more usable weapons will reduce what
he calls “self-deterrence” and result in
the increased likelihood of conflict
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using such weapons. Each chapter is a
self-contained unit that ends with a sep-
arate bibliography and a list of applicable
treaties. This approach is particularly
valuable for a reader who wants to re-
view quickly only one of the subjects
covered.
The author does a good job presenting
both sides of the issues surrounding
these weapons. He clearly views these
issues from a legal, arms-control per-
spective, as opposed to that of someone
who might have actually to employ the
weapons in combat. This is hardly sur-
prising, given the author’s background.
Koplow is a professor of law at George-
town University Law Center and direc-
tor of the Center for Applied Legal
Studies. He has the added credentials of
service in both the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the Depart-
ment of Defense.
A quick look at chapter 6, on smart
antipersonnel mines, illustrates the
book’s strengths (which are major) and
its weaknesses (which are minor). The
scenario is hypothetical and involves a
country called “Kafiristan.” In my view,
such cases are less powerful than his
historical ones, such as the use of
precision-guided bombs against heavily
defended bridges in North Vietnam.
This chapter provides a useful primer
on land-mine warfare, including im-
portant definitions explaining self-
destructing, self-neutralizing, and
self-deactivating mines. It also discusses
the two current, but competing, treaties
on the subject: the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, which was signed by the
United States, and the more restrictive
1997 Ottawa Treaty, which the United
States did not sign.
Whether one agrees or not with
Koplow’s conclusions, Death by Moder-
ation is a valuable addition to the litera-
ture because it forces the reader to
think about a number of important is-




Thies, Wallace J. Why NATO Endures. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009. 321pp. $90
The study of alliances is central to our
understanding of international rela-
tions. Wallace Thies, a reputable NATO
scholar, argues that the “iron law of co-
alitions”—that alliances are formed to
resist enemies and do not outlast
them—must be rethought because of
NATO’s record-breaking performance
over the past six decades. The title, Why
NATO Endures, therefore understates
the sweeping conclusion of this concise
and readable essay.
Thies’s rhetorical technique is to docu-
ment how contemporaneous observers
have characterized six tumultuous inci-
dents in NATO’s existence as life-
threatening crises, then to evaluate with
the clarity of hindsight the alliance’s
self-healing tendencies. In each case,
NATO emerges as a stronger alliance
with improved vitality.
The analysis draws from both historical
sources and political-science research to
contrast traditional alliances with
NATO. Thies’s principal points are
both simple and profound. The Euro-
pean alliances of past centuries were cut
from different cloth than was the North
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Atlantic alliance. Early alliances seemed
designed to be transitory. There was no
need for cooperation, integration, prep-
aration, or even friendship among
Bismarckian-era allies in a multipolar
world. Offensive wars were fought for
territory and treasure. However, this
situation was turned on its head when
two superpowers developed alliance
systems in an ideological struggle where
contesting armies had thermonuclear
weapons and needed to be ready to
fight for national survival on a mo-
ment’s notice. Further, NATO’s mem-
bers were liberal democracies empow-
ered to take positions independent of
the United States on any number of is-
sues and were willing to air these differ-
ences in public.
The author’s well-informed encapsula-
tion of the six “fatal” crises that NATO
has weathered over the years provides
scholars and interested general readers
insight, perspective, and juicy anec-
dotes. The author’s technique of laying
out the problem in each case and fol-
lowing with “what actually happened”
makes for a series of intriguing and illu-
minating vignettes in diplomatic his-
tory. Watching them unfold in real
time, without the benefit of opened ar-
chives and clear hindsight, was not
nearly as satisfying or rewarding.
A second cavil with the book’s title
(and the more important one) is that it
is conclusive only in the past tense. The
book is certainly a persuasive explana-
tion as to why NATO endured. It offers
a plausible countertheory for the cre-
ation of successful and enduring alli-
ances. However, only one of the crises
addresses the post–Cold War world in
which we find ourselves today. Indeed,
many of the circumstances that
attended NATO’s creation and suste-
nance have either vanished or are erod-
ing. Its bête noire (Russia) has ceased to
be NATO’s enemy for two decades, and
the anxieties created by imminent de-
struction have been replaced by lesser
threats, such as transnational terrorism
and crime. It remains to be seen if the
“self-healing tendencies” of democra-
cies are sufficient to enable NATO to
endure in an entirely different kind of
world. The reader will benefit from




Wheeler, Winslow T., and Lawrence J. Korb. Mil-
itary Reform: An Uneven History and an Uncertain
Future. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press,
2009. 256pp. $24.95
In Military Reform, two national secu-
rity experts reflect on initiatives in-
tended to reform defense planning
across the entire enterprise. For decades
Winslow Wheeler and Lawrence Korb
have observed, studied, and partici-
pated in defense reform, gaining a
weathered perspective on the ideas,
events, and actions taken by national
security organizations within govern-
ment. This work describes the condi-
tions necessary or common in the
national security environment in cases
where individuals or institutions have
exhibited interest in reform.
Wheeler and Korb review the issues that
underpinned defense reform initiatives
over several decades. They describe the
actions of key individuals who champi-
oned reform ideas and the issues and
stakes of those who opposed or resisted.
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Each reform movement that the au-
thors study is recounted in a style like
that of a novel. Wheeler and Korb take
the time to develop reformers like char-
acters in stories. The value of this ap-
proach is that the reader gains added
insight into the people involved in these
ideas and decisions and into the impact
that their experiences, knowledge, and
personalities had on the period of
reform.
Military Reform conveys the complexity
of interests and institutions that com-
pete in national defense. Defense plan-
ning is a collaborative process that
includes the armed services and agen-
cies of the Department of Defense and
Congress. Through the use of case stud-
ies of past reform initiatives, the au-
thors capture the impact of the actions
of these organizations from the per-
spectives of organizational behavior,
process, and competing interests.
For example, chapters 2 and 3 assess the
actions and influence of key members
in Congress and the Congressional Mil-
itary Reform Caucus, as well as of the
senior leadership within the Depart-
ment of Defense in the early 1980s. The
authors’ assessment details the actions
taken to control rising acquisition costs
in several defense programs. This case
study illustrates the impact that politics
has on defense reform, the need for a
reform leader or champion, and the im-
pact that the news media can have in
amplifying reform issues.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that
the realities of the political environ-
ment can trump the actions of reform-
ers, because members of Congress are
politicians and so tend to view reform
issues as political challenges or oppor-
tunities for compromise or political
gain. Members of Congress and
congressional committees have legisla-
tive processes and oversight authority
that can significantly impact the objec-
tives and mitigate the effects of reform.
Further, though the media can amplify
issues, their tendency to focus on the
“newsworthiness” of reform issues re-
sults in a lack of “staying power.”
Defense reform is not only impacted by
Congress and the media, however.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the impact of
previous defense reviews conducted by
the Department of Defense, blue-
ribbon panels commissioned by the
executive branch, and thematic trends
such as “transformation” or the “revo-
lution in military affairs.”
The organizations within the Pentagon
possess a remarkable ability to resist
change. Senior Pentagon officials are
bureaucrats, tending to view issues and
problems either as threats to established
programs and funding sources or as op-
portunities for increases in funding.
The bureaucratic management necessi-
ties of the Department of Defense and
competition for budget and mission
lead to perceptions that reform is a
threat to the organization.
The book concludes with a description
of what defense reform is and is not, in
terms of budget, technology, and orga-
nizational behavior. This work takes a
pragmatic approach in the study of de-
fense reform, assessing the complex and
competitive nature of the reform en-
deavor within government. It is also
timely: the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review report, released by the Defense
Department in February, and the cur-
rent national security environment
both reflect several of the qualities ana-
lyzed in the book.
SEAN SULLIVAN
Naval War College
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Holwitt, Joel Ira. Execute Against Japan: The U.S.
Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine War-
fare. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,
2009. 262pp. $37.50
Joel Ira Holwitt is a lieutenant who has
just completed the Submarine Officer
Advanced Course and will soon report
to USS New Mexico (SSN 779), in
Groton, Connecticut, as navigator. This
book was his PhD dissertation at Ohio
State University, where he studied un-
der Dr. John Guilmartin. It is a serious
work that is researched in the tradition
of The Blue Sword (1982) by Dr. Mike
Vlahos, War Plan Orange (1991) by Ed-
ward Miller, and the more recent Agents
of Innovation (2008) by John Kuehn, all
of which deal with the interwar period
and the roles played by the War Plans
Division, the Naval War College, and
the General Board.
This book is an in-depth historical look
at how the United States and the U.S.
Navy’s decision-making process worked
in the run-up to Pearl Harbor. It is a
well documented and fascinating story
that brings to life some naval personali-
ties perhaps not well known to today’s
officers. Most interesting for students at
the U.S. Naval War College and naval
officers who work in today’s inter-
agency system, it is another look into
how the Navy’s leadership has func-
tioned and the constructive role that
the Naval War College has played in in-
fluencing the thinking of the leadership.
Students of history and policy too will
find this an interesting story, not only
because the German decision to imple-
ment unrestricted submarine warfare
actually was one of the major causes for
the American entry into the First World
War but also because there appears to
be no documentation indicating that
those leaders whom we would today call
the “national command authority” ever
actually participated in the decision to
implement this policy.
There exists a memorandum dated
March 1941 from Admiral Edward
Kalbfus (researched by Naval War Col-
lege faculty and students), recommend-
ing a strategy of unrestricted submarine
and aerial warfare against Japan, that
was clearly rejected by the General
Board. The report, however, was re-
tained by the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark,
and it ultimately influenced his decision
to deliver the memo to the commander
of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C.
Hart.
As a serving flag officer, I found it fasci-
nating to see how real life worked in the
run-up to the war. For example, for me
the most interesting story was how the
CNO transmitted his “commander’s in-
tent” to Admiral Hart, a most experi-
enced submariner. Stark knew that the
State Department would never consent
to unrestricted submarine warfare and
so decided against raising the issue di-
rectly before the United States entered
the war. Instead, he sent a letter to Ad-
miral Hart; Stark’s war planner, Rear
Admiral Kelly Turner, also discussed it
with Captain James Fife, another highly
respected submariner, who delivered
the information to Admiral Hart and
his staff personally in the Philippines.
There was no way that Admiral Hart
could mistake Stark’s intent. This put
Hart in a position to anticipate his or-
ders, in a way the best commanders
will. Hart sent U.S. submarines to sea,
ready for war patrol, immediately after
the initial Japanese attack.
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The other interesting aspect of this
work deals with the difference between
prewar training of our submariners and
what they actually did in combat. In a
section called “The Accidental Com-
merce Raiders,” Holwitt points out that
commanders had been conditioned by
article 22 of the London Naval Treaty—
which many thought meant that if they
torpedoed merchants without warning,
they would actually be held liable,
“hunted down and captured or sunk as
pirates.” So, according to this account,
commanders were taught to be cautious
and were essentially trained for naval
combat against high-speed, heavily ar-
mored combatants and not against
commercial shipping. The result was
that very few of the tactics eventually
used were developed before the war.
Execute Against Japan should be re-
quired reading for naval officers (espe-
cially in submarine wardrooms), as well
as for anyone interested in history, pol-
icy, or international law. Lieutenant
Holwitt has already briefed some of our
Naval War College students. His re-
search shows how and why our experi-
ence in the First World War did not
prepare us for the next one, and this is
its essential lesson. It is a lesson worth
some reflection.
REAR ADMIRAL JAMES P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVY
Naval War College
Mueller, Michael. Canaris: The Life and Death of
Hitler’s Spymaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2007. 320pp. $34.95
Who was Wilhelm Canaris? The naval
cadet from the Ruhr who rose to vice
admiral and directed the Abwehr,
German military intelligence, for nine
years remains one of the most intrigu-
ing figures in twentieth-century mili-
tary history. German journalist and
documentarian Michael Mueller unrav-
els several of the mysteries that sur-
round Canaris’s life, though many
remain.
Mueller acknowledges the shortfall. De-
spite solid research and fresh archival
material, his account “neither answers
all the questions, nor resolves all the
contradictions.” The paucity of primary
sources and the tendency of intelligence
operators habitually to brush their
tracks owe much to the circumstances
of Canaris’s arrest and execution. Only
remnants survive of Canaris’s service
diaries, discovered by investigators in
the aftermath of the 20 July 1944 plot to
assassinate Hitler.
Mueller’s narrative informs, illumi-
nates, and entertains. Canaris’s early ca-
reer at sea was marked by escapades of
derring-do in South America and
Spain. An officer of his time, Canaris
absorbed the credo of the sea service,
and it served him well. He had a clear
talent for languages and social rapport,
and his superiors noted the vitality of
his wide-ranging networks. Before long,
he became “too valuable to send to
sea.”
An astute and calculating observer,
Canaris navigated multiple career-
threatening crises that began as the de-
feated German fleet returned to Kiel in
1918. In the closing years of the
Weimar Republic, Canaris again lever-
aged his luck, evading a series of poten-
tially devastating political scandals. He
did not emerge unscathed, however; his
growing reputation made both naval of-
ficials and politicians nervous.
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If rivals watched with gimlet eyes,
Canaris’s political patrons had reason
to look the other way. He was soon en-
meshed in the government’s efforts to
circumvent the naval-armament provi-
sions of the Versailles treaty that had
ended World War I. With his interna-
tional networks delivered, Canaris won
only muted applause in Berlin.
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder was leery
of Canaris, who he feared was compro-
mised politically. Mueller acknowledges
the awkwardness between the two offi-
cers but emphasizes Raeder’s profes-
sionalism. Raeder’s own memoir
supports that judgment. Setting his
personal feelings aside, Raeder inter-
vened to elevate Canaris to the head
of the Abwehr.
At first Canaris walked the razor’s edge
between collaboration with the Nazi
regime and open resistance. The spring
of 1938 was the turning point. The cu-
mulative effect of the Blomberg and
Fritsch scandals, destroying the careers
of the war minister and the command-
ing general of the Wehrmacht, respec-
tively, was too much for an old-school
naval officer. Still in uniform, Canaris
became the heart of the opposition cir-
cle in Abwehr headquarters.
Canaris’s career-long wrangling with
his political and diplomatic counter-
parts will resonate with military intelli-
gence officers today. His death in the
bloodletting unleashed by Claus von
Stauffenberg’s failed attempt on Hitler’s
life is startling only for its accidental
nature. The real surprise is that he was
untouched until the Abwehr was dis-
solved in mid-1944.
Who was Wilhelm Canaris? A loyal ser-
vant of “the other Germany” or a
right-wing Nazi sympathizer? What
accounts for Himmler’s indulgent, even
protective, attitude toward Canaris and
his circle? The wily yet principled admi-
ral is an incomplete puzzle. However,
Mueller puts new pieces on the table,
while nudging others into place.
Readers will appreciate Muller’s abun-
dant reference notes, exhaustive bibli-
ography, and index. Sadly, the work is
marred by the absence of rigorous
copyediting and fact-checking; names
in particular suffer. But these are minor
quibbles. Mueller’s work is an impor-
tant contribution to the literature, and
the Naval Institute deserves a laurel for
bringing it to these shores.
ANTHONY D. MCIVOR
Partner, Black Swan Advisors, LLC
Harari, Yuval Noah. Special Operations in the Age
of Chivalry: 1100–1550. Suffolk, U.K.: Boydell,
2007. 224pp. $90
Yuval Noah Harari published this book
in the midst of the ongoing struggles
among the Hezbollah militia from Leb-
anon, the Palestinian Hamas militias,
and the Israeli army. These contempo-
rary events, especially the special opera-
tions undertaken by all sides, provide
the backdrop to this work. With regard
to medieval special operations, not
much has been written, and Harari en-
deavors to fill this void by focusing his
work on a general readership rather
than a strictly scholarly audience.
The title of this book is eye-catching
but immediately raises questions: What
does the author mean by “special oper-
ations,” and what is meant by “the Age
of Chivalry”? The author’s use of the
phrase, which dates back to the high
and late Middle Ages, is really nothing
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more than a literary choice. It is easy
for the reader to get distracted in the
discussion regarding the term and the
notions of chivalry and chivalric vir-
tues. Harari does not imply that the
employment of deception, guile, kid-
napping, and assassination as means of
political and military operations was
contrary to the code of conduct. Rather,
he says that they were not the normal
methods of operation but were in that
sense unconventional and therefore
special. He notes specifically that the
code of chivalry never stood in the way
of success or victory and that medieval
special operations almost always neces-
sitated foul play. This brings us to the
second and more substantial issue—
Harari’s definition of special
operations.
The author defines special operations as
combat operations that are limited in
area, size, and duration and that, rela-
tive to the resources expended, have
disproportionate strategic and political
results. Additionally, he notes, they are
by their nature covert and unconven-
tional. While covertness is a given, be-
cause a small force cannot hope to
accomplish its mission if discovered,
the concept of unconventionality causes
a problem. Not all medieval battles
were fought between two opposing
forces lined up three battalions abreast,
with a melee following a few volleys of
arrows and charges of knights. The
large, set-piece battle was in fact rela-
tively rare; the small-unit raid was more
the norm. This issue is not whether the
operations are “special” but rather
whether the examples used actually
meet a modern definition of special op-
erations. Modern special operations are
similar to Harari’s definition in that
they are designed to achieve covertly a
political or strategic end, but both the
operation and the effect are planned,
and the operations are usually carried
out, by specially trained forces, not nec-
essarily by small detachments of con-
ventional soldiers. By his less rigorous
definition, nearly all small actions could
be regarded as “special.”
Harari’s preface and first chapter,
which together account for nearly
one-third of the book, define medieval
special operations and then list a pleth-
ora of examples, such as small-unit
raids, political intrigues carried out by
military forces, assassinations, hostage
takings, kidnappings, and associated
rescues. He focuses on inland special
operations targeting infrastructure or
people or national symbols (either peo-
ple or strategic places). However, his
methodology for selecting examples is
unclear. As a result, chapter 1 is long on
examples but short on the analysis of
their impacts—the one true weakness
of the book.
Of the other cases specifically explored,
the assassination of King Conrad of Je-
rusalem by the Nizaris (Assassins) in
1192 and the destruction of the impe-
rial flour mill at Auriol by the French in
1536 are more in line with the contem-
porary definition of special operations.
These examples feature specially trained
troops executing plans that had strate-
gic and political goals and involved
limited resources. It is in these cases
that the true value of this work is
evident.
Harari successfully shifts the reader’s
attention from the glory of the large,
set-piece battle to the implications of
the actions of small forces of soldiers,
no matter whether their operations
were special or not. The author’s
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writing style is captivating, and the
book meets its stated aim of providing a
popular history of medieval special op-
erations. Harari, whether intentionally
or not, demonstrates the importance of
being able to fight hybrid wars.
MARK K. VAUGHN
Naval War College
Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the
Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap,
2009. 512pp. $35
In the Western historical imagination,
the Eastern Roman Empire, which ruled
from Constantinople (now Istanbul,
Turkey) from AD 330 until 1453, has re-
ceived mostly disdain and neglect. The
term “Byzantine” carries some negative
connotations. One dictionary defines
“byzantine” (lower-case b) as “charac-
terized by a devious and usually surrep-
titious manner of operation.” In the
often-quoted judgment of a Victorian
historian, “Its vices were the vices of
men who had ceased to be brave with-
out learning to be virtuous. . . . The his-
tory of the Empire is a monotonous
story of the intrigues of priests, eunuchs
and women, of poisonings, of conspira-
cies, of uniform ingratitude, of perpet-
ual fratricides.”
The academic study of Byzantine his-
tory, the preserve of a rather inbred
community, requires mastery of diffi-
cult medieval Greek, the intricacies of
Orthodox theology, and other esoteric
specialties. But in recent years the work
of a new generation of talented Byzan-
tinists has given us English translations
of many long-inaccessible primary
sources, including an extensive body of
military texts.
In 1976, military analyst and historian
Edward Luttwak published The Grand
Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the
First Century AD to the Third, advancing
a controversial thesis that the empire
developed a conscious and consistent
strategy of “defense in depth,” based on
lines of frontier forts, backed by re-
gional and central mobile armies.
In this new work, on the Eastern Em-
pire’s grand strategy, Luttwak explains
that after the collapse of the Western
Empire in the fifth century, Eastern em-
perors no longer enjoyed this luxury.
Faced by endless waves of nomadic
horse archers from the steppes, plus
Sassanid Persia (the persistent tradi-
tional enemy to the east), the empire
could not afford to fight decisive battles
or wars of attrition, which would only
deplete the costly, carefully trained im-
perial army. Trying to annihilate the
present enemy would only smooth the
way for the next tribe migrating out of
Central Asia. The empire’s most natural
ally was whatever tribe was stacked up
behind the horde currently assailing the
Danube frontier.
The empire developed an “operational
code” that combined shrewd diplo-
macy, careful intelligence, defensive
siege craft, and well-placed bribery,
with military force as a last resort.
When battle could not be avoided,
Byzantine generals practiced “relational
maneuver,” a style of fighting based on
insight into the strengths and weak-
nesses of each enemy.
The rise of Islam in the seventh century
represented a deadly new threat, based
on an aggressive religious ideology.
With strongly disaffected religious mi-
norities in its Syrian and North African
provinces, the empire was particularly
vulnerable. Luttwak explains how a
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succession of warrior-emperors man-
aged this threat for almost seven
centuries.
A short but sharply argued chapter,
“Leo VI and Naval Warfare,” reviews
the very limited surviving texts on
Byzantine sea power and provides a lu-
cid account of “Greek fire,” the em-
pire’s much-misunderstood “secret
weapon.”
Luttwak’s analysis is particularly sharp
on the relation of religion and state-
craft. Unlike in the medieval West,
where church and state contended bit-
terly for centuries for dominance, the
Orthodox Church was usually an inte-
gral part of the imperial order: the pa-
triarch of Constantinople was appoint-
ed by the emperor and served at his
pleasure. Orthodoxy was a source of
“cultural confidence” for Byzantine
soldiers and a practical instrument for
taming uncivilized barbarians.
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Em-
pire is a work of solid scholarship, cre-
ative imagination, and practical mili-
tary analysis. It should be of more than
antiquarian interest to those who be-
lieve that the present confrontation be-
tween Islam and the West may become
a multigenerational conflict. The em-
pire endured so long because it took
war very seriously, avoided it whenever
possible, and realistically analyzed the
cultures that surrounded it.
The book’s only weakness is its maps,
which are muddy and crudely drawn.
The reader will benefit from keeping at
hand a good historical atlas, such as the
Penguin Atlas of Medieval History.
MIKE MARKOWITZ
CNA, Alexandria, Virginia
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN NAVAL
HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the
researcher with the greatest need and who can make the optimal use of the re-
search materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives,
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles
Library. Further information on the manuscript and archival collections and
copies of the registers for specific collections are available on request from the
Head, Naval Historical Collection (e-mail: evelyn.cherpak@usnwc.edu). The re-
cipient will be a Research Fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime History
Department, which will provide administrative support during the research
visit. Submit detailed research proposal that includes a full statement of finan-
cial need and comprehensive research plan for optimal use of Naval War College
materials, curriculum vitae, at least two letters of recommendation, and relevant
background information to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval
War College Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207, if possi-
ble by 1 September 2010. For further information, contact the chair of the selec-
tion committee at hattendorfj@usnwc.edu. Employees of the U.S. Naval War
College or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not eligible for con-
sideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.
For most of recorded history, the term “reading” has referred to the process ofdecoding marks inscribed on stone or clay tablets, papyrus, linen, or paper
in order to extract the knowledge the writer was attempting to share. The link
among thought, speech, and the written word was identified by the Greek phi-
losopher Aristotle, who said, “Spoken words are the symbols of mental experi-
ence, and written words are the symbols of spoken words.” Many pages of
writing bound together into book format have been the most ubiquitous and
longest-lasting form of communication for the past thousand years. Today, how-
ever, emerging technology is providing other alternatives. While the heart of the
Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) is a library of sixty printed and
bound books that have been distributed widely throughout the fleet, other op-
tions are also available for sailors who want to participate in the program.
Audiobooks. In Aristotle’s day, “spoken words” were exchanged during one-
to-one conversations or within small groups who sat enthralled as orators and
storytellers conveyed information through the oral tradition. The ability to re-
cord and replay the human voice enabled many more people to share in a com-
mon experience. The modern audiobook utilizes voice actors (or the authors
themselves) to present its content in a highly dramatic fashion. These
audiobooks are particularly appealing to the visually impaired and to individu-
als who can listen to books while on travel. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has expressed a fondness for listening to audiobooks
during his seemingly endless travels. Many of the titles in the NPRP library are
available on prerecorded audio tapes and compact discs (which can be pur-
chased in the Navy Exchange or commercial bookstores) or can be downloaded
into MP3 players and iPods. At least twenty-two titles are currently available at
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E-books. Over the past five years, many high-tech companies have been working
to create efficient electronic devices capable of downloading and displaying the
written word. Probably best known is the Kindle, from Web giant Amazon.com,
which will download books in less than sixty seconds from virtually anywhere,
using its “Whispernet” or via a “Wi-Fi” hot spot. The Kindle will hold as many as
1,500 books in its memory, and hundreds of thousands of titles are available,
many at no charge. In July 2010, Amazon announced that for the first time it had
sold more e-books during the month than it had sold hardback books! Amazon
believes that e-book sales will soon eclipse paperback sales as well. The Reader
(from Sony Corporation) and the Nook (from Barnes & Noble) are also compet-
ing for shares of the e-book market. The latest, and perhaps the most formida-
ble, competitor is the iPad (from Apple), which performs not only as a book
reader but also as a video player, Web-surfing device, and music player. Addi-
tionally, many “smartphones” can also be used to read e-content, although their
smaller screens make extended reading difficult. As with audiobooks, over a
dozen e-book versions of NPRP titles (and thousands of other books) are avail-
able for free download on NKO, through the courtesy of the Navy General Li-
brary Program.
There are a number of pros and cons to e-books. Some readers simply miss
the feel and weight of a bound book in their hands. Printed books can be read,
underlined, and shared with friends and family members, and a collection of
beautifully bound books can create a warm and inviting personal library. On the
other hand, hundreds of e-books can be carried in one hand, and new titles are
available in a matter of minutes. E-books are often less expensive than printed
books, and they are more ecologically friendly, since no trees are felled to make
the paper, no fuel is burned moving the books from printer to bookstore to con-
sumer, and no space is taken up in the landfill when the books are no longer
needed.
Observers believe that the trend will be for e-book sales to continue to grow,
while sales of printed books will decline, but the ultimate outcome of this battle
is unclear. No one believes that the days of the printed book are numbered, as
there will likely always be readers who reject the lure of e-book technology. The
Navy Professional Reading Program promotes reading in all formats, as well as
listening to audiobooks. The real payback from reading is the knowledge and in-
creased worldview one gets from all of the books in the NPRP library. We en-
courage you to experiment with all the reading options—to borrow books from
your command library, to download them for free on NKO, or to purchase them
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in print or electronic versions for your professional library. Any way you go, you
will be a better sailor and better citizen for your efforts.
JOHN E. JACKSON
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